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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
For the last half century Canadian agriculture has 
been undergoing structural reform. Small labor intensive 
mixed semi-subsistence farms have evolved into large 
capital intensive specialized market-oriented businesses. 
Simultaneous to this farm size expansion, farm numbers have 
dwindled. Tables 1.1 through 1.4 highlight these trends. 
By altering the input configuration of agriculture, 
technological advancements have not only increased the 
quantity and quality of output produced, but have changed 
the very organization of the sector. 
Agriculture reorganization has not been peculiar to 
Canada. Rather it has been the norm in most developed 
countries.! in each case, as in Canada, technological 
innovations have been the catalyst. Mechanization, 
building design modifications, irrigation devices, 
^The USDA (1981) describes similar structural changes 
for the United States, Wormell (1978) for Great Britain, 
Weinschenck (1973) for the European Community and Ogura 
(1982) for Japan. 
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Tcible 1.1: Selected statistics reflecting technology-
adoption in Canadian agriculture^ 
Characteristics YEAR 
1971 1976 1981 1986 
Number of Farms (000) 366.1 338.6 318.4 293.1 
Ave. Farm Size (acres) 463.4 499.4 511.4 571.8 
Hired Help (weeks of 
paid labour) 
10.5 10.9 14.2 19.5 
Tractors Per Farm 1.63 1.88 2.07 2.48 
Combines Per Farm 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.54 
Swathers Per Farm 0.38 0.45 0.52 0.55 
Area Fertilized Per Farm 
(acres) 
46.8 N/A 143.6 195.2 
Area Sprayed for Insects 
and Disease Per Farm 
(acres) 
6.2 N/A 12.8 38.7 
Area Sprayed for Weeds 
and Bush Per Farm (acres) 
57.9 N/A 118.2 193.5 
^Source: Statistics Canada, 1986. 
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Table 1.2: Farm classification by size, Canada® 
Number and 
Percentage of 
Farms 
1971 
YEAR 
1976 1981 1986 
under 10 acres 14,214 
( 3.9%) 
14,095 
( 4.2%) 
16,413 
( 5.2%) 
14,679 
( 5.0%) 
10 - 69 acres 38,608 
(10.5%) 
40,573 
(12.0%) 
40,301 
(12.7%) 
35,561 
(12.1%) 
70 - 239 acres 127,544 
(34.8%) 
108,965 
(32.2%) 
99,000 
(31.1%) 
86,955 
(29.7%) 
240 - 399 acres 59,864 
(16.4%) 
52,859 
(15.6%) 
47,081 
(14.8%) 
42,799 
(14.6%) 
400 - 559 acres 35,821 
( 9.8%) 
31,571 
( 9.3%) 
27,759 
( 8.7%) 
25,193 
( 8.6%) 
560 - 759 acres 28,970 
( 7.9%) 
26,616 
( 7.9%) 
23,758 
( 7.5%) 
21,897 
( 7.5%) 
760 - 1119 acres 29,995 
( 8.2%) 
29,513 
( 8.7%) 
27,788 
( 8.7%) 
26,294 
( 9.0%) 
1120 - 1599 acres 16,753 
( 4.6%) 
17,909 
( 5.3%) 
18,283 
( 5.7%) 
18,637 
( 6.3%) 
over 1600 acres 14,341 
( 3.9%) 
16,451 
( 4.8%) 
17,978 
( 5.6%) 
21,074 
( 7.2%) 
Total 366,110 
(100.0%) 
338,552 
(100.0%) 
318,361 
(100.0%) 
293,089 
(100.0%) 
^Source: Statistics Canada, 1986. 
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Table 1.3: Agriculture capital stock value, Canada 
(Millions Current Dollars)® 
Capital Stock YEAR 
1971 1976 1981 1986 
Total Capital $ 24, 067 $ 57, 054 $130, 304 $109, 676 
Land and 
Buildings 
$ 16, 936 $ 43, 555 $103, 275 $ 80, 088 
Machinery & 
Equipment 
$ 3, 909 $ 9, 034 $ 17, 444 $ 20, 766 
^Source: Statistics Canada, 1986. 
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Table 1.4: Farm classification by structural organization, 
Canada® 
Farm Number YEAR 
1971 1976 1981 1986 
Individual or 336, 159 311, 609 293, 827 263, 244 
Family Farm" (91. 8%) (92. 0%) (92. 3%) (89. 8%) 
Partnership 21, 018 11, 832 11, 486 12, 147 
with a Written (5. 7%) (3. 5%) (3. 6%) (4. 1%) 
Agreement 
Legally Constituted 
Company 
- Family 7, 080 11, 947 10, 742 15, 091 
(1-9%) (3. 5%) (3. 4%) (5. 1%) 
- Other 911 1, 991 1, 247 1, 286 
(0. 2%) (0. 6%) (0. 4%) (0. 4%) 
Other Type 942 1, 173 1, 059 1, 321 
(0. 3%) (0. 3%) (0. 3%) (0. 5%) 
Total 366, 110 338, 552 318, 361 293, 089 
(100. 0%) (100. 0%) (100. 0%) (100. 0%) 
^Source: Statistics Canada, 1986. 
^Includes partnerships without written agreements. 
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fertilizers, pesticides, plant and animal genetic 
improvements, feed additives, and veterinary supplies have 
all served to enhance biological yields and/or land 
productivity. As these new and more capital intensive 
technologies were introduced into agriculture production 
processes, producers responded by enlarging their land 
holdings and by specializing their operations. 
Consistent with behavioral rules derived under profit 
maximization, producers increased their land input as the 
marginal physical product of land, and hence the marginal 
value product of land increased relative to its cost, and 
specialized their operations to achieve scale economies 
associated with indivisible crop specific and livestock 
specific technologies. This expansion and specialization, 
on top of capital induced higher biological yields, caused 
output per worker to mushroom. Since the agriculture labor 
force did not proportionately adjust itself downward to 
compensate for increased labor productivity, total 
agriculture production outstripped demand, causing 
commodity prices to plummet. As the commodity prices 
spiraled downward, so did the value of human resources 
employed in agriculture. 
This confluence of events gave rise to what was 
referred to in the 60s as "The Farm Problem" (Heady et al.. 
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1967). It created a disparity between the value of labor 
and land in agriculture and their value in nonagriculture. 
The disparity was evidence of an excess supply of resources 
in agriculture. Although the capital induced increases in 
the marginal physical products of labor and land had 
initially raised the marginal values of labor and land, the 
subsequent fall in commodity prices more than offset these 
marginal physical product increases, causing an overall net 
decline in marginal values. Labor resources began to 
migrate from agriculture and irreplaceable cultivatable 
land was sold into urban use. 
The remnant agriculture producers were the most 
economically efficient. These were the producers with the 
superior managerial skills and technical know-how. These 
were the producers who were the most receptive to 
technological change. These producers tried to 
counterbalance the drop in commodity prices by cutting 
their per unit costs and by expanding their output. To 
achieve further scale economies associated with 
mechanization, these producers enlarged their land holdings 
by amalgamating with the abandoned holdings of the less 
efficient producers, and by using new land reclamation 
practices to bring previously unarable land into 
cultivation. To expand their output, they increased their 
8 
productivity by adopting more and more technological 
innovations in the form of new and improved variable 
capital inputs. 
The surviving producers were so successful in their 
endeavors to increase output, total agriculture production 
continued to outstrip demand despite the lower labor base. 
As a result prices remained low and producers were 
encouraged to adopt even more technological innovations to 
realize even more cost savings and to achieve even higher 
productivity levels (Cochrane, 1958). The outcome was ever 
burgeoning supplies. Commodity markets could still not 
support all the producers, even though their number had 
been greatly reduced. As a result labor resources 
continued to be drawn from agriculture. 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
Purely from an economic efficiency view point, the 
exit of resources from agriculture does not constitute a 
public concern. Instead it can be argued that because of 
psychological perceptions concerning the intrinsic worth of 
farming as a way of life and labor market imperfections, 
labor resources have not left agriculture fast enough. The 
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migration of resources from agriculture is simply the way 
the economy is self-adjusting to restore efficiency after 
having been perturbed out of equilibrium by technological 
change. Resources are flowing to the sectors where they 
are most productive as measured by their value in that use. 
Left alone this self-adjustment process would continue 
until sufficient resources have left agriculture to restore 
parity between their marginal value in agriculture and in 
nonagriculture. However, this technology driven adjustment 
process has not been left alone. 
Governments of developed countries, for various 
reasons, have tried to halt or at least temper the 
migration of labor from agriculture. Western European 
governments and the Japanese government wanted to alleviate 
growing social unrest by halting the flow of rural people 
to already overcrowded urban areas and to prevent the 
severe food shortages experienced during WWII from ever 
reoccurring by achieving self-sufficiency (Weinschenck, 
1973; Wormell, 1978; and Ogura, 1982). North American 
governments wanted to maintain their historical comparative 
advantage in international markets and were urged by a 
nostalgic urban populace, fresh from the farm, to preserve 
the lifestyle of traditional family farms. In each 
developed country the government felt the private market 
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was not fully reflecting environmental, political, social 
and psychological positive externalities associated with 
retaining resources in agriculture. In short, the 
government felt that the private values of resources in 
agriculture underestimated their perceived social values. 
This deviation between the private and perceived 
social values of agriculture resources provided the 
motivation for government intervention. Governments 
intervened by redistributing income from consumers and 
taxpayers to agriculture producers. This income 
redistribution was accomplished by a wide array of policy 
instruments, with the policy instrument mix varying across 
commodities, time and countries (OECD, 1987a-e). 
The present global concerns are that: 1) government 
intervention in agriculture has gone beyond the point of 
mere income redistribution in many countries and is 
escalating into rampant agriculture protectionism; 2) 
government intervention is crippling many state treasuries; 
and 3) government intervention is providing uneven support 
across commodities and across countries creating huge 
inefficiencies in world production and trading patterns. 
In fact the concern about these matters has been so great 
agriculture has assumed a priority status in the ongoing 
negotiations for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
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(GATT). 
There is a consensus of opinion among member countries 
subscribing to the GATT that if added economic order is to 
be achieved in international agriculture markets, domestic 
agricultural policies and border measures can no longer be 
exempted by waivers from the GATT code. The question is 
not whether, but how to get back to trade based on 
comparative advantage rather than on the size of each 
country's treasury. Because the noneconomic pressures that 
motivated governments to intervene in their agriculture 
sectors in the first place still exist to a large extent, 
it is unrealistic to expect that countries will adopt a 
completely nonintervening attitude toward their agriculture 
sectors. With this in mind, as a second best solution, the 
call is for global decoupling of farm income subsidies and 
farm production decisions. 
It is being suggested that one way that governments 
can accomplish decoupling is to replace their production 
distortionary commodity specific policies with less 
distortionary lump sum income transfers. Although lump sum 
income transfers may still encourage higher production 
levels in a country than would occur without any government 
intervention, they should not encourage, unlike current 
commodity specific support policies, production of 
12 
commodities for which the country does not enjoy 
comparative advantage. 
As part of the GATT negotiations, Canada will be 
committed to a particular policy reform. In the past 50 
years, experience has shown that agriculture retention and 
use of resources over time can be and is influenced by the 
policies in play. Traditional trade theory states a 
country has comparative advantage in production of those 
goods which use the factors it has in greatest abundance 
most intensively. This means that the policy course Canada 
decides to pursue in the future can affect Canada's 
comparative advantage in agriculture trade by affecting 
long run primary resource availability to agriculture. 
1.3 Statement of Intent 
The purpose of this study is to compare the impacts 
two markedly different policy regimes have on Canada's long 
run resource use patterns. The policy regimes considered 
are the current commodity specific program, and a decoupled 
program that involves lump sum transfers to factors of 
production. In effect these two general policy regimes 
bound the likely outcome from the ongoing GATT 
13 
negotiations. 
The study will be conducted in the framework of the 
Canadian Agriculture Model (CAM) and the Basic Linked 
System (BLS). The CAM is just one of many models that make 
up the BLS, a comprehensive system developed by the Food 
and Agriculture Program of the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). The BLS is a recursive 
dynamic nonspatial general equilibrium world trade model 
(Fischer et al., 1988). It contains 18 national models, 
one of which is the CAM, 2 regional models and 14 more 
simplistic country grouping models. Together the 20 
national and regional models account for over 80 percent of 
world population, over 80 percent of world land base, over 
80 percent of world trade and over 80 percent of world 
agriculture production. 
The CAM provides an ideal empirical testing ground for 
studying the longer run impacts of agriculture policies on 
factor markets. Because it is a general equilibrium model, 
the CAM encompasses both the factor and commodity markets, 
simultaneously tying agriculture input demand to 
agriculture output. This link allows the factor market to 
interact with, and react to agriculture policies through 
the commodity markets. Hence, the CAM is capable of 
handling both commodity specific policies and lump sum 
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transfers in a consistent fashion. This dual capability of 
the CAM facilitates the making of a meaningful comparison 
between the effects of commodity specific policies and lump 
sum transfers on agriculture resource retention and value. 
Because the CAM can be simulated interactively with the 
other country models in the BLS, the effects of fluctuating 
domestic agriculture resource levels on Canada's 
comparative advantage can also be analyzed. Of course, as 
with all models, the CAM is only an approximation of 
reality, and hence there is always room for improvement. 
To adapt the CAM for the proposed study, revisions are made 
to both the input and policy block specifications. 
1.4 Obj ectives 
The overall purpose of this study is to analyze the 
long run implications of different agricultural policy 
regimes for resource markets. In particular the primary 
objectives are; 
1) to determine longer run agriculture factor 
retention under continued current commodity 
specific policies; 
2) to measure aggregate producer benefits generated by 
current commodity specific policies; 
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3) to determine longer run agriculture factor use 
under a decoupled policy regime which gives 
producers in aggregate, in the form of a lump sum 
transfer, equivalent benefits to what they would 
receive under a continuance of current commodity 
specific policies; and 
4) to compare and contrast the implications current 
commodity specific policies have for resource 
markets with the implications lump sum transfer 
payments would have. 
Incidental to these primary objectives, another set of 
objectives can be identified. These secondary objectives 
deserve mention as necessary prerequisites for the 
fulfillment of the primary objectives. They concern the 
refinement and extension of the CAM and are; 
5) to strengthen the theoretical underpinnings for 
intersectoral resource assignment in the CAM; 
6) to introduce the possibility for resource 
unemployment in the CAM; and 
7) to develop structural representations for select 
agricultural policies in the CAM. 
1.5 Procedures 
The first step in the present study will be to prepare 
the CAM for the policy exercise. This involves partial 
respecification of the CAM's input and policy blocks. The 
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changes to be made to the input block will provide a more 
realistic and a more theoretically consistent factor market 
representation. Currently, the CAM assigns resources to 
the agriculture and nonagriculture sectors in a somewhat ad 
hoc manner. Resources are assigned to the different 
sectors according to the profitability of agriculture 
relative to nonagriculture as indicated through sector 
prices and output. This method for resource assignment 
will be replaced with one that adheres more closely to 
micro formulations of the production decision. Explicit 
specifications for resource demands of the nonagriculture 
and agriculture sectors will be derived. These resource 
demands will be reconciled to total supply through the 
adjustment of factor rents. Reconciliation in the land and 
capital markets will require the equating of resource 
demand to resource supply. Labor demand, however, will not 
be forced to equal labor supply. Labor unemployment will 
be permitted, setting the CAM apart from most computable 
general equilibrium models. 
The changes to be made to the policy block are 
designed to provide more detail about the effects of 
selected measures, specifically supply management and 
stabilization programs, on agriculture resource use 
patterns. Currently, the CAM does not provide a formal 
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structural representation of these policies^, or for that 
matter any other agricultural policy instrument. Instead 
of stressing the mechanics of individual policies, the CAM 
concentrates on their combined effect on commodity prices. 
It determines the combined effect, as an aggregate tariff 
equivalent, using world to domestic price linkage equations 
incorporating a reduced form of the government's decision 
making process. Because this approach to policy 
representation does not let the effects of one instrument 
to be discerned from the effects of another, it will be 
dropped for the more important domestic policies. For 
these key policies, structural specification of their 
mechanics will be introduced into the CAM. 
Once the necessary revisions to the CAM have been 
completed, the next step will be to simulate the CAM in 
conjunction with the other national and regional models in 
the BLS. Three policy simulations will be conducted. In 
the first simulation all the models in the BLS will be 
simulated as is to gain estimates for agriculture resource 
use patterns in Canada under status quo policy. In the 
^There is structural representation of the dairy 
supply management program to the extent production quotas 
are imposed. Other aspects of the program, however, such 
as the dairy target price and producer direct payments, 
lack formal structural representations. 
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second siulation, all the models, except those for the 
Centrally Planned Economies, will be simulated with their 
policies dismantled to gain estimates for agriculture 
resource use patterns under multilateral trade 
liberalization. Producer benefits of the status quo policy 
course will be determined as the difference between 
producers net income between these two scenarios. In the 
third simulation all the models, except the CAM, will have 
the same policy framework as in the status quo scenario. 
The CAM will have commodity policies dismantled as for free 
trade, but will accommodate the transfer of lump sum 
payments to producers in amounts equal to the aggregate 
producer subsidy equivalent of status quo policy. 
1.6 Organization 
Chapter 2 summarizes the significant behavioral 
features of each primary factor. Chapter 3 addresses the 
question "to what extent" and "how" these features are 
incorporated in the revised input block for the CAM. 
Chapter 4 briefly surveys present Canadian agricultural 
policy, then describes its structural representation in the 
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CAM. Chapter 5 evaluates longer run agriculture factor use 
patterns under the status quo policy course and compares 
these results to those that would evolve under multilateral 
trade liberalization. Chapter 6 then explores the question 
what would happen to agriculture resource usage if all the 
producer benefits of current commodity specific policies 
were instead made to producers as lump sum transfers. 
Finally, Chapter 7 reviews the findings of this study, 
draws conclusions, and identifies areas in need of further 
research. 
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2. RESOURCE MARKETS 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of land, labor and 
capital behavioral features. Emphasis is placed on 
identifying behaviors peculiar to agriculture employment 
and presenting dominant theories on how these anomalies 
arise. 
2.2 Land Behavioral Features 
2.2.1 Farmland disappearance in the rural-urban fringe 
Land can easily be converted from agricultural use to 
nonagricultural use, but the reverse is seldom true. Once 
the concrete has been poured for commerce and industry, for 
highway and airport construction, and for residential 
housing and recreational use, the land is virtually beyond 
recall to agriculture. Land is perfectly mobile between 
the agriculture sector and the nonagriculture sector in one 
direction alone. In the other direction land is completely 
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immobile. This one way mobility is a policy concern since 
the majority of land that is moving from agriculture into 
nonagriculture use is from Classes I and II. The 
best land for cultivation also happens to be the best land 
for commercial development. 
Land mobility, which in this case is the same as 
farmland disappearance, depends on sector differences in 
land rewards. However, since the farmland owner is usually 
also the farm operator, farmland disappearance depends as 
well on sector differences in labor rewards, and on the 
demographic characteristics and psychological preferences 
of farm operators (Keene 1979). Further, farmland 
disappearance is not the same for all regions. It is 
greatest in the rural urban fringes of metropolitan areas. 
Because the rate of farmland disappearance varies by 
geographical location, farmland loss poses more of a threat 
to some agriculture industries than others. For example, 
in Canada, farm land loss poses more of a threat to fruit 
and vegetable production clustered around major cities than 
to grain production in the Prairie grasslands. 
2.2.2 Land supply as a growth factor 
Despite agriculture land absorption by nonagriculture, 
the agriculture land base has been increasing over time. 
22 
Irrigation, drainage controls, and development of improved 
chemical inputs have decreased the need for 
stammer fallowing, and have allowed marginal lands to be more 
fully integrated into agriculture use (see Table 2.1). In 
addition breeding of hardier plant varieties with shorter 
growing seasons has permitted cultivation to creep 
northwards and has expanded double cropping. But the 
reclaimed land serves only as an imperfect substitute for 
the farm land loss in rural-urban fringes. More inputs, 
implying a higher cost of production, are needed to get the 
same yield on this reclaimed land than on the original land 
base. 
2.2.3 Agricultural productive versus market value 
The market value of farmland is often greater than can 
be justified by its agriculture productive value, where 
agriculture productive value is the present value of the 
expected stream of earnings from the land in agriculture 
employment. The agricultural economics literature offers 
several explanations for this value discrepancy. While no 
one explanation can account for all the difference between 
the market value of farmland and its agriculture productive 
value, each explanation provides a partial account with its 
importance varying by geographic location and by general 
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Table 2.1: Agriculture land use in Canada^ 
000's Acres YEAR 
1971 1976 1981 1986 
Total Farm Area^ 169,664 169,082 162,815 167,607 
Improved Area 108,147 109,285 113,969 113,693 
Crops 68,765 70,038 76,518 81,993 
Summerfallow 26,741 26,984 23,974 21,002 
Pasture 10,224 10,041 10,884 8,795 
Other 2,417 2,222 2,592 1,904 
^Source: Statistics Canada, 1986. 
^In 1981 unimproved farm land in Western Canada was 
under reported. 
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economic conditions. 
One explanation is that land is a consumptive good as 
well as a factor of production. Studies which have taken 
this approach (Martin and Jeffries, 1966; Pope, 1985) 
assume the market value of a parcel of land is equal to its 
agriculture productive value plus its consumptive value. 
Other explanations are concerned with the investment value 
of land. Most hypothesize that speculators bid-up the 
price of agriculture land in the anticipation land values 
will appreciate as the nonagriculture sector increases its 
demand for land (Melichar, 1979; Castle and Hoch, 1982; 
Burt, 1986). Feldstein (1980) offers a variation on this 
theme. He hypothesizes that inflation spurs the demand for 
land as an asset holding. Inflation, by depressing the 
return of other assets such as gold and bonds, motivates 
investors to enlarge their land holdings at the expense of 
the other assets in their portfolio. 
The explanations of greatest importance for this study 
are those that attribute the value difference to 
capitalized benefits of government programs. One of the 
explanations focuses just on government programs that 
combine mandatory production controls with price supports. 
In Canada this has relevance for the supply managed dairy 
and poultry industries, particularly in the provinces where 
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production quotas are attached to farms. The theory is 
that the value of the production quota, as a license to 
produce a commodity that has a price supported above 
average total cost, is capitalized into farmland value. 
This implies that only initial quota recipients receive 
benefits from government programs combining mandatory 
production controls with price support. Capitalization of 
quota values into land prices, by raising the average total 
cost of production to the commodity price support level, 
eliminates all program benefits for future quota holders by 
eliminating economic rents. 
Technological advances aggravate the problem of quota 
rents (Chryst, 1965). Technological advances, by 
increasing output, cause more restrictive quotas to be set 
which in turn raise quota values. This increase in quota 
values becomes capitalized into land prices, increasing the 
wedge between the price of land that has quota tied to it 
and the price of land that doesn't. Further this 
capitalization process is to some extent irreversible. 
Bullock et al. (1977) show that if quotas are removed, land 
values will rarely decline to their pre-capitalized levels. 
The amount by which they decline depends upon the 
productivity of the land, and the number of viable 
alternative uses for it. 
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Herdt and Cochrane (1966) argue that all government 
price support programs are responsible for inflated 
farmland prices when technological advances are being made, 
not just the programs that combine production controls with 
price supports. Their theory is as follows: Technological 
advances decrease unit costs of production. Government 
price support programs prevent commodity prices from 
dropping correspondingly. Consequently, marginal revenues 
of individual commodity producers exceed their marginal 
cost. Individual producers react rationally and try to 
increase output. As they increase output, they increase 
land demand. The resulting competition for additional land 
input drives-up the price of land, increasing average unit 
costs, until all economic rents are dissipated. 
2.3 labor Behavioral Features 
2.3.1 Labor suppIv as a growth factor 
Total labor supply in an economy is a function of the 
economy's demographic make-up, institutional framework, and 
economic health. Ignoring immigration inflows and 
outflows, labor supply can be altered in the short run by 
altering the participation rate and/or the average hours 
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worked per labor force participant. The standard utility 
maximizing labor-leisure choice model hypothesizes that the 
short run labor supply curve is backward bending above some 
real wage rate level. This model implies that once the 
real wage rate passes beyond this crucial level, the income 
effect of a further increase in the real wage rate will 
dominate the substitution effect. 
Long run labor supply ultimately depends on the 
population growth rate. The population growth rate, in 
turn, is influenced by prevailing institutional and social 
norms such as government retirement pensions, educational 
requirements, and health service cost and availability. 
2.3.2 Labor quality 
Over time the quality of labor has been increasing. 
The income earning potential of an individual today is 
greater than it was 50 years ago. This improvement in 
quality, due to human capital formation, can be attributed 
to several factors. One of the two most readily identified 
factors is that the general populace has improved access to 
formal education and greater leisure to pursue studies. 
The second factor is that laborers have increased 
experience in working with modern technology. Skill 
acquisition comes along with this experience, and is passed 
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on from employee to employee through on the job training. 
Complementing the above two factors has been a general 
improvement in individuals' physical health due to medical 
advances. People's receptiveness to new knowledge and 
their ability to retain this knowledge is correlated with 
their physical well-being. 
2.3.3 Voluntary labor unemployment 
The most conspicuous labor market imperfection is 
unemployment. Labor unemployment can be either voluntary 
or involuntary. Voluntary unemployment is exactly what the 
name implies: workers are unemployed because they choose 
to be. Search theory (Phelps, 1970; Diamond, 1981) 
explains this choice as the natural outcome of job and 
worker heterogeneity. Jobs differ in the wages they pay, 
the training and skills required to perform them and by 
geographic location. Workers also differ. They have 
different reservation wages, different abilities and 
different location affinities. Since prospective workers 
do not have complete information about employment 
opportunities, they must job search. On receiving a job 
offer, the individual worker evaluates it according to 
wages paid, and the moving and training costs involved in 
accepting the job. Because it is difficult or even 
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impossible to hunt for jobs while employed, it is to the 
individual worker's advantage to refuse job offers until an 
attractive one is received. 
An advantage of this frictional view of unemployment 
is it can be reconciled to a Walrasian labor market 
equilibrium. So long as the number of job seekers equals 
the number of job vacancies, i.e., excess demand equals 
excess supply, the wage rate has no tendency to change, and 
equilibrium is achieved in the presence of an uncleared 
labor market (Phelps, 1970). 
2.3.4 Involmitarv labor unemployment 
Involuntary unemployment occurs when unemployed 
workers, who are willing to work for less than the going 
wage rate, can't find jobs. Its existence is more 
troublesome for standard economic theory than voluntary 
unemployment. It is contrary to the standard 
conceptualization of a Walrasian equilibrium. As a result 
of this inconsistency alternative theories have been 
advanced to justify this observed behavior of labor 
markets. 
One theory is that the labor market is simply in 
disequilibrium (Briguglio, 1984; Rosen and Quandt, 1978; 
Barro and Grossman, 1971). Involuntary unemployment is 
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just a temporary aberration that occurs while the labor 
market moves between states of rest. 
The other theories account for involuntary 
unemployment at labor market equilibrium. These theories 
can be subdivided into those which operate in a Walrasian 
equilibrium framework and those such as Negishi (1977) and 
Hahn (1978) that dismiss the Walrasian equilibrium 
framework as inappropriate, and propose nontatonnement 
equilibrating processes. 
The theories that operate in a Walrasian ecpiilibrium 
framework can be further subdivided into those that make 
use of implicit contractual arrangements between firms and 
employees and those that make use of the efficiency wage 
hypothesis. Contract theory postulates that because firms 
are less risk averse than employees, informal 
understandings arise between them on acceptable wage 
responses to changing economic circumstances (Baily, 1974; 
Azariadiz, 1975). Since these ^understandings' guarantee 
employees real wage security, the firm's only viable 
response to uncertain demand is labor input adjustment. 
The drawback to contract theory is that although it 
accounts for involuntary unemployment at equilibrium, the 
portrayed equilibrium is one with higher employment than 
would be generated in an auction market (Oswald, 1986). 
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Efficiency wage theory assumes a positive relationship 
between the wage a worker receives and the effort exerted 
on the job. Yellan (1984) states that four mutually 
compatible rationalizations of this relationship have been 
advanced in the literature: the shirking model, the labor 
turnover model, the adverse selection model, and the 
partial gift exchange model. 
The shirking model, tendered by Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984), assumes that workers dislike exerting effort 
because it reduces their utility. Because firms find it 
impossible to perfectly monitor their employees' 
performances, individual firms begin to offer wages higher 
than the market clearing rate as an incentive to their 
employees not to shirk. Unfortunately, as all firms adopt 
this practice, the wage padding, in and of itself, loses 
its effectiveness in discouraging shirking. But all is not 
lost, since the padded wages have shrunk labor demand, 
thereby creating unemployment. This induced unemployment 
serves to replace the padded wages as a work incentive. 
With unemployment, a worker knows that if he is caught 
shirking and fired, he cannot immediately gain other 
employment. While padded wages start out as a ^carrot' for 
encouraging work effort, they end up as a ^stick'. 
Equilibrium is reached when all firms find it optimal to 
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offer the same wage rate. This wage rate is necessarily 
above the market clearing rate since at full employment 
there is no incentive whatsoever for workers not to shirk. 
At full employment a worker knows that if he is fired, he 
can immediately find another job. The equilibrium 
unemployment level is that which provides a sufficient 
deterrent to workers that they are unwilling to chance 
being caught shirking. 
The major objection to this model is that seniority 
wage schemes, performance bonds and other such employment 
contracts can substitute for involuntary unemployment as 
work incentives (Carmichael, 1985). The defense given to 
this objection is the moral hazard problem (Shapiro and 
Stiglitz, 1984; 1985). Firms, under these latter schemes, 
have the incentive to declare workers shirking so they can 
either replace them with cheaper new employees or 
appropriate their bonds. Shapiro and Stiglitz argue that 
the firm's concern for its reputation can at best mitigate 
this problem, it can not solve it. 
The only real difference between the labor turnover 
model and the shirking model is the reason why firms are 
initially motivated to raise their wage offerings above 
market clearing levels. Salop (1979) hypothesizes that 
firms offer padded wages to gain their employees loyalty, 
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and thus reduce costly labor turnover. The resulting 
equilibrium of this labor turnover model is the same as 
that for the shirking model. Unemployment caused by the 
padded wages, serves to replace the padded wages as an 
incentive for long term firm-employee affiliation. 
The adverse selection model, proffered by Weiss 
(1980), posits that a worker's reservation wage is 
positively correlated with his ability. This means that if 
a firm requires workers of a certain skill standard, it has 
to pay wages that are attractive to workers of this 
standard. It is not in the firm's interest to hire workers 
who are willing to work for less than this minimum wage 
since their willingness to work indicates to the firm that 
they do not have the required skill. 
The partial gift exchange model incorporates 
sociological interplay into the economic setting. Akerlof 
(1982) states that "workers acquire sentiment for each 
other and also for the firm. As a consequence of sentiment 
for the firm, the workers acquire utility for an exchange 
of "gifts" with the firm.... On the worker's side, the 
"gift" given is work in excess of the minimum work 
standard; and on the firm's side the "gift" given is wages 
in excess of what the workers could receive if they left 
their current jobs. As a consequence of worker sentiment 
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for one another, the firm cannot deal with each worker 
individually, but must ... treat ... workers ... 
collectively. •• 
2.3.5 A o r i c u ] l a h o r  c a t e g o r i e s  
Agriculture labor falls into four different 
categories; farm operator, farm family, hired, and 
migrant. Migrant labor distinguishes itself from the other 
categories on basis of length of employment and required 
skills. Since little skill is required by migrant 
laborers, and they are employed for such brief periods, 
migrant labor is usually not considered a limiting factor 
in agriculture labor market studies, and as a result is 
typically ignored. Rather the concern focuses on how 
distinct the other three categories are from one another. 
Because hired labor wages are all that can be directly 
observed, the standard practice is to assume operator and 
family labor receive the same wage rate as the hired help, 
and to lump them together as a single input (e.g.. Weaver, 
1983; Lopez, 1980; Binswanger, 1974). The implication is 
they are perfect substitutes for each other. 
Lopez (1984) argues against this approach. He states 
that operator labor and hired labor should be treated as 
different inputs since they engage in different activities 
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on the farm. Operators perform administrative and 
entrepreneurial labor services while hired laborers perform 
more manual services. Given that this is the case, the 
question is what is the appropriate measure of return to 
operator labor. Lopez states that the appropriate measure 
is operator labor's opportunity cost, the nonagriculture 
wage rate. Tyrchniewicz and Schuh (1969) propose net farm 
income to family labor per family worker as a candidate. 
Clark and Brinkman (1984) assume farm operators receive 
hired labor wages plus a premium for their managerial 
services. They estimate the premium as 1/2 the hired wage 
rate times 1/3 the number of hours worked by both the 
operator and the hired help on the average farm. 
2.3.6 Agriculture — nonagriculture wage discrepancy 
The fact that labor returns in agriculture are below 
returns in nonagriculture is well documented. At dispute 
is the reason for the discrepancy. One explanation is that 
agriculture laborers receive sufficient satisfaction from 
the ^farming' lifestyle (i.e., from living in a rural 
community, being their own boss, working close to nature, 
etc.) to compensate them for their lower returns. In other 
words, agriculture laborers are earning psychological 
income on top of their monetary income, and if this 
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psychological income is properly commensurated, the 
measured difference between agriculture and nonagriculture 
returns would disappear. The discrepancy between the 
returns in the two sectors, however, is too large to accept 
this theory as a total explanation. 
Tweeten's (1969) labor adaptation of the Fixed Asset 
Theory (Johnson, 1956; Edwards, 1959) tries to explain the 
remaining difference between sector returns after the 
psychic income has been accounted for. This theory states 
that there is a difference between the acquisition cost of 
agriculture labor and its * salvage value'. The * salvage 
value' is the critical value for labor movement. Labor 
will only move from agriculture when its marginal value 
product in agriculture falls below its salvage value. 
Since demographic characteristics of the agriculture labor 
force, such as a high age mean and lack of formal 
education, depress agriculture workers' employment value in 
the nonagriculture sector and their * salvage value' lies 
below this nonagriculture employment value by the amount of 
psychic income they earn from farming, labor becomes 
trapped in agriculture in times of falling commodity 
prices, and overproduction results. Johnson and Pasour 
(1981) argue that this fixed asset theory is erroneous in 
its use of acquisition prices as the bench mark for optimal 
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resource determination. The appropriate measure is the 
resource's opportunity cost. When assets are valued in 
terms of their opportunity cost, the excess resource usage 
implied by the fixed asset theory becomes incompatible with 
rational producer behavior. Further the growing number of 
farmers who supplement their farm income by engaging in 
off-farm work casts doubt as to whether the employment 
value of agriculture workers in nonagriculture production 
is actually that low. The experience they gain in off-farm 
work should increase their nonagriculture employment value. 
Tweeten's preferred explanation is that a combination 
of imperfect competition, government intervention and 
imperfect information flows trap agriculture workers in the 
agriculture sector. Labor unions, as artificial 
monopsonies, preclude agriculture workers from gaining 
entry to certain industries in the nonagriculture sector. 
Government intervention in the form of minimum wage rates, 
anti-discriminatory regulations, and other regulations 
designed to protect employees, put barriers in the way of 
nonagriculture firms seeking to hire former agriculture 
workers. Finally, imperfect information dissemination on 
job availability in the nonagriculture sector retards 
agriculture workers out migration. 
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2.3.7 labor and farm proaraTng 
Labor's share of agriculture program benefits is the 
flip side of the capitalization of agriculture program 
benefits into land values. Various studies (Teigen, 1988; 
Gertel, 1985; Clark and Brinkman, 1984; Reinsel and Krenz, 
1972) have estimated that a high proportion of farm program 
benefits are capitalized into land values. This implies 
that the true long run beneficiaries are land owners, not 
farm operators. Viewed in another way, farm programs only 
service a very selective clientele, just a subset of all 
producers. The clientele must meet two requirements. 
First, they must be the farm owners as well as the farm 
operators. Second, they must be the first generation farm 
owners since the programs were initiated. Of this selected 
clientele, producers with large land holdings are favored 
over those with small land holdings. 
2.4 Capital Behavioral Features 
2.4.1 Capital heterogeneity 
Static capital heterogeneity is illustrated by noting 
that capital is a catchall for buildings, machinery and 
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equipment. Dynamic capital heterogeneity is illustrated by 
noting the changing composition of capital stock as 
conventional capital items are replaced by new innovations 
and by noting the quality improvement that distinguishes 
individual capital units of the same type across time. 
2.4.2 Asset fixity 
A long standing theory is asset fixity traps durable 
resources in agriculture, causing supply irreversibility 
and overproduction. This theory in the last decade has 
been severely attacked. Johnson and Pasour (1981), as 
reviewed in Section 2.3.6, attack the most popular 
explanation for this asset fixity, the fixed asset theory. 
Chambers and Vasavada (1983) suggest an alternative 
explanation for asset fixity. They posit the cause to be 
the uncertain decision making environment. But when they 
proceeded to test for asset fixity arising from this cause, 
they found little empirical evidence to confirm its 
existence. They conclude there is no excess capital usage 
in agriculture, except possibly on a stochastic basis. On 
average capital usage equals optimal requirements. 
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2.5 Summary 
Based on the factor market features identified in the 
previous sections, the following are plausible assumptions 
to make concerning land, labor, and capital behavior in a 
computable general equilibrium model of the agriculture and 
nonagriculture sectors : 
1) Factor supplies are not perfectly inelastic, but 
upward sloping functions of factor rents. 
2) Capital is heterogenous in composition. Individual 
units of capital differ in potential efficiency from 
one sector to the other. As a result, in aggregate, 
capital is an imperfect substitute for itself in 
different sectors. The same holds true for labor. 
3) Neither capital nor labor is perfectly mobile across 
sectors. 
4) While the absolute mobility of capital and labor is 
the same in either direction of movement among 
sectors, the absolute mobility of land is not. Land 
is unidirectional mobile towards nonagriculture. 
5) Psychological preferences and demographic 
characteristics of land owners and laborers influence 
land and labor mobility, respectively. 
6) Land is a consumption and an investment good, as well 
as a factor of production. Its market value reflects 
all these end uses. 
7) Because land supply is more inelastic than the other 
two primary factors, farm program benefits become 
capitalized into land rental rates. 
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8) New additions to labor and capital stock, 
irrespective of sector, are more efficient than those 
already employed. In contrast, new additions to land 
stock in the agriculture sector are less efficient 
than land already employed in agriculture. 
9) Voluntary and involuntary labor unemployment coexist. 
10) Labor's efficiency as a factor of production in the 
nonagriculture sector varies with the wage rate. 
Conceptually,the idea of incorporating all the above 
assumptions as maintained assumptions in the CAM is 
appealing. Practically, the ideal loses its appeal. It is 
doubtful whether the additional information this exercise 
would provide would be worth its cost in terms of manhours 
and computer expenditures needed to fully respecify and 
estimate the model, and in terms of loss of model 
interpretability. Consequently, as will be seen in the 
next chapter, only the more pertinent and more easily 
incorporated behavioral features are reflected in the 
revised input block of the CAM. 
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3. RESOURCE MARKET SPECIFICATION OF THE CAM 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the factor market specification 
of the CAM. The specification has been revised from that 
contained in earlier versions of the CAM. The revisions 
were made with the dual intent of obtaining a more 
realistic and a more theoretically consistent 
specification. Section 3.2 starts the discussion with an 
explanation of how the CAM operates and how it interacts 
with the other national and regional models within the BLS. 
An overview of the CAM's revised input block is given in 
Section 3.3. After providing this general background 
information, the chapter proceeds with a more detailed 
specification and estimation procedures description of the 
CAM's revised input block. Data sources are listed in 
Section 3.4. They are followed by equation analyses in 
Sections 3.5 through 3.7. Model validation statistics are 
presented in Section 3.8. 
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3.2 Overview of the CAM and the BLS 
The BLS is a recursive dynamic nonspatial computable 
general equilibrium world trade model system that links 
together a set of national and regional models, one of 
which is the CAM. The CAM, as is standard with all the 
other models within the BLS, consists of three blocks; an 
exchange block, a production block and a policy block. 
Commodity supply for period t is predetermined in period 
t-1. In period t, the CAM's exchange block, taking 
commodity supply as given, interacts simultaneously with 
the exchange blocks of all the other national and regional 
models of the BLS to determine world prices. World prices 
are calculated to be those for which the sum of trade 
deficits over all countries is zero. As world prices are 
determined, the CAM's exchange block is also interacting 
simultaneously with portions of the CAM's policy block to 
determine domestic prices and demand. The domestic prices 
outputed at this stage are fed into the production block. 
The production block, interacting simultaneously with the 
remaining portions of the policy block, uses the inputed 
domestic prices to determine commodity supply for period 
t+1. The solution of the production block is completely 
recursive to that of the national exchange block. Figure 
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3.1 illustrates the structure of the solution process of 
the BLS for a hypothetical two country world. Figure 3.2 
illustrates the structure of the CAM. The latter diagram 
can be viewed as an elaboration of Figure 3.1. 
3.3 Overview of the CAM's Factor Market Structure 
Three primary factors are accounted for in the CAM: 
land, labor and capital. Each factor grows at a prescribed 
rate over time, but is in fixed supply in any given year. 
All three factors constrain agriculture production, but 
only labor and capital constrain nonagriculture production. 
The technology in each sector exhibits constant returns to 
scale, allows for factor substitution in the production 
process, and accommodates technical change. 
All three factors are internationally immobile. Land 
and capital are intersectorally immobile as well. Labor is 
permitted limited movement across sectors. Workers are 
free to leave their sector of current employment, but have 
no guarantee of obtaining work in the competing sector. 
With positive probability, workers moving between sectors 
will end up in the unemployment pool. Within the 
agriculture sector itself, all three factors have 
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restricted mobility. 
Labor and capital investment are not sector specific 
in their efficiency potential. As a consequence they can 
be assigned to either sector. They are allocated to each 
sector according to input demand functions estimated for 
that sector. The labor and investment capital markets are 
assumed to achieve Walrasian equilibrium in each period in 
the sense factor rewards are the equilibrating adjustment 
mechanisms. 
The capital services available to each sector are 
assumed directly proportional to the operative capital 
stock owned by that sector. Each sector's operative 
capital stock in any given period includes investments made 
in that period plus undepreciated capital stock remaining 
from investments made in previous periods. Capital stock 
is assumed to depreciate according to a geometric decay 
pattern. Because capital investment takes on *clay' 
qualities after its initial sector assignment, capital 
rewards are allowed to vary across sectors (Jones, 1971). 
In any given year the capital rewards in the two sectors 
adjust in unison with one another until equilibrium is 
attained in the investment capital market. Equilibrium is 
attained when investment demand equals investment supply. 
Equilibrium in the labor market does not require full 
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employment. Two types of unemployment exist: voluntary 
and involuntary. Voluntary unemployment is the type 
depicted in job search theory (Phelps, 1970) and is 
captured by exploiting Okun's Law. Involuntary 
unemployment is the type depicted in efficiency wage theory 
(Stiglitz, 1976). As in the capital investment market, 
wages in the two sectors adjust with one another in any 
given year until labor market equilibrium is attained. 
Equilibrium is attained when labor demand plus unemployment 
equals labor supply. 
Labor and capital assigned to the agriculture sector 
in any given year are distributed between enterprises, 
within labor and capital mobility constraints, according to 
expected net profitability of each enterprise. The labor 
and capital allocation is not forced to equate the marginal 
value products of labor and capital, respectively, between 
the different enterprises. Although land, labor and 
capital rewards are not explicitly included when 
calculating the expected net profitability of each 
enterprise, they are implicitly included in the allocation 
decision. Grossman (1983) shows that when one or more 
factors are imperfectly mobile, factor returns are 
functions of final commodity prices and total endowments of 
each factor. Since the allocation decision within the 
49 
agriculture sector is a function of the same variables that 
theoretically determine labor and capital rewards, that is 
a function of all agriculture commodity prices and total 
availability of land, labor and capital, it is argued labor 
and capital in the agriculture sector move in response to a 
reduced form representation of their rewards. 
3.4 Presentation Organization 
Figure 3.3 presents a diagrammatic view of the CAM's 
revised production block. In this block commodity factor 
usage is calculated in three stages. Stage 1 fixes the 
total supply of each factor that is available for 
allocation. Stage 2 solves for factor rewards, allocates 
factors between sectors, determines factor unemployment and 
calculates nonagriculture production. Stage 3 takes the 
factors allocated to the agriculture sector, distributes 
them between the various agriculture commodities, and 
determines agriculture production, both total and 
individual commodity output. Specification and estimation 
results for each stage are presented in the next three 
sections. Short shrift, however, is given to stage 3 
because it is the same as in earlier model versions. More 
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detailed accounts of stage 3 can be found in Fischer et al. 
(1988) ; Frohberg and Fischer (1985); and Graham, Huff and 
Lattimore (1985). 
In the specification description of each stage, 
parameters are denoted by lower case letters with equation 
identifying subscripts. The lower case letter, v, is 
reserved to represent the disturbance term of the equation 
referenced in the attached superscript. A complete list of 
the mnemonics used in specifying the CAM is given in 
Appendix A. 
3.4.1 Data construction and source 
The national account series used to form the parameter 
estimates are from the World Tables published by the World 
Bank. The demographic series, input usage series, and most 
of the price series are from Statistics Canada and include 
both published and unpublished data. 
Sector prices are the GDP price deflators. Sector 
nominal wage rates are the annual labor compensations per 
employee in that sector. Sector nominal capital rental 
rates are derived using Hall and Jorgenson's (1967) formula 
which assumes static price expectations and the absence of 
direct taxation. That is, sector capital rental rates are 
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calculated by multiplying the implicit investment deflator 
by the sum of the capital depreciation rate and the long 
term interest rate: 
(3.1) Rt = [ I^t / It ] * [dt + it ] 
for dt = 1 - Kt / [ Kt-i + It ] 
where d is economic depreciation rate; 
i is average yield on Government 5 to 10 
year bonds; 
I is investment in constant 1970 dollars; 
is investment in current dollars; 
K is capital stock in constant 1970 
dollars; and 
R is the nominal capital rental rate. 
To get a land rental rate purged of all speculative and 
consumptive price components, and that just reflects 
agricultural worth, the land rental rate is taken to be the 
estimated shadow price of land generated from the base run 
of an earlier version of the CAM. Since this base run only 
began in 1970 and the simulated land shadow prices were 
zero for the first three years of simulation, the simulated 
shadow prices had to be extrapolated backwards from 1973 to 
1961 to get a series sufficiently long for use in 
estimation. The extrapolation was done in correspondence 
to the movement of the land rental rate series, published 
by Statistics Canada. More specifically, the same 
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percentage changes were assigned to the simulated shadow 
price series as were observed in the Statistics Canada land 
rental rate series. 
3.5 Stage One: Factor Supply Determination 
3.5.1 Specification 
3.5.1.1 Land suppIv The agriculture land base is 
the total area in crop and forage production, summerfallow 
and improved pasture. Since the growth in the land base in 
the past has been technology related, it is assumed this 
growth can continue, but at a decreasing rate as the limits 
of physical land availability are approached. To represent 
this long run concave growth trend, agriculture land supply 
(A) is specified as a linear function of the logarithm of 
time (T), as shown below in equation (3.2): 
(3.2) At = bAO + bAi*ln(Tt) + bA2*(PIGDPAt_i/PIGDPNt_i) 
(A) 
+ bA3*[(QAt-i/NAt-i)/(QNt-i/NNt-i)] + v^. 
Equation (3.2) also has embodied in its structure the 
additional assumption that actual land supply will deviate 
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from the long term growth trend in any given year according 
to the profitability of the agriculture sector relative to 
the nonagriculture sector. Two ratios are proposed as 
profitability indicators; the agriculture (PIGDPA) to 
nonagriculture (PIGDPN) price ratio and the agriculture to 
nonagriculture income parity ratio as defined by Graham, 
Huff and Lattimore (1985). The latter compares agriculture 
value added (QA) per agriculture worker (NA) to 
nonagriculture value added (QN) per nonagriculture worker 
(NN) . 
3.5.1.2 Labor supplv Labor force (L) is a 
multiple of population (POP) and the participation rate 
(PART): 
(3.3) Lt = PARTt*POPt. 
Population is a multiple of the population growth rate 
(GRPOP) and population in the previous period: 
(3.4) POPt = GRPOPt*POPt_i. 
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On the premise population growth depends primarily on 
noneconomic factors, the prediction of population growth is 
left exogenous to the model. 
A Spillman function is used to capture the populace's 
decision to participate in the labor force: 
AGEt ln(WNt_i/PNt_i) (PART) 
(3.5) PARTt = 1 - bLO*^Ll *^L2 + Vt 
Increases in either the proportion of the population aged 
16 to 45 (AGE), or the lagged real nonagriculture wage rate 
(WN/PN) are hypothesized to increase the participation 
rate. The logarithm of the real wage rate is used instead 
of its level value since increases in real wages increase 
incomes, and thereby produce a counterbalancing negative 
effect on labor force participation. Because the 
proportion of the population aged 16 to 45 is a demographic 
characteristic like the population growth rate, the 
determination of this series is also left exogenous to the 
model. 
3.5.1.3 Investment suppIv Investment supply (I) 
is specified as a multiplicative function of the previous 
year's gross domestic product (GDPCO) adjusted by the trade 
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balance (BAL) in constant dollars, the previous year's real 
rental rate for capital services in the nonagriculture 
sector (RN/PN) and the previous year's unemployment rate 
(u) : 
^11 bi2 
(3.6) It = bio*(GDPCOt-i + BALt_i) *(RN^-i/FNt-i) 
^13 (I) 
*ut_i + Vt 
The amount saved from national income for investment is 
assumed proportionately related to national income. The 
real capital rental rate serves as a proxy for the real 
interest rate. It is hypothesized that as the real 
interest rate increases, consumers are motivated to favor 
future consumption over current consumption. As consumers 
savings increase, investment necessarily increases also. 
The unemployment rate is used as a rough indicator of the 
economy's position in the business cycle. 
3.5.2 Estimation results 
Each factor supply equation was estimated using 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) under the assumption 
its additive disturbance vector is distributed multivariate 
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normal. This estimator choice was prompted by the inherent 
nonlinearity of the participation rate and investment 
equations. Except for land supply, all the equations were 
regressed using annual data for 1961 to 1981. Because 
there appeared to be a change in the land supply growth 
rate between the '60s and the '70s, '60s observations were 
not used in estimating the land supply equation. To 
partially compensate for this shortening of the regression 
period, the regression period for the land supply equation 
was extended forward to 1985. Coefficient estimates for 
the three factor supply equations are given in Table 3.1. 
The profitability indicators in the land supply 
equation did not prove to have significant explanatory 
power. As a result they were dropped from the equation, 
and the equation was reestimated. The final estimates 
portray the average annual land supply growth rate of 
having declined from 0.6% in 1971 to 0.4% in 1985. 
The estimated coefficients of the labor force 
participation rate equation imply a constant wage 
elasticity of 0.17. The estimated coefficients of the 
investment supply equation imply, calculating at the mean, 
a marginal propensity to save of 15 percent. The interest 
rate elasticity of investment is estimated to be 0.5. 
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Table 3.1: Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for the 
factor supply equations 
Land Supply^ 
Parameter Estimate 
b^o -28809 
bj^l 16956 
T-Statistic 
-23.80 
59.71 
Labour Force Participation^ 
Parameter Estimate 
b^o 2.4265 
bLi 0.0839 
bjj2 0.8447 
T-Statistic 
20.63 
3.96 
19.33 
Investment Supply** 
Parameter Estimate 
bio 3.3725 
bji 0.8331 
bj2 0.4762 
bj3 —0.1146 
T-Statistic 
0.96 
10.39 
4.22 
-2.27 
^Regression period: 1971-1985. 
^Regression period: 1961-1976. 
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3.6 Stage Two: Factor Allocation Between Sectors 
3.6.1 Specification 
3.6.1.1 Sequential optimization It is assumed 
there exists an aggregate technology for Canadian 
agriculture and an aggregate technology for Canadian 
nonagriculture that are independent of each other. It is 
further assumed the production process in each sector is 
characterized by partial materials separability (Capalbo 
and Denny, 1986), that is the primary factors are assumed 
weakly separable from intermediate inputs, but not from 
technical change. This assumption, by permitting 
sequential optimization, permits determination of value 
added and primary input demands for each sector without 
requiring determination of total output. 
3.6.1.2 Conceptual model of the efficiency wage 
hypothesis Suppose the efficiency wage hypothesis holds 
true in the nonagriculture sector. Particularly, assume 
the following; Nonagriculture value added is a function of 
the capital services and effective labor used in the 
production process. The sector's use of capital services 
is directly proportional to the amount of undepreciated 
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capital stock it owns. The sector's use of effective labor 
is related not only to the number of workers it employs, 
but also to the wages it pays. The latter follows from the 
underlying efficiency wage hypothesis which says the effort 
a worker exerts on the job is a positive function of the 
wage rate received. 
Now assume the nonagriculture production function is 
well behaved, that is it is continuous and continuously 
differentiable up to the second order, has positive first 
order partial derivatives, is concave, and is linearly 
homogenous. Under these assumptions, the decision process 
of the nonagriculture sector can be expressed as; 
(3.7) Max Z = F [ h*N, K ] - W*N - R*K 
W,N,K 
with h = h [W] such that h^>0 
where h is effort per worker; 
K is undepreciated capital stock; 
N is number of employed workers; 
R is the real capital rental rate; 
W is the real wage rate; and 
Z is profit. 
Setting the partial derivatives of this direct profit 
function equal to zero gives the following behavioral 
rules; 
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(3.8) = Fjj*N*h^ - N = 0, 
(3.9) Zjj = Fjj*h - W = 0, and 
(3.10) Zj^ = Fjç - R = 0, 
where Fjj denotes the partial derivative of the production 
function with respect to effective labor. Equation (3.9) 
can be interpreted in two ways. Noting that FN=FH*h, 
equation (3.9) is just the standard requirement that 
workers be hired until the marginal benefit of employing 
another worker equals the wage rate. The alternative 
interpretation is gained by dividing through by h to get 
equation (3.11); 
(3.11) Fh = W/h. 
Equation (3.11) expresses the requirement that the marginal 
benefit of 1 unit of effort by a worker be equal to the 
cost of obtaining that effort. Rearranging terms in 
equation (3.8) and substituting in equation (3.11) 
(3.12) hyj * W/h = 1 
gives the additional requirement that the sector choose a 
wage which will make the elasticity of effort with respect 
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to the wage rate equal to unity (Stiglitz, 1976). 
3.6.1.3 Nonacrriculture value added and primary input 
demands For analytical convenience, the nonagriculture 
value added process is represented using a Cobb-Douglas 
function exhibiting constant returns to scale and Hicks 
neutral technical change: 
aQl t>Q2 
(3.13) QNt = bQ0*exp(bQi*T)*[aQ0*(WNt-i/PNt_i) *NNt] 
Consistent with the conceptual model in the previous 
section, equation (3.13) expresses nonagriculture value 
added (QN) as a function of the capital services and 
effective labor used in the production process where the 
sector's use of capital services is assumed directly 
proportional to the amount of undepreciated capital stock 
(KN) owned, and the sector's use of effective labor is 
assumed to be the multiple of the number of workers (NN) it 
employs and the effort it induces from each worker at its 
offering wage rate (WN/PN). For analytical convenience, a 
Cobb-Douglas function is chosen to represent the effort 
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function of workers. Again for analytical convenience it 
is assumed that the exertion level of workers is a function 
of the lagged rather than the current real wage rate. This 
choice of explanatory variable can be justified to the 
extent the lagged real wage rate serves as a better 
indicator of permanent income than the current wage rate. 
It is further assumed, to permit parameter estimation, that 
the above technological relationship only holds 
stochastically and that deviations between observed and 
planned output are best described by an additive error 
term. 
The input demands for nonagriculture are derived from 
the primal set-up as the first order conditions for profit 
maximization. When these input demands are combined with 
the production function in equation (3.13) and the 
unemployment rate equation, the following simultaneous 
system results: 
(3.14) QNt = CQo*exp(bQi*T)*[(WNt-i/PNt_i)*NNt] 
w . bQ2 
where CQo=bQo*aQo 
(WN) 
(3.15) (WNt/PNt) = bQ2*QNt/NNt + v^ 
bQ2 
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(RN) 
(3.16) (RNt/PNt) = (l-bQ2)*QNt/KNt + 
^ul bu2 bu3 (u) 
(3.17) Ut = buo*Clog(QNt)] *Lt *Ut-i + vt. 
Several features should be noted about the above 
system of equations. First, the exponent, ag^, is 
constrained to the value 1 in equation (3.14) in accordance 
with the first order condition requiring the elasticity of 
effort with respect to the wage rate to be unity at the 
optimum. Second, equations (3.15) and (3.16) are just the 
standard requirements the marginal productivity of each 
input be equal to its marginal cost. For estimation 
purposes an additive error term is identified for each 
equation under the assumption the sector makes random 
errors in choosing profit maximizing input levels. The 
rationale for the unemployment rate equation specification 
is discussed below. 
3.6.1.4 Unemployment rate The unemployment rate 
specification in equation (3.17) is an approximate reduced 
form showing that unemployment reflects both sides of the 
labor market. Disturbances in either labor supply or labor 
demand will reverberate on unemployment. The influence of 
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labor supply determinants on unemployment is captured by 
using the labor force, itself, as an explanatory variable. 
The influence of labor demand determinants is captured by 
using the gross domestic product of nonagriculture as an 
explanatory variable. Assuming labor is not an inferior 
input, there should be a direct correspondence between 
output changes and labor demand changes. On the assumption 
there is a natural rate of unemployment which can not be 
completely eradicated, a logarithmic transformation of 
nonagriculture value added is used so the effect of this 
variable on unemployment will diminish as it increases in 
absolute size. The lagged dependent variable is included 
in equation (3.17) to account for unemployment persistence 
due to the business cycle. 
3.6.1.5 Intersectoral factor price linkages 
Because land, labor and capital are mobile, in at least one 
direction, between sectors, it is hypothesized that their 
reward in agriculture adjusts with their reward in 
nonagriculture. But, because this mobility is imperfect 
due to preferential and aptitudinal specificity (Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan, 1983), it is further hypothesized their 
reward in agriculture displays a certain amount of 
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stickiness. Accordingly, the agriculture wage (WA) and 
capital rental (RA) rates are expressed as multiplicative 
functions of their counterparts in nonagriculture, and 
their respective lagged values: 
bwi 
(3.18) (WAt/PNt) = bwo * (WNt/PNt) 
bw2 (WA) 
* (WAt-i/PNt-i) + v^ 
bRl 
(3.19) (RAt/PNt) = bRo * (RNt/PNt) 
bR2 (RA) 
* (RAt-i/PNt_i) + vt-
The agriculture land rental rate (TA) specification 
has two twists that distinguish it from the other 
agriculture return specifications. First, because the CAM 
does not recognize land as an input in nonagriculture 
production, the nonagriculture capital rental rate is used 
in place of the nonagriculture land rental rate under the 
assumption these two nonagriculture returns are highly 
correlated with one another. Second under the assumption 
upward pressure on the land rental rate will increase as 
land is used more intensively, the land rental rate is 
adjusted by the ratio of crop and forage area (AA) to total 
agriculture area (A); 
67 
bTi 
(3.20) (TAt/PNt) = bjo * (AAt/At) * (RNt/PNt) 
^T2 (TA) 
* (TAt-i/PNt-i) + Vt. 
On the presumption all three agriculture factor 
rewards reflect agriculture's profitability relative to 
nonagriculture, it is assumed the disturbance terms of the 
three equations are contemporaneously correlated. 
3.6.1.6 Planned agriculture primary input demands and 
production cost Agriculture producers must decide on 
aggregate primary input usage before they are certain of 
commodity and input prices. Their planned demands for 
operator labor (DNAO), hired labor (DNAH), capital 
services (DKA) and land (DAA) are derived using a dual 
approach. Under the assumption the value added function is 
linearly homogeneous, expected production cost (C®) can be 
expressed as a multiple of expected output (QA®) times 
expected unit cost (G®) where unit cost is a function of 
expected input prices and a technology index: 
(3.21) Ct = QA?*Gt[WN?/PNt,WA?/PN?,RAt/PNt,TAt/PNt,Tt] 
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The unit cost function, as expressed in equation 
(3.21), incorporates the postulate that prior to the 
beginning of a production period, when total labor 
requirements are being decided upon, operator labor and 
hired labor are not considered perfect substitutes for each 
other in a farm operation. Adopting Lopez's (1984) use, 
the price of operator labor is taken to be the 
nonagriculture wage rate, and the price of hired labor to 
be the agriculture wage rate. Note the distinction between 
operator and hired labor made here in Stage 2 is 
discontinued in Stage 3. It is assumed that once the 
production period has begun, and the total number of 
workers committed to agriculture production is fixed, 
operator labor and hired labor can substitute perfectly for 
each other in this finite time horizon if the need 
arises. 
To give the data as much voice as possible in the 
determination of an exact structure for the unit cost 
function, the unit cost function is expressed in translog 
functional form: 
e 4 
(3.22) In(Gt) = In(bGo) + H bGi*ln(Pit) + bG5*ln(Tt) 
i=l 
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4 4 
+ 0.5* 21 bGij*ln(Pit)*ln(Pjt)] 
i=l j=l 
4 
+ X bG5i*ln(Pit)*ln(Tt) 
i=l 
2 
+ 0.5*bG55*[ln(Tt)] 
e e e e 
where P^t = WN^/PN^, P2t ~ WA^/PN^, 
P3t =. RA^PN-t» and P^t = TA-t/PN^. 
The advantage of the translog functional form is its 
flexibility. It can act as a second order Taylor series 
approximation to any twice-differentiable cost function, 
and thus by implication to the true cost function 
(Christensen et al., 1973). Of course how good the 
approximation is depends on how many a priori restrictions 
are imposed and how consistent these restrictions are with 
reality. In consideration of this codicil, restrictions 
are used parsimoniously. Besides constant returns to scale 
restrictions, two other sets of restrictions are imposed. 
One set ensures symmetry, that is it ensures bGij=bQji for 
all i and j. The other set ensures linear homogeneity in 
prices by forcing; 
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(3.23) 
i=l 
bci = 1 
and 
(3.24) 
i=l 
jQij = 0 for i=l,...,5. 
By Shephard's lemma, the first logarithmic derivatives 
of the translog cost function with respect to input prices 
are the input cost shares (Mi): 
4 
(3.25) Mit = ^Gi + ^  bGij*ln(Pjt) + bG5i*ln(Tt) 
j=l 
for i = 1,...,4. 
Given estimates of expected production cost and input 
cost shares, the planned input demands can then be obtained 
by multiplying each cost share by production cost and 
dividing by the respective input price: 
(3.26) Xit = ( C® / Pit 
where Xlt=DNAOt; 
and X4t=DAAt. 
) * Mit for i=l,...4 
X2t=DNAHt; X3t=DKAt; 
To derive estimates for total cost and the individual 
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cost shares, additive disturbance terms are introduced into 
the cost function of equation (3.22) and the cost shares of 
equation (3.25) on the assumption producers make random 
errors in choosing cost minimizing input levels. The 
disturbances are assumed to be distributed multivariate 
normal and to be contemporaneously correlated across 
equations. Because the share equations are forced to sum 
to unity at each observation, the covariance structure of 
the combined five equation system is singular. As a result 
one of the share equations can be deleted without loss of 
information. With the additional assumption the 
disturbances are serially independent, it does not matter 
which equation is deleted, provided the remaining equations 
are estimated with a Maximum likelihood procedure (Berndt 
and Savin, 1975). The cost shares chosen for estimation 
with the cost function are desired operator labor, desired 
capital services and desired land. 
3.6.1.7 Market clearing identities Agriculture 
land input (AA), operator labor input (NAO) and hired labor 
input (NAH) are each assumed to equal the respective 
planned demand: 
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(3.27) AAt = DAAt 
(3.28) NAOt = DNAOt 
(3.29) NAHt = DNAHf 
As discussed below, this equivalence assumption is not 
carried over to capital services. 
Summerfallow and improved pasture area (SF) is 
calculated residually from the agriculture land market 
closing identity. It is the difference between agriculture 
land supply and the area in crop and forage production: 
(3.30) S Ft = At - AAf 
The nonagriculture work force (NN) is calculated 
residually from the labor market closing identity. It is 
equated to total labor supply (L) adjusted by the national 
employment rate (l-0.01*u) less the agriculture work force: 
(3.31) NNt = [ 1 - 0.01*Ut ]*Iit - NAOt - NAHf 
It is assumed that realized capital input does not 
always equal planned input because of time lags encountered 
in appropriating funds for major capital purchases, and in 
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making buildings and/or equipment operational after their 
purchase. In particular, an arbitrary assumption is made 
that only 30 percent of the difference between the desired 
capital stock and the stock (KA) which was bought into the 
current period can be realized within a single year. 
Agriculture investment (lA) is set equal to this amount 
plus the amount necessary to replace the depreciated 
capital of the previous year: 
(3.32) lAt = DAt*KAt_i + 0.3*[ DKAt " (1-DAt)*KAt_i ] 
Nonagriculture investment (IN) is calculated 
residually from the investment capital market closing 
identity. It is the difference between total investment 
supply (I) and agriculture investment; 
(3.33) INt = It - lAf 
Both nonagriculture (KN) and agriculture capital stock 
(KA) are equated to capital stock brought into the current 
period plus the current period's investment, all adjusted 
by the capital depreciation rate: 
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(3.34) KNt = (1-DNt) * [ KN^-i + IN^ ] 
(3.35) KAt = (1-DAt) * [ KAt-1 + ] 
3.6.2 Estimation results 
With the exception of the agriculture cost function, 
all behavioral equations of this Stage were estimated with 
annual data for 1961 to 1981 using Maximum Likelihood 
procedures. Parameter estimates for the simultaneous 
system consisting of the nonagriculture value added 
equation, the nonagriculture input demand equations and the 
unemployment equation are given in Table 3.2. To reduce 
multicollinearity problems, the nonagriculture production 
function was written in capital intensive form during 
system estimation. In comparison to earlier versions of 
the model, the nonagriculture sector is portrayed as more 
capital intensive. The output elasticity of capital is 
0.33 compared to a value of 0.24 in the earlier versions. 
In addition less emphasis is placed on Hicks neutral 
technical change. The contribution of this type of 
technical change to output is estimated at 0.7 percent per 
year compared to 4.5 percent in the earlier versions. One 
reason for the lower technical change coefficient is that 
the current structure, unlike the earlier versions. 
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Table 3.2: Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for the 
simultaneous system consisting of the 
nonagriculture value added equation, the 
nonagriculture primary input demand equations 
and the unemployment rate equation^ 
Parameter Estimate T-Statistic 
Cqo 0.6889 20.98 
bgi 0.0067 10.53 
bQ2 0.6693 250.04 
buo 2.3839 1.49 
bui -1.1208 -1.08 
bu2 0.3070 1.22 
bu3 0.4949 4.90 
^Regression period; 1961-1981. 
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implicitly accounts for embodied technical change in labor 
through the wage rate variable in the production function. 
This argument is based on the postulate the increase in the 
real wage rate over time has partly reflected an increase 
in labor quality. 
The elasticity of unemployment, eu, with respect to 
the wage rate can be calculated from the estimated 
parameters for the nonagriculture value added, the 
unemployment rate and labor force participation rate 
equations using the following formula; 
(3.36) eu = bui*bQ2/ln(QN) - bu2*ln(bL2)• 
When the parameter estimates from Table 3.2 are plugged 
into equation (3.36), the resulting estimate for eu turns 
out to be very small; only 0.01. 
On the assumption the disturbances for the 
intersectoral factor price linkages are contemporaneously 
correlated, the three linkage equations were estimated 
simultaneously as a set of equations. The parameter 
estimates are contained in Table 3.3. The intersectoral 
price transmission elasticity of wages is estimated at 0.80 
and the intersectoral price transmission elasticity of 
capital rental rates at 0.47. These estimates suggest 
11 
Table 3.3: Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for the 
intersectoral factor price linkages^ 
Agriculture Wage Rate 
Parameter Estimate 
b^Q 0.4066 
b^2 0.7992 
b^j3 0.4274 
Agriculture Capital Rental Rate 
Parameter Estimate 
bj^Q 2.8191 
bp2_ 0.4679 
b|^2 0.5246 
Agriculture Land Rental Rate 
Parameter Estimate 
bqiQ 0.5604 
b^2 0.3267 
b^2 0.4808 
T-Statistic 
4.68 
5.22 
3.15 
T-Statistic 
5.35 
6.74 
3.78 
T-Statistic 
3.45 
1.22 
2.72 
^Regression period: 1961-1981. 
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capital is more sector specific than labor. The price 
transmission elasticity for land is low at 0.33, but this 
is probably more a reflection of the quality of the 
nonagriculture capital rental rate as a proxy for the land 
rental rate than it is of lack of correlation in land 
rental rates across sectors. 
Great difficulty was encountered in estimating the 
planned agriculture cost shares and cost function. 
Although it would have been theoretically more efficient to 
estimate them together, preliminary trials indicated both 
the SHAZAM software package, which was used for all the 
other estimation, and the data were inadequate for this 
task. Although use of alternative software packages were 
able to solve the computational problem, they could not 
address the data inadequacy. As a consequence a decision 
was made to estimate the cost function recursively of the 
cost shares. Having made this decision, it was once more 
possible to employ the SHAZAM software. 
Originally a Statistics Canada published series was 
used for the land rental rate. However, use of this series 
consistently produced estimates implying a positive own-
price elasticity for land. The consumptive and speculative 
components of this series were diagnosed as the problem. 
As explained earlier, to get a series purged of 
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these land price components, the shadow price of land 
estimated in an earlier version of the CAM was adopted for 
the land rental rate between 1973 and 1981. To get values 
prior to 1973 the shadow price estimates were extrapolated 
backwards in correspondence to percentage changes in the 
Statistic Canada series. It was thought that this would be 
appropriate since the land prices were not as inflationary 
in the '60s as in the '70s. Estimation attempts, however, 
were still unsuccessful. Even restricting coefficients to 
imply the same own price elasticities that Lopez (1980) 
found did not prove fruitful. Finally, recognizing the 
land rental rate might still be the problem, a dummy 
variable, which takes the value of one prior to 1973 and 
zero thereafter when the land rental rate reflects only the 
shadow price estimates, was introduced into each share 
equation to shift the land rental rate slope parameters. 
The results of this joint estimation of the cost shares are 
reported. 
Parameter estimates are given in Table 3.4. They 
were checked for structural soundness by examining not only 
their inferences for the input demands, but also their 
inferences for the underlying cost function and production 
technology. Specifically checks were made on whether the 
implied input demands are positive and have * reasonable' 
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Table 3.4: Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for the 
agriculture input cost shares®'^ 
Variables 
Intercept 
Nonagriculture 
Wage 
Agriculture 
Wage 
Agriculture 
Capital Rent 
Agriculture 
Land Rent 
Operator 
labor 
0.22075 
(38.11) 
0.00575 
(0.57) 
0.01243 
•0.01402 
(-0.89) 
•0.00417 
(-0.56) 
Shift Variable -0.01205 
(-3.07) 
Technology 
Index 
•0.03215 
(-4.38) 
Hired 
Labor 
0.03850 
0.01243 
0.00625 
-0.01815 
-0.00053 
-0.00016 
-0.00518 
Capital 
Services 
0.32894 
(15.19) 
-0.01402 
(-0.89) 
-0.01815 
0.05560 
(2.45) 
•0.02343 
(-2.67) 
0.01374 
(3.14) 
0.09684 
(12.63) 
Land 
0.41181 
(6.39) 
-0.00417 
(-0.56) 
-0.00053 
-0.02343 
(-2.67) 
0.02813 
(9.75) 
-0.00153 
(-1.01) 
•0.05951 
(-10.27) 
^T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the 
parameter estimates. 
^Regression period; 1961-1981. 
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price elasticities, whether the implied cost function is 
concave in input prices and has *reasonable' Allen partial 
elasticities of substitution, and whether the implied 
production technology reflects *reasonable ' factor 
augmenting technical change. 
Since factor prices and the total production cost are 
always positive, the implied input demands can be tested 
for positivity by examining whether the fitted cost shares 
are positive at each observation. The two fitted labor 
cost shares and the fitted capital cost share are positive 
at each observation. The fitted land cost share is 
positive only for observations after 1972. Since failure 
of this positivity test corresponds with the structural 
shift embedded in the land rental rate coefficients, it is 
not necessary to reject all the estimated parameters, just 
the estimated parameters for the shift variable, 
D6172*ln(TA). Because the estimated structure for the time 
period prior to 1973 has to be rejected along with the 
estimated parameters for the shift variable, the rest of 
the checks are just conducted over 1973 to 1981 
observations. 
The implied cost function can be checked for concavity 
in input prices by examining if the Hessian matrix is 
negative semi-definite at each observation. Concavity is 
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satisfied. 
The parameter estimates for the trend variables are 
statistically significant and their signs suggest technical 
change has been labor saving, capital using and land 
saving. This technology portrayal is consistent with 
conventional belief. 
The Allen partial elasticities of substitution for the 
translog cost function are; 
2 2 
(3.37) AESii = [ bgii + Mi - Mi ] / Mi 
and 
(3.38) AESij = [ bgij + Mi*Mj ] / [ Mi*Mj ] for ifj. 
Allen (1938) showed input demand price elasticities to be 
related to the Allen partial elasticities of substitution 
in the following manner: 
(3.39) Eij = Mj * AESij. 
Mean values of the Allen partial elasticities of 
substitution and the input demand price elasticities 
estimates are given in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. 
According to these values, operator labor is more own price 
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Table 3.5: Estimates of the Allen partial elasticities of 
substitution for the primary input demands of 
agriculture® 
Operator 
Labor 
Hired 
Labor 
Capital 
Services 
Land 
Operator 
Labour 
-8.12 
Hired 
Labour 
7.34 -33.19 
Capital 
Services 
0.83 -0.15 -0.16 
Land 0.37 0.59 0.82 -7.3 
^Reported values are the means of the estimates 
between 1973 and 1981. 
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Tcible 3.6: Estimates of the price elasticities for the 
primary input demands of agriculture® 
Elasticity of 
Operator 
labor 
Hired 
Labor 
Capital 
Services 
Land 
With Resoect To 
Nonagriculture 
Wage 
-0.8354 0.1407 -0.6649 -0.0298 
Agriculture 
Wage 
0.7395 -0.6627 -0.1200 0.0432 
Agriculture 
Capital Rent 
0.0913 -0.0025 -0.1297 0.0580 
Agriculture 
Land Rent 
0.0458 0.0122 0.6542 -0.5042 
^Reported values are the means of the estimates 
between 1973 and 1981. 
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elastic than is hired labor, and both categories of labor 
are more own price elastic than capital services and land. 
The estimated value of -0.84 for operator own price 
elasticity is similar to Lopez's (1980) estimate of -0.90. 
The estimated values for capital services and land, 
however, deviate from Lopez's estimates. The own price 
elasticity of capital is estimated to be -0.13 compared to 
Lopez's -0.41, and the own price elasticity of land is 
estimated to be -0.50 compared to Lopez's -0.36. The AES 
estimates imply all the primary inputs are substitutes for 
each other except hired labor and capital services. The 
AES of -0.15 combined with the cross price elasticity of 
-0.12 for capital services with respect to the agriculture 
wage rate and the cross price elasticity of 0.00 for hired 
labor with respect to the capital rental rate suggest that 
while hired labor is regarded as a complement to capital, 
the reverse is not true. Note the finding that operator 
labor and hired labor are substitutes for each other 
contrasts to the finding of Lopez (1984). 
On the strength of the above checks and tests, all the 
parameter estimates, except those for the shift variable, 
are deemed reasonable and structurally sound for the time 
horizon after 1972. As a result they were accepted for use 
in the CAM's revised input block. However, this acceptance 
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is with reservation because of the lack of rigor employed 
in their estimation. 
The translog cost function was regressed over 1973 to 
1981 observations with all the parameter estimates obtained 
from the joint estimation of the cost share equations 
imposed to get estimates for the three remaining unknown 
coefficients: bgo, t»G5' b^gg. The estimates for bgg 
and be55 were not statistically significant from zero. The 
estimate for bgQ was 4.95. 
3.7 Stage Three: Factor Allocation Within Agriculture 
Agriculture's share of the primary resources is 
distributed to the different commodities in Stage 3 via the 
following nonlinear programming model: 
10 
(3.40) Max Zt = -EI VAit*Yit*Ait 
Kit,Nit i=l 
bii (b2i-bli) 
(3.41) with Alt = ^it * Kit * Nit 
(bsi-bii) 
(3.42) ait = b3i*exp(b4i*T)*KAt 
(l-b5i-(b2i-bii)) 
*(NAOt+NAHt) 
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(3.43) bii + (b2i - bii) < 1 
(3.44) bsi + (1 - bsi) = 1 
7 10 
(3.45) such that ST Ait + Z. gi*Ait - AAt < 0 
i=l i=8 
10 
(3.46) SZ. Nit - (NAOt + NAHt ) < 0 
i=l 
10 
(3.47) ^ Kit - KA < 0 
i=l 
(3.48) Kit > 0.7*Kit_i for i=l,...,7 
(3.49) Kit > 0.9*Kit-i for i=8,...,10 
(3.50) (Nit/Kit)^ 0.8*(Nit_i/Kit-i) 
for i=l,...,10 
where i=l is wheat, i=3 is coarse grains, 
i=4 is oilseed meal, i=5 is other food of 
crop origin; i=6 is nonfood items of crop 
origin, i=7 is fruit, i=8 is pork, poultry 
and eggs, i=9 is beef cattle, and 
i=l0 is dairy cattle. 
As shown, the factors are distributed, within availability, 
substitutability and mobility constraints, to maximize 
expected short run profit (Z) of the whole agriculture 
sector. Expected short run profit of the whole agriculture 
sector is calculated in equation (3.40) as the simple 
summation over all agriculture commodities of commodity 
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output times producers expectations of government assisted 
unit value added (VAi). Chapter 4 describes in detail how 
government assisted unit value added is determined for each 
commodity. Briefly, it equals the market return plus all 
direct payments made to producers by the government in 
association with that commodity less variable cost. Output 
equals yield (Yi) per unit of production times the number 
(Ai) of units produced. 
Equation (3.41) posits a Cobb-Douglas relationship 
between the number of units of each commodity produced and 
the amount of capital and labor used in the production 
process. Although the whole agriculture sector exhibits 
constant returns to scale with respect to capital and labor 
input, any one particular commodity exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale with respect to the capital and labor 
devoted exclusively to that commodity. The parameter h2± 
defines the returns to scale of commodity i. The parameter 
bii is the elasticity of commodity i with respect to own 
capital input. The parameter b^^ captures Hicks neutral 
technical change. Finally the parameter bg^ determines how 
changes in total capital and labor allowance for 
agriculture will shift the isoquant of the production 
function for commodity i. 
Equations (3.45) to (3.47) are availability 
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constraints and just ensure that the amount of land (A^), 
labor (Nj[) and capital (K^) employed in the production of 
each commodity will not exceed, when totaled, the maximum 
amount available to the sector. Note, equation (3.45) 
recognizes a certain quantity of land (g^) must be put 
aside for forage production to meet roughage requirements 
for producing each animal unit of type i. Equations (3.48) 
and (3.49) are mobility constraints on capital recognizing 
most capital items employed in agriculture are commodity 
specific. Capital goods employed in livestock production 
are assumed to be less flexible than those employed in crop 
production. No more than 30 percent of the capital used in 
crop enterprises and no more than 10 percent of the capital 
used in livestock enterprises can be switched between 
enterprises in any two consecutive years. Equation (3.50) 
is a substitutability constraint. In recognition that a 
large change in the ratio of labor to capital usage across 
any two consecutive years implies unlikely radical 
technology changes in the production of a commodity, labor 
usage is restrained so that the labor-capital ratio in the 
current year is at least 80 percent of the labor-capital 
ratio in the previous year. 
Table 3.7 gives the parameter estimates contained in 
the CAM for the individual commodity production functions. 
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Table 3.7: Parameter estimates for the agriculture 
commodity production functions® 
bli b2i 
Parcimeters 
b3i b4i b5i 
Commodiv 
Wheat 0. 2497 0. 2694 512.7 0. 010 0. 5568 
Coarse Grains 0. 1865 0. 2081 480.0 0. 010 0. 5000 
Oilseed Meal 0. 1919 0. 2000 130.0 0. 000 0. 5000 
Other Food of 
Crop Origin 
0. 1811 0. 2216 46.77 0. 002 0. 5730 
Nonfood Items of 
Crop Origin 
0. 0629 0. 2000 2.49 0. 002 0. 7402 
Fruit 0. 1603 0. 2002 14.23 0. 000 0. 3969 
Pork, Poultry 
& Eggs 
0. 2274 0. 2587 4.74 0. 000 0 .9076 
Bovine & Ovine 
Meats 
0. 2202 0. 3034 h 
o
 -0. 005 0 .7000 
Dairy Products 0. 3445 0. 4420 h 
h
 
o
 0. 000 0 .4659 
^Source; Frohberg and Fischer, 1985. 
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Frohberg and Fischer (1985) describe the iterative 
procedure used to derive these estimates. 
3.8 Model Validation 
Table 3.8 presents the simulation model determining 
resource supply and intersectoral allocation in the CAM. 
The form of some equations in this simulation model differs 
slightly from what was estimated. Changes were made in 
select equations for three reasons. The first reason was 
to calibrate model output. In some equations it was 
necessary to realign the intercept or scaling parameter 
because simulated values of explanatory variables, 
exogenous to the input block, but endogenous to the rest of 
the model, were of slightly different magnitude than the 
actual values used for estimation. 
The second reason was to reduce computation time and 
cost. Solution of the BLS is very computer intensive. So 
computation time would not be unduly escalated with the 
incorporation of this new input block segment for the CAM, 
the system of equations was made completely recursive by 
using lagged rather than current values for endogenous 
variables appearing on the right hand side of some 
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Table 3.8: Simulation set-up for intersectoral factor 
allocation in the 
Land Supply 
At = -28809 + 16956*ln(Tt) 
Population 
POPt = GRPOPt * POPt-i 
Labor Participation 
AGE^ log(WNt—i/PN^—i) 
PARTt = 1 - 2.43*0.0839 *0.845 
Labor Supply 
Lt = PARTt * POPt 
Investment Supply 
0.833 0.476 
It = 3.12*(GDPCOt_i+BALt-i) *(RNt_i/PNt_i) 
-0.115 
*Ut-i 
Expected Agriculture Output 
Qt = 1.03*[(QAt-i + QAt-2 + QAt_3)/3] 
0.1 
*(PIGDPAt-i/PIGDPNt-i) 
^Equations are written with 3 significant digit 
accuracy. 
^Equations are written so that the normalization 
variable appears on the RHS of the expression. 
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Table 3.8 (Continued) 
Planned Agriculture Production Cost 
Ct = exp { 1.56 + ln(QAt)+0.221*ln(WNt_i/PNt_i) + 0.0385 
*ln(WAt_i/PNt-.i) + 0.4237*ln(RAt-i/PNt_i) + 0.412 
2 
*ln(TAt-i/PNt-i) + 0.00288*[In(WNt-i/PNt-i)] + 0.00313 
2 2 
*[ln(WAt-i/PNt_i) ] + 0.0278*[ln(RAt_i/PN-t-i) ] + 0.0141 
2 
*[ln(TAt-i/PNt-i)] + 0.0124*ln(WNt_i/PNt-i)*ln(WAt_i 
/PNt_i) - 0.014 0*ln(WNt-i/PNt-i)*ln(RAt_i/PNt-i) 
- 0.00417*ln(WNt_i/PNt_i)*ln(TAt_i/PNt-i) - 0.0322 
*ln(WNt_i/PNt-i)*ln(Tt) - 0.0182*ln(WAt-i/PNt-i) 
*ln(RAt-i/PNt_i) - 0.000532*ln(WAt_i/PNt-i)*ln(TAt-i 
/PNt-i) - 0.00518*ln(WAt_i/PNt-i)*ln(Tt) - 0.0234 
* ln(RAt-l/PNt_i)*ln(TAt-i/PNt-i) + 0.0968*ln(RAt-i 
/PNt_i)*ln(Tt) - 0.0595*ln(TAt_i/PNt_i)*ln(Tt) } 
Planned Crop & Forage Area 
DAAt = [Ct/(TAt_i/PNt-i)] * [0.412 - 0.00417*ln(WNt_i 
/PNt_i) - 0.000532*ln(WAt_i/PNt-i) - 0.0234 
*ln(RAt-l/PNt_i) + 0.0281*ln(TAt-l/PNt-i) 
- 0.0595*ln(Tt)] 
Crop & Forage Area 
AAt = Min { DAA-t", A^ ) 
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Table 3.8 (Continued) 
Summerfallow & Pasture 
SFt = At - AAt 
Planned Agriculture Operator Labor 
DNAOt = [Ct/(WNt-i/PNt-i)] * [0.221 + 0.00575*ln(WNt-1 
/PNt_i) + 0.0124*ln(WAt-l/PNt-i) - 0.0140*ln(RAt-l 
/PNt_i) - 0.00417*ln(TAt-l/PNt-i) - 0.0322*ln(Tt)] 
Agriculture Operator Labor 
NAOt = DNAOt 
Planned Agriculture Hired Labor 
DNAHt = [Ct/(WAt-i/PNt_i] * [0.0585 + 0.0124*ln(WNt_i 
/PNt-i) + 0.00625*ln(WAt-i/PNt_i) - 0.0182 
*ln(RAt-i/PNt_i) - 0.000532*ln(TAt_i/PNt-i) 
- 0.00518*ln(Tt)] 
Agriculture Hired Labor 
NAHt = DNAHt 
Agriculture Labor 
NAt = NAOt + NAHt 
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Tcible 3.8 (Continued) 
Planned Agriculture Capital 
DKAt = [Ct/(RAt-i/PNt-i] * [0.427 - 0.0140*ln(WNt-i/PNt-i) 
- 0.0182*ln(WAt_i/PNt_i) + 0.0556*ln(RAt-i/PNt_i) 
- 0.0234*ln(TAt-i/PNt_i) + 0.0968*ln(T^)] 
Agriculture Investment 
lAt = DA*KAt_i + 0.3*[DKAt-(l-DA)*KAt-i] 
Agriculture Capital 
KAt = (1-DAt) * [KAt-i + lAt] 
Unemployment Rate 
-1.12 0.307 0.495 
Ut = 2.38*(ln(QNt_i)) *Lt *Ut_i 
Nonagriculture Labor 
NNt = Lt*(l-0.01*ut) - NAt 
Nonagriculture Investment 
INt = It - lAt 
Nonagriculture Capital 
KNt = (1-DNt) * [KNt_i + INt] 
Table 3.8 (Continued) 
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Nonaariculture Value Added 
0 . 669 
QNt = 0.689 * exp(0.00666*Tt) * [(WNt_i/PNt_i)*NNt] 
0.331 
* KNt 
Nonaariculture Waae Rate 
WNt = PNt * [0.669 * QNt/NNt] 
Nonaariculture Capital Rental Rate 
RNt = PNt * [0.331 * QNt/KNt] 
Aariculture Wage Rate 
0.799 s 0.427 
WAt = PNt * [0.407*(WNt/PNt) * (WAt-i/PNt-i) ] 
Agriculture Capital Rental Rate 
0.468 s 0.525 
RAt = PNt * [2.82*(RNt/PNt) *(RAt_i/PNt) 
Aariculture Land Rental Rate 
0.317 
TAt = PNt * [0.560 * (AAt/At) * (RNt/PNt) 
0.481 
* (TAt-i/PNt_i) ] 
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equations. The equations affected were the unemployment 
equation and the agriculture production cost and input 
demand equations. Table 3.9 shows the resulting recursive 
structure of the system of equations. 
Note the replacement of current endogenous variables 
with lagged endogenous in the planned agriculture 
production cost and input demand equations is tantamount to 
making the assumption agriculture producers in the 
simulation model have extrapolative expectations. Because 
factor rents do not fluctuate widely from one year to the 
next, agriculture producers were given naive expectations 
about factor rents. It was assumed producers take the 
current period values for factor rents as their 
expectations for the succeeding period. In contrast 
producers were given more sophisticated extrapolative 
expectations about agriculture output. The reason for 
doing so was because output does vary widely from one year 
to the next as a result of weather shocks. It was assumed 
producers use for their output expectation (QA®) a three 
year moving average of past output levels multiplied by the 
long term average growth rate all adjusted by the current 
price ratio between agriculture and nonagriculture: 
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Table 3.9; Recursive stiructure for intersectoral factor 
allocation in the CAM 
EQUATION NUMBER^ 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
ENDOGENOUS 
AX XX 
POP X X 
PART X X 
L X XX 
IX X 
C X 
DAA X X 
AA XX 
SF X 
DNAO X X 
NAO X X 
DNAH X X 
NAH X X 
NA XX 
U XX 
N N  X X X  
DKA X X 
l A  X X X  
KA X 
IN XX 
^Equations; 1) Land supply? 2) Population; 3) Labor 
participation; 4) Labor force; 5) Investment supply; 
6) Agriculture Production Cost; 7) Planned crop & forage 
area; 8) Crop & forage area; 9) Suimnerfallow; 10) Planned 
operator labor; 11) Operator labor; 12) Planned hired 
labor; 13) Hired labor; 14) Agriculture Employed; 
15) Unemployed; 16) Nonagriculture employed; 17) Planned 
agriculture capital; 18) Agriculture investment; 
19) Agriculture capital; 20) Nonagriculture investment; 
21) Nonagriculture capital; 22) Nonagriculture production; 
23) Nonagriculture wage; 24) Nonagriculture capital rent; 
25) Agriculture wage; 26) Agriculture capital rent; 
27) Agriculture land rent. 
Table 3.9 (Continued) 
99 
EQUATION NUMBER® 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
ENDOGENOUS 
K N  X X X  
Q N  X X X  
WN XX 
R N  X X X  
WA X 
RA X 
TA X 
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(3.46) QAt = 1.03 * [(QAt_i + QAt-i + QAt-s) / 3] 
0.1 (OA®) 
* (PIGDPAt_i/PIGDPNt_l) + Vt. 
The price ratio serves as an indicator of the profitability 
of agriculture production relative to nonagriculture 
production. 
The third reason for making equation changes in the 
simulation model was to enforce structural integrity. 
Theoretically the shadow prices of land, labor and capital 
outputed from the resource allocation optimizing model of 
Stage 3 should equal their market value. To ensure that 
simulated market price movements do not diverge from the 
estimated shadow price movements, the estimated shadow 
prices are used in place of the lagged market prices in the 
agriculture factor rent equations. 
The model in Table 3.8 was simulated both in a stand 
alone run and in conjunction with the entire BLS in a 
linked run to determine strengths and weaknesses in its 
structure. Intra- and post-sample simulation summary 
statistics are presented in Table 3.10. Surprisingly, the 
investment and capital specifications perform better as 
part of the whole CAM and BLS than on their own. The 
revised input structure appears to have some difficulty in 
dealing with hired agriculture labor. Part of the reason 
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Table 3.10: RMS percent errors of selected variables from 
the stand alone and linked simulations of the 
CAM's revised input block 
Intra-Sample^ Post-Sample^ 
Stand Alone Linked Stand Alone Linked 
A 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.3 
AA 4.9 10.6 5.6 17.6 
COST 11.2 16.0 14.8 16.1 
I 5.6 4.1 11.5 7.0 
lA 21.7 5.2 30.6 38.5 
IN 5.7 4.3 12.4 6.8 
KA 8.3 1.3 2.9 3.8 
KN 1.1 1.1 3.2 1.6 
L 1.8 1.6 2.4 3.0 
NA 8.7 8.7 22.2 12.9 
NAH 27.5 35.5 18.4 34.0 
NAO 10.0 9.7 24.2 2.9 
NN 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 
PART 1.8 1.6 2.4 2.9 
QN 2.9 3.2 2.2 1.8 
RA/PN 14.8 18.2 14.3 21.3 
RN/PN 13.1 11.9 11.9 11.6 
SF 8.7 19.0 14.7 40.6 
TA/PN 34.0 40.5 13.4 22.6 
u 12.8 12.7 35.5 36.6 
WA/PN 8.7 25.0 12.0 7.6 
WN/PN 3.5 3.7 7.3 4.1 
^Simulation Period; 1973-1981. 
^Simulation Period: 1982-1985. 
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is that this is the smallest cost share. Other trouble 
spots for the revised structure are factor rents, 
particularly the capital rental rate. The difference in 
RMS percent errors of agriculture rents between the two 
runs reflect the substitution in the linked run of lagged 
shadow prices estimates for lagged market values. 
It should be remembered, however, when examining the 
simulation statistics that the CAM and BLS do not purport 
to be a short range forecasting medium, but a long term 
policy analysis tool. In this guise it is more important 
that the input structure captures long term market trends 
than it is that it reproduces history exactly. In fact, 
under these circumstances too close a fit could be 
interpreted as a black mark against the revised 
specification because it would indicate the parameter 
estimates were reflecting transitory market movements 
rather than persistent trends. A more revealing 
performance criterion would be one that compares simulated 
with actual growth rates. Table 3.11 makes this comparison 
for selected variables for the period 1974 through 1985. 
As a general rule, the growth rates estimated during the 
linked run are more modest than actual growth rates. With 
respect to this growth rate comparison criterion, the 
revised resource structure does quite well for hired labor. 
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Table 3.11: Actual and simulated average annual growth 
rates of selected variables: 1974-1985 
Percent Growth Rates 
Actual^ Simulated^ 
A 0.4 0.4 
AA 1.3 1.1 
COST 3.8 2.9 
I 3.3 2.5 
lA -1.4 2.4 
IN 2.9 2.6 
KA 2.9 3.3 
KN 1.1 1.1 
L 2.8 2.3 
NA 0.4 2.1 
NAH 2.9 2.7 
NAO -0.6 1.7 
NN 2.4 2.2 
PART 1.6 1.2 
QN 2.9 3.0 
RA/PN 2.0 0.4 
RN/PN 2.5 1.9 
SF -1.5 0.0 
TA/PN -5.3 2.2 
u 6.4 0.9 
WA/PN -0.8 0.2 
WN/PN -0.1 0.8 
^Simulation Period: 1973-1981. 
^Simulation Period: 1982-1985. 
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but still does an inadequate job on factor rents. 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter reviewed the revised resource market 
structure of the CAM. Distinguishing features of the 
specification include: 
- the use of the efficiency wage hypothesis to help 
explain unemployment; 
- the treatment of hired labor as a separate input from 
operator labor; and 
- the derivation of the agriculture input demands using a 
cost function approach. 
Great difficulties were encountered in estimating the 
agriculture cost and input demand equations, and as a 
result some license was taken in their estimation. 
However, despite the lack of rigor exercised during the 
estimation of these equations, the resulting estimates 
appear to exhibit reasonable theoretical properties for the 
period after 1973. 
On the whole, the revised resource structure does a 
reasonable job in reproducing history, although its 
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performance in the area of factor rents and hired labor 
demand is less than satisfactory. 
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4. AGRICULTURE POLICY SPECIFICATION OF THE CAM 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the agriculture policy 
specification of the CAM. Like the factor market 
specification, the agriculture policy specification has 
been revised from that in earlier versions of the model. 
Based on the postulate price manipulation is the principal 
tool governments use to achieve their various objectives, 
earlier versions of the CAM calculated domestic prices 
using a set of equations representing the reduced form of 
the government's decision making process. The approach is 
similar to that adopted by Skold and Meyers (1987); Meilke 
and Griffith (1983); and Lattimore and Schuh (1979). Less 
than perfect price transmission from the world market to 
the domestic is explained in price linkages by economic 
performance monitoring variables policy makers are assumed 
to observe and react to when determining target protection 
levels for domestic prices. Although this approach lends 
itself to an analysis of say an unilateral 50 percent 
producer subsidy reduction, it does not give information on 
what is the best way to cut the subsidies. Because all 
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policies are expressed as tariff equivalents, the effects 
of removing one particular policy instrument can not be 
delineated from the effects of removing another. However, 
it is precisely this information that is required. Because 
of competitive, complementary and input-output 
relationships between commodities, starting with their 
production and continuing through to their final 
consumption, a policy directed towards a single commodity 
often exerts both positive and negative externalities on a 
host of other commodities. To distinguish between the 
effects different instruments have on both targeted and 
nontargeted commodities, requires structural representation 
of each policy instrument considered. The CAM's policy 
block has been revised with the intent of providing such 
structural representation for selected domestic farm 
programs. 
The organization of the chapter is as follows. To 
begin with a brief review of Canadian commodity specific 
agriculture policy is given in Section 4.2. The review 
serves to identify which policy instruments merit 
structural representation. The CAM's revised policy block 
is then presented. Section 4.3 describes the operational 
design and basic specification of the block. It describes 
in the context of the CAM what instruments are available to 
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the government, how the government determines target levels 
and permissible bounds for realized values of these 
instruments, and to what extent producers consider the 
government's policy setting actions when forming market 
price expectations for the coming year. For all intensive 
purposes this part of the policy block is the same as that 
contained in earlier versions of the CAM. The remaining 
four sections of the chapter describe the specification of 
the domestic farm programs selected for structural 
representation, and relate how the government in the 
context of the CAM raises funds to finance these programs. 
4.2 Canadian Agriculture Commodity Policy 
4.2.1 Grain and oilseeds 
Apart from transportation subsidies and the recent 
Special Canada Grains Program, federal policies affecting 
grain and oilseed production focus on promoting marketing 
efficiency and providing producers with an income safety 
net rather than price and income support, per se. For the 
most part grain and oilseed grown in the Canadian Wheat 
Board (CWB) designated area is legislatively treated 
separately from that grown in the rest of Canada. The CWB 
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designated area includes the three Prairie provinces and a 
small region in British Columbia. For brevity grain and 
oilseed producers in the CWB designated area will be 
hereafter loosely referred to as Prairie producers. Wheat, 
barley and oats grown in the CWB designated area will be 
referred to as the Board grains and rye, canola and 
flaxseed grown in this same area as the Non-Board grains. 
Board grain producers have three marketing options. 
The first and generally preferred option is to deliver 
their grain to the CWB, a federal agency, which markets the 
grain for them. Board grain producers must exercise this 
first option for all their grain destined for domestic 
human consumption or export. The other two marketing 
options are only open to grain destined for domestic feed 
use. Producers delivering to the CWB receive a pooled 
price paid in installments. The first installment is paid 
on delivery of the grain and is based on the government 
guaranteed initial payments. Even though the initial 
payments serve as price floors, they theoretically do not 
have distorting market effects since the government tries 
to set them conservatively below projected market 
equilibrium. In general the Government succeeds in this 
objective. The last few years being an exception, realized 
market prices have rarely been below the set initial 
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payments. The last installment or final payment is usually 
made in the first quarter of the calendar year succeeding 
the close of the crop year on July 31. This final payment 
is the per unit combined earnings from all grain sales made 
during the year less initial payments and CWB operating 
costs. Intermediary installments or adjustment payments 
may be made throughout the crop year to producers who have 
already delivered their grain to the CWB if an increase in 
initial payments is warranted by buoyant export prices. 
The second marketing option producers have is to deliver 
their grain to the off-board market and receive full 
settlement for the grain at the time of the sale. The off-
board market refers to both private grain companies 
acquisitions and local farm to farm, farm to feedlot, and 
farm to feedmill sales. The third and final option 
producers have is to market their grain through their own 
livestock operations. 
The CWB acquires stocks, as needed to meet sales 
commitments, through two sets of marketing quotas. These 
marketing quotas are issued to prevent congestion of the 
grain delivery system and to equalize delivery 
opportunities among producers. They are based on producers 
cultivated acreage. The first set of quotas limit the 
amount of the three Board grains that can be delivered to 
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elevators for the CWB. They are necessary since the pooled 
price producers receive from the CWB provides no incentive 
to producers to spread their deliveries throughout the crop 
year when producers have to finance on farm storage costs 
from their own pockets. The second set of quotas limit the 
amount of Board grains that can be delivered in total to 
elevators for both the CWB and the off-board market. They 
are used to prevent off-board grain from clogging the 
elevator system and thus hindering CWB deliveries. Because 
Non-Board grains compete for the same storage and 
transportation facilities as the Board grains, the CWB also 
issues delivery quotas for them even though it is not 
responsible for their export. 
To help Prairie producers protect themselves against 
losses caused by international market fluctuations, the 
government offers an asymmetric stabilization program. The 
Western Grain Stabilization Program (WGSP) guarantees 
Prairie producers that if the aggregate or per ton net cash 
flow generated from the combined commercial sales of 
certain commodities in the current year falls below the 
previous 5 year average, they will be reimbursed the 
shortfall through deficiency payments. The stabilized 
commodities include all the Board and Non-Board grains and 
most specialty crops. Participation in the program is 
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voluntary and costs producers a certain percentage of their 
gross sales receipts. The producer levy fluctuates in 
accordance with the stabilization fund balance. The 
federal government's contribution to the stabilization fund 
on a percent basis of commercial sales is 2 percentage 
points higher than the producer levy. In addition the 
federal government pays all administration costs. The 
maximum coverage a producer can insure against is $60,000 
worth of grain sales. The attractive feature of the 
program is all grain and oilseed crops must be experiencing 
depressed market conditions before any payments are 
triggered, and all participating producers receive the same 
compensation no matter what crop they are growing. As a 
result producers participating in this program should have 
no incentive on the basis of this program to switch between 
the stabilized crops. However, because farm fed grain is 
ineligible for payment under the program, producers may 
have an incentive to commercially market their grain rather 
than feed it or sell it to local livestock producers. 
Grain and oilseed transportation within Canada is 
subsidized through several federal programs. Prairie 
producers are subsidized the cost of moving their grain to 
export positions. Prior to 1984 Prairie producers only 
paid fixed statutory rates called the Crows Nest Pass 
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Rates. The Crows Nest Past Rates were frozen in 1922 at 
the competitive levels of 1897. Because of the lack of 
incentive on the railways' part, at these low freight 
rates, to upgrade grain handling and transportation 
facilities, this infrastructure deteriorated causing lost 
export sales. To rectify the growing problem, the federal 
government financed branchline rehabilitation projects, box 
car repairs, hopper car purchases, and other investment 
programs designed to increase rail grain shipping capacity. 
Despite these subsidies, however, the physical grain 
carrying and handling capacity of Canadian railways 
continued to deteriorate. As a result the Government 
terminated the Crow rates in 1984 and introduced the 
Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA). Under this new 
legislation, grain freight rates charged are competitive 
with those of other commodities. The freight costs are 
paid jointly by the Government and Prairie producers, with 
Prairie producers assuming a larger share through time of 
the total cost over and above $659 million. The government 
will pay the first $659 million of the freight costs in 
perpetuity. This subsidy is called the Crow Benefit. 
Under the authority of the Feed Freight Assistance 
Act, the federal government offers a rebate on the movement 
of Canadian grown feedgrains to eligible feed deficit 
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regions within Canada. Over time regions classified as 
eligible recipients of this subsidy have decreased in 
number while regions classified as eligible shippers have 
increased. 
Other rail subsidies exist besides those discussed 
above, but they are of relatively minor importance in terms 
of both total government expenditure and realized producer 
benefits when compared to those under the WGTA. 
Grain and oilseed producers outside the CWB designated 
area are offered protection from world price troughs under 
the Agricultural Stabilization Act (ASA). The ASA 
guarantees producers a price floor for their commodity that 
is 90 percent of the 5 year market price average adjusted 
for changes in cash costs. When the market price falls 
below this support price, producers receive a deficiency 
payment equal to the discrepancy. The federal government 
shoulders the full cost of this program and sets no limits 
on the amount of commercial grain sales that are eligible 
for deficiency payment receipt. 
To tide Board grain producers over until marketing 
quotas are issued for their grain, the federal government, 
under the Prairie Grain Advance Payment Act, provides 
interest-free cash advances of up to $30,000 per producer 
on the security of their farm stored grain. Interest-free 
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cash advances are also made available to other grain and 
oilseed producers, but under different legislative 
authority. The authority in this latter case is the 
Advance Payments for Crops Act. 
Protection against natural hazards is offered to all 
crop producers through voluntary crop insurance programs. 
These insurance programs are jointly funded by the Federal 
and Provincial Governments and participating producers. 
As commented earlier, the CWB controls all Prairie 
Board grains destined for export. This centralization of 
export authority gives Canada a bargaining advantage in the 
international arena. To further assist Board grain export 
the CWB is able to arrange credit financing for the 
purchasing country with Canadian Government loan 
guarantees. 
In addition to export control of the three Board 
grains, the CWB has import control over them and all their 
substitutes except corn. This exclusive import control may 
change in the future. Under the terms of the bilateral 
trade agreement between Canada and the U.S, U.S. wheat and 
feedgrains will be able to enter Canada without importers 
first having to gain permission from the CWB. This change 
will be triggered once it is determined that the subsidies 
U.S. producers receive for each commodity, in total value. 
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are equal to or less than the amount received by Canadian 
producers. 
There are no quantity restrictions on U.S. corn 
imports, but these imports are subject to a specific tariff 
and a countervail duty. Because there are no quantity 
restrictions, the U.S. corn import price acts as a ceiling 
on Eastern Canadian feedgrain prices. 
The price domestic millers must pay for wheat has been 
administratively set through a series of two price schemes 
for the last two decades. These schemes have insulated the 
domestic mill rate from the world price and have 
alternately benefited consumers at the expense of 
producers, and producers at the expense of consumers. In 
recent years significant benefits have been passed on to 
producers through this program. The program was terminated 
July 31, 1988, however, after it was discerned most of the 
benefits were shifting to Eastern producers away from 
targeted Western producers. For the crop year 1988 the 
government will issue producers a one time subsidy to 
compensate them for the loss of benefits they were 
receiving under the program. 
To help crop producers through currently depressed 
market conditions, the federal government in the past few 
years has issued several special subsidies. These ad hoc 
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subsidies ostensibly are just stop gap measures until long 
term policy solutions can be reached through international 
negotiations. In 1986 and 1987, for example, the 
government issued deficiency payments to crop producers 
under the Special Canada Grain Program (SCGP). Working 
within an absolute expenditure ceiling for the whole SCGP, 
the size of the deficiency payment or ^assistance rate' for 
each eligible crop was set in proportion to the impact 
international subsidies were calculated to have on that 
crop's domestic price. Producers were paid according to 
their seeded area in each crop and the historical average 
yield recorded for that crop in their region of production. 
4.2.2 Red meats 
Canadian red meat industries are relatively government 
unfettered. The key federal policies governing these 
industries provide income safety nets rather than price 
support. The safety nets are achieved through asymmetric 
stabilization programs that cut off the troughs of market 
price fluctuations and leave the peaks undisturbed. 
Stabilization is conducted under the authority of the ASA. 
In the past provisions of the ASA for livestock producers 
were similar to those for grain producers. The ASA 
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guaranteed cattle, hogs and sheep producers a price floor 
for their commodity that was 90 percent of the 5 year 
market price average adjusted for changes in cash costs. 
The program was completely government funded and covered 
all commercial livestock sales. There were no limits on 
how much an individual producer could receive or how much 
could be paid out in aggregate. 
More recently voluntary National Tripartite 
Stabilization (NTS) schemes have been initiated under the 
ASA to replace the old completely government funded method 
of stabilization. These schemes are jointly funded by the 
federal government, participating provincial governments, 
and participating producers within the participating 
provinces. The federal and provincial governments each 
match producers levy contributions up to a combined 
maximum. The government expenditure ceiling cap for hogs 
and cattle is 8 percent of total market returns and for 
lambs 13 percent. 
There are two types of stabilization schemes. One 
type guarantees producers a price floor for their commodity 
that equals the estimated national current cash costs of 
production for their commodity plus a percentage of the 
historical 5 year moving average margin between cash costs 
and national selling prices. The other type guarantees 
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producers a price floor for their commodity that equals a 
percentage of the 10 year moving average national market 
price of their commodity adjusted for inflation and changes 
in feed costs. The schemes for feeder cattle producers, 
slaughter cattle producers and hog producers fall in the 
first category while the schemes for cow-calf producers and 
lamb producers fall in the second category. 
Health restrictions prevent many exporting countries 
from gaining access to the Canadian domestic market. Both 
meat and live animal imports are prohibited from countries 
not free of foot and mouth disease. Live animals from 
acceptable exporting regions are allowed into Canada 
tariff-free after a set quarantine period. Meat imports 
are all tariffed. During the mid 1970s, Oceanic countries 
adhered to voluntary agreements limiting meat imports. In 
1981 the voluntary agreements were replaced by formal 
quantitative restrictions under the Meat Import Act. These 
formal quantitative restrictions, however, were not 
activated until 1985 when they were applied to subsidized 
EEC beef imports. 
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4.2.3 Dairy 
Dairy, one of the more protected agriculture 
industries in Canada, is a government regulated supply-
managed industry. Milk destined for use in manufacturing 
is treated distinctly from that destined for fluid 
consumption. The federal government is responsible for 
setting policies affecting the production and pricing of 
industrial milk and cream, and trade of manufactured dairy 
products. The Canadian Dairy Commission, a federal agency, 
oversees the administration of these policies with the 
combined cooperation of provincial governments and 
provincial producer marketing boards. Industrial milk 
production is constrained by quota to a level that just 
gives national self-sufficiency on a butter-fat basis. 
This national quota is allocated to the different 
provincial governments who in turn further allocate it to 
all the dairy producers operating in their particular 
province. Producers receive a flat rate unit subsidy of 
$6.03/hl on their within-quota production over and above 
the market return. The market return is supported by 
federal government surplus purchases of butter and skim 
milk powder. The government purchase price of these 
commodities is set to induce a market price for industrial 
milk and cream, which when added to the direct unit payment 
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paid to producers, will provide producers with the 
government established Target Return. Prior to calendar 
year 1988 this target return was based on a cost of 
production formula which had as its components various farm 
input price indices and the consumer price index along with 
judgmental factors. Currently, the target return is based 
on a cost of production survey, and takes into 
consideration the costs of only 70 percent of the producers 
surveyed. The selected producers are those reporting the 
lowest cost operations. This change in the Target Return 
calculation is designed to eliminate the most inefficient 
dairy operations. 
The government tightly restricts imports of both 
manufactured dairy products and dairy substitutes to 
prevent international competition from eroding the domestic 
market return. The importation of butter and skim milk 
powder is completely prohibited. Other dairy products are 
subject to tariffs, in addition to the import quantity 
restrictions. 
Canadian dairy exports have the competitive advantage 
a central selling agency, the CDC, offers in trade 
negotiations and foreign market procurement. Dairy 
products acquired through the CDCs surplus purchasing 
activities are exported at world prices. The financial 
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losses incurred on these exports, as well as on traditional 
exports are exacted from producers through levies. 
Fluid milk regulation is decentralized with provincial 
governments assuming policy control for pricing and 
production within their borders. To prevent the policies 
of one province from disrupting the fluid milk industry in 
another province, interprovincial trade in fluid milk is 
prohibited along with international trade in fluid milk. 
Each province sets daily quotas to maintain self-
sufficiency in its own fluid needs. The provinces vary, 
though, in how they price this fluid milk. Some provinces 
allow the retail market to determine price given the 
controlled production, while other provinces set price 
according to full cost of production formulas. In all 
cases fluid milk prices command a premium over industrial 
milk prices. Provinces also differ in methods of quota 
transfer. In some provinces, such as Ontario, quota is 
bought and sold as a commodity in and of itself. In other 
provinces quota is attached to specific capital items; for 
instance, in Saskatchewan quota is attached to dairy cows. 
4.2.4 Poultry 
Poultry policy is similar to dairy. Chicken and 
turkey production are each supply managed by a federal 
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agency (The Canadian Chicken Marketing Agency (CCMA) and 
The Canadian Turkey Marketing Agency (CTMA), respectively). 
Each federal agency sets production quota for national 
self-sufficiency at a producer price that will recoup full 
cost of production, and allocates this quota among the 
provinces. Provinces are responsible for setting the 
poultry price within their own borders. They do so 
according to a formula that expresses producer price as 
cost of production adjusted for current market conditions. 
Although there is no surplus purchasing by the federal 
agencies to support price, there is some by provincial 
marketing boards. As with dairy, quota transfer among 
producers is a provincial responsibility and varies by 
province from free market, to auction, to asset fixation. 
Imports are restricted in quantity to a maximum of 
their historical share of domestic production. For 
broilers this share is 6.3 percent and for turkeys 2.0 
percent. Supplemental imports are allowed if domestic 
shortages arise. All imports are subject to flat rate 
tariffs. Under the terms of the free trade agreement with 
the U.S., in the future these tariffs will be eliminated, 
and the import quantity restrictions relaxed. 
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4 . 2 . 5  Eggs 
The egg industry is also supply managed and has a 
federal agency, the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency (CEMA), 
serving both as its coordinator and its watch dog. The 
CEMA sets the producer price of shell eggs using a full 
cost of production formula. It then issues production 
quota in an amount equal to the calculated national egg 
demand at that price floor. At times, because of 
fluctuating demand, the Agency has to purchase surplus 
table eggs. On acquisition, the CEMA resells these surplus 
purchases, at a financial loss, to the processing industry 
as breakers. Both consumers and producers are levied to 
offset the financial loss. Production quota transfer is 
again a provincial policy decision, and as such varies from 
province to province. 
Imports are restricted in quantity to a maximum of 
0.625 percent of the previous year's domestic production. 
Imports made within this quota are subject to a flat rate 
tariff. Again, the Canadian-U.S. bilateral trade agreement 
calls for elimination of the tariff and a marginal increase 
in import quantity restrictions. 
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4.2.6 Fruits and vegetables 
Domestic fruit and vegetable production has primarily 
been protected by seasonal tariffs. The Canadian-U.S. 
bilateral trade agreement, however, spells the end of this 
source of protection. The ASA provides completely 
government funded stabilization coverage for certain 
horticultural crops on a discretionary basis at a 
discretionary support level. Recently a national 
tripartite stabilization scheme, along the lines of those 
for red meats, was established for apples. Producer 
marketing boards with price negotiating powers are a 
popular form of provincial government support. Fruit and 
vegetable producers, like grain producers, have the option 
of participating in crop insurance programs. 
4.3 Specification of the CAM's Policy Block 
Given the dynamic, regional and commodity specific 
nature of Canadian agriculture policy, it is apparent how 
futile an effort it would be to structurally represent each 
and every policy in the CAM. Such an effort would result 
in a black box which for all practical purposes would not 
give any more useful information than could be obtained 
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from a simpler model that did not attempt such thorough 
policy coverage. For this reason only select domestic farm 
programs are structurally represented and license is taken 
in specifying their regional and temporal applicability. 
Particular attention is given to spelling out the mechanics 
of income stabilization and supply management programs. 
Meilke and Warley (1988) identify these program types as 
"two of the most distinctive and prominent features of 
Canadian agricultural policy". No attempt is made to spell 
out border protection measures. The price linkages 
estimated for earlier versions of the CAM are retained to 
account for all border barriers, from import quotas and 
tariffs, to health restrictions and bilingual labelling 
requirements. It is argued that these price linkages do 
not double count the direct payments to farmers issued 
under the income stabilization programs since they were 
estimated using market prices as the dependent variable 
rather than producers actual in-pocket gross unit returns 
for each commodity. 
4.3.1 Solution priority 
Three underlying assumptions about government behavior 
regulate the operation of the CAM's policy block. The 
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assumptions are as follows; 1) the government intervenes 
in commodity markets by manipulating domestic market prices 
and by issuing direct payments to producers; 2) the 
government places lower priority on internal commodity 
price support and producer income stabilization than it 
does on correcting external payment imbalances and carrying 
out social programs financed through income taxes; and 3) 
government intervention in the commodity markets will stop 
short of causing socially undesirable and economic 
destabilizing changes in domestic human consumption, 
commodity trade and stocking activities. 
In accordance to these assumptions, the CAM's policy 
block sets target values and maximum and minimum bounds for 
Canada's trade deficit and income tax rate and for the 
domestic price, domestic human consumption, net trade 
volume and stock of each tradeable commodity bundle. The 
solution algorithm gives priority in terms of target value 
realization first to the trade deficit, second to the 
income tax rate, third to domestic prices, fourth to 
commodity trade, fifth to stocks and last to human 
consumption. What this priority ranking means is that if 
it is not mathematically possible to achieve all target 
values, the solution algorithm will hold the economic 
variable with the higher priority at its target value and 
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will adjust the economic variable of lower priority within 
the permissible limits until an equilibrium solution is 
found. The economic variable with the higher priority will 
only be moved away from its target value if an equilibrium 
solution cannot be found that allows the economic variable 
of lower priority to stay within its permissible limits. 
Because generous bounds are placed on trade volumes, 
realized commodity prices almost always equal their set 
target values. Price target values are set responsive to 
the changing economic conditions depicted by the model's 
solution. This is in contrast to the other policy 
parameters, which are set either externally, or internally 
according to rules that are invariant to the model's 
portrayed solution. 
4.3.2 Target price formation 
The BLS requires the CAM to offer the same commodity 
bundles for international exchange as every other national 
model does. There are ten commodity bundles eligible for 
exchange. These are (1) wheat; (2) rice; (3) coarse 
grains; (4) bovine and ovine meats; (5) dairy products; (6) 
other livestock products which includes pork, poultry, eggs 
and fish; (7) protein feed which includes oilseed meal. 
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meat meal and fish meal; (8) all other food which includes 
oils and fats, sugar, fruit, vegetables and beverages; (9) 
nonfood agriculture which includes fibers, wool and 
industrial products; and (N) nonagriculture. 
Target domestic consumer prices are set for each 
bundle, except dairy products, using world to domestic 
price linkages. The linkages represent the reduced form of 
policy makers' decision making process. They include as 
explanatory variables the market performance indicators 
policy makers are believed to observe and react to when 
determining border protection for domestic market prices. 
In particular the linkage equations express the target 
domestic market price (CTPi) for each agriculture bundle i 
as a multiplicative function of the world market price 
(WPi) in the current year, the world market price in the 
previous year, the realized domestic price (CPi) in the 
previous year and the self-sufficiency ratio (SSRi) average 
over the previous two years. Because only relative prices 
matter, prices are deflated by either the world (WPN) or 
domestic (CPN) nonagriculture price as is appropriate. 
Algebraically, 
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bii 
(4.1) [CTPit/CTPNt] = bio * [WPit/WPNt] 
^i2 
* [WPit-i/WPNt-i] 
bi3 
* [CPit-i/CPNt-i] 
* [0.5*(SSRit-i+SSRit-2)] 
bi4 
(CTpi) 
+ V-t for 1=1,...,4,6,...,9. 
Table 4.1 gives parameter estimates for these policy 
synthesizing price linkages. The parameter b^i reflects 
the extent to which relative world price changes are passed 
onto domestic market prices. The value of 1 for this 
parameter in the wheat and coarse grain linkages implies 
perfect price transmission whereas the value of 0.283 in 
the other livestock products linkage implies isolation of 
the domestic market from world prices. This latter result 
is more indicative of the poultry component of this bundle 
than it is the pork and fish components. The parameter bi2 
comes into play for bundles, such as the bovine and ovine 
bundle, whose component parts have biological production 
processes spanning several periods causing adjustment lags, 
and bundles, such as the other food items bundle, whose 
component parts are reported over different crop years 
across countries. The parameter b^^ reflects the extent to 
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Table 4.1: Parameter values for the target price 
equations® 
Parameters 
bio bil bi2 bis bi4 
Wheat 1. 0181 1. 0000 0. 0000 0. 0000 0. 0000 
Rice 0. 8598 0. 2657 0. 0000 0. 5084 0. 0000 
Coarse grains 0. 8549 1. 0000 0. 0000 0. 0000 0. 0000 
Bovine and 
Ovine Meats 
1. 9659 0. 5867 0. 0991 0. 0000 -0. 5000 
Other Livestock 
Products 
4. 5380 0. 2830 0. 0000 0. 5448 -1. 1160 
Protein Feeds 0. 9965 0. 5650 0. 0000 0. 4350 0. 0000 
Other Food 3. 7180 0. 6760 0. 3240 0. 0000 -1. 3990 
Nonfood 
Agriculture 
2. 4090 0. 3236 0. 2528 0. 0000 -0. 8971 
^Source: Frohberg and Fischer, 1985. 
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which the government intervenes in the market with self-
sufficiency as its goal. This parameter does not have 
significance for bundles which are net exported, such as 
wheat and coarse grains, and bundles whose physiology 
prevent their viable production in Canada, such as rice. 
Dairy target prices are set according to cost of 
production. Details of the formulation are given in 
Section 4.4 where the Dairy Supply Management Program 
specification is laid out. 
The nonagriculture target price is set as a time 
varying fraction of the current nonagriculture world price 
where the time varying fraction is a multiplicative 
function of the previous year's ratio between the domestic 
and world nonagriculture prices: 
0.776 
(4.2) CTPNt = 0.99*[ CTPNt-i/WPNt-i ] * WPNf 
4.3.3 Consumer prices 
As discussed in connection with the priority ranking 
of the solution algorithm, realized consumer prices (CPi) 
can lie anywhere in a set range around their target values, 
their exact value being that which achieves a domestic 
market equilibrium without causing other policy variables 
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to go outside their permissible bounds: 
(4.3) CPit = CTPit + PDEVit 
with PDEVit < (PMAXi-l)*CTPit if PDEVit > 0 
and PDEVit > (PMINi-1)*CTPit if PDEVit < 0 
for i = 1,..., 9 
where 
PDEVi is the difference between the target and 
realized consumer price of bundle i; 
PMAXi is the maximum value, expressed as a 
percentage of the target price, which the 
realized consumer price can adopt; and 
PMINi is the minimum value, expressed as a 
percentage of the target price, which the 
realized consumer price can adopt. 
4.3.4 Producer prices 
The commodity bundles eligible for exchange in the BLS 
group commodities that are homogeneous from a consumer 
demand perspective. The commodities need not be 
homogeneous from a production perspective, and in fact 
often are quite heterogeneous when considered from this 
viewpoint. Consider, for example, the protein feed 
exchange bundle. Commodities comprising this bundle can be 
broadly subdivided into: oilseed meals, meat meals, and 
fish meals. While the production process of a commodity in 
each subdivision is somewhait similar to the production 
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processes of other commodities in that same subdivision, it 
is completely different from the production processes of 
commodities in the other two subdivisions. Because of this 
irreconcilable dissimilarity in production processes across 
commodities within exchange bundles, national and regional 
models within the BLS are not forced to produce the same 
bundles as they exchange internationally. The CAM allows 
for the production of 10 agriculture commodity bundles: 
(WH) wheat; (CG) coarse grains; (OM) oilseed meal; (FR) 
fruit; (OC) all other food of crop origin; (NC) nonfood 
agriculture of crop origin; (BO) bovine and ovine meats; 
(DY) dairy products; (PO) pork, poultry and eggs; and (FI) 
fish. 
Producer market returns for the production bundles are 
derived from the consumer prices for the exchange bundles 
using a multistage mapping process. The first stage 
corrects for the fact different weights are appropriate 
when aggregating commodities within a bundle for 
consumption than are appropriate when aggregating for 
production. As shown the difference in appropriate 
aggregation weights is captured by a constant 
multiplicative factor, PPTCi: 
(4.4) PPit = PPTCit*CPit + vt . 
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PPTCi is the average historical ratio of exchange bundle 
i's commodity component prices weighted by consumption 
quantities to the commodity component prices weighted by 
production quantities. Table 4.2 reports the value of 
PPTCi for each exchange bundle. 
The second stage interpolates from the producer price 
of the more diverse exchange bundles producer prices for 
subaggregates of their commodity components. Each 
subaggregate consists entirely of commodities with similar 
production processes. The left side of Table 4.3 shows the 
various subaggregates of each bundle. 
To do the interpolation additional information has to 
be introduced to make the problem solvable. The type of 
information introduced depends upon the postulated 
relationship between the subaggregates. If the K 
subaggregates of bundle i are assumed consumption 
independent, then the information added is each 
subaggregate's contribution to total revenue. Given this 
information the formula for the producer price of the jth 
subaggregate is: 
PPii 
(4.5) PPijt = Sijt*PPit*Qit/Qijt + vt 
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Tcible 4.2: Price corrections for aggregation weight 
differences between economic activities® 
Exchange PPTCi FPTPi 
Bundle aiO ail 
1; Wheat 1. 0000 0.9000 0.0000 
3: Coarse grains 0. 9711 0.9988 -0.0011 
4 : Bovine and Ovine 
Meats 
0. 9871 n/a n/a 
5: Dairy Products 1. 0000 0.2500 0.0000 
6: Other Livestock 
Products 
0. 9131 n/a n/a 
7: Protein Feeds 0 .3455 0.9491 -0.0438 
8: Other Food Items 0. 6541 1.4914% 
1.0134° 
0.0854% 
-0.0021° 
9: Nonfood 
Agriculture 
0. 9724 n/a n/a 
^Source: Frohberg and Fischer, 1985. 
bused as feed for ruminants. 
°Used as feed for hogs and poultry. 
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Table 4.3: Exchange bundle price disaggregation and 
production bundle market return aggregation® 
Production Bundles^ 
Exchange Bundles WH CG OM FR OC NC BO DY PO FI 
1: Wheat 
2 : Rice 
3 : Coarse Grains 
4: Bovine & Ovine 
5 : Dairy Products 
6: Other Livestock Products 
61: Pork, Poultry & Eggs 
62 : Fish 
7 ; Protein Feeds 
71: Oilseed Meal 
72: Meat Meal 
73: Fish Meal 
8: Other Food Items 
81: Oilseed Oil 
82: Ruminant Fat 
83: Lard 
84: Fish Oil 
81: Fruit 
82: Rest of Other Food 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
X 
X X X  
X X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
^Source: Fischer et al., 1988. 
bProduction bundle mneumonics are as follows: 
WH=wheat; CG=coarse grains; OM=oilseed meal; FR=fruit; 
OC=other food of crop origin; NC=nonfood agric. of crop 
origin; BO=bovine & ovinemeats; DY=dairy products; 
PO=pork, poultry & eggs; and FI=fish. 
Table 4.3 (Continued) 
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Production Bundles^ 
Exchange Bundles WH CG OM FR OC NC BO DY PO FI 
9 : Nonfood Agriculture 
91: Of Crop Origin X 
92: Ruminant Hides X X 
93 : Other Livestock Hides 
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where PPij is the producer price of subaggregate j of 
bundle i; 
Sij is the share of bundle i's revenue contributed 
by subaggregate j; 
PPi is the producer price of bundle i; 
Qi is production of bundle i; and 
Qij is production of subaggregate j of bundle i. 
If the K subaggregates of bundle i are assumed 
consumption substitutes, then the information added is the 
proportion each subaggregate's price is of the sum of all 
the subaggregate prices. Adding this information about K-1 
of the subaggregates to the production quantity weighted 
average of all K subaggregate prices yields a system of K 
equations in the K unknown subaggregate prices: 
PPi = [ PPil*Qil + ... + PPiK*QiK ] / Qi 
Sil = PPil / [ PPil + ... + PPiK ] 
(4.6) 
SiK-1 = PPiK-1 / [ PPil + ... + PPiK ] 
Solution of system (4.6) gives the following formula for 
the price of the jth subaggregate of bundle i: 
K PPij 
(4.7) PPijt = Sijt*PPit*Qit / [S. Sikt*Qikt] + vt 
k=l 
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K 
where Sij^ = PPijt / SZ PPikf 
k=l 
Both the total revenue shares for the consumption 
independent interpolation and the price shares for the 
consumption substitute interpolation are estimated using a 
logit expression: 
^ Sii 
(4.8) Sijt = Wijt /-ST Wikt + 
k=l 
with 
Wijt = exp(aoij+aiij*Tt) / [l+exp(aoij+aiij*Tt)]. 
Table 4.4 reports the parameter estimates for these logit 
specifications. 
The third and final stage of the mapping procedure 
recombines the producer prices of the exchange bundles and 
their subaggregates to arrive at the market return for each 
production bundle. The market return earned on production 
bundle k equals the producer price of the equivalent 
exchange bundle i being produced plus all revenue earned on 
the L various byproducts resulting from bundle k's 
production: 
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Table 4.4: Parameter estimates used in determining total 
revenue and price sum shares of the exchange 
bundle subaggregates^ 
Exchange Bundles Subaggregates Parameters 
and Preliminary aOijj alij 
Subaggregates 
6 ; Other Livestock 61: Pork, Poultry 1. 0339 -0. 0109 
Products^ and Eggs 
62; Fish 0. 9385 0. 0198 
7 : Protein Feeds^ 71: Oilseed Meal 0. 9369 0. 0255 
72: Meat Meal 1. 2854 -0. 1656 
73: Fish Meal 1. 4657 -0. 1300 
8 : Other Food Fats and Oils -0. 6177 -0. 0252 
Items'^ Nonfats and Oils 0. 6177 0. 0252 
Fats and Oils^ 81: Oilseed Oil 1. 0481 0. 0250 
82: Ruminant Fat 0. 4398 -0. 0489 
83: Lard 0. 9888 -0. 0658 
84: Fish Oil 1. 9079 -0. 1453 
Nonfats and Oils^ 85: Fruit 1. 2539 -0. 0386 
86: Rest of 0. 9344 0. 0103 
Other Food 
9 : Nonfood 91: Of Crop Origin 0. 9294 0. 0158 
Agriculture^ 92: Ruminant Hides 1. 2790 -0. 0564 
93; Other Livestock 0. 0000 0. 0000 
Hides 
^Source: Frohberg and Fischer, 1985. 
^Parameters used to determine price sum shares. 
^Parameters used to determine total revenue shares. 
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L 
(4.9) Pkt = PPit + 21 BYklt*PPlf 
1=1 
where 
Pk is the market return for production bundle k; 
PPi is the producer price of exchange bundle i; 
and 
BYkl is the amount of byproduct 1 resulting from 
the production of 1 unit of bundle k. 
The right side of Table 4.3 shows the various prices that 
go into the formation of the market return for each 
production bundle. 
4.3.5 Feed prices 
The feed price for exchange bundle j is a 
multiplicative function of the producer price: 
FPi 
(4.10) FPit = FPTPit*PPit + vt 
with FPTPit = agi + aii*Tt. 
The multiplicative factor FPTPi corrects for the fact 
commodities comprising an exchange bundle may be fed in 
different combination than they are produced. FPTPi is the 
average historical ratio of exchange bundle i's commodity 
component prices weighted by production quantities to the 
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commodity component prices weighted by feed quantities. To 
account for the fact the commodity components of some 
bundles have been fed in varying combinations over time as 
one commodity has gained popularity at the expense of the 
other commodities, the average historical ratio is 
expressed as a linear trend function. However, as shown in 
Table 4.2, the coefficient on time is zero for most 
bundles. 
4.3.6 Producer market price expectations 
At the time producers make their production decisions 
in period t for period t+1, they are unaware of the market 
prices that will prevail in period t+1. Hence, they must 
form expectations about these prices. Producers are 
assumed to have extrapolative expectations. Under the 
postulate their uncertainty is attributed more to 
incomplete knowledge about world supply and demand 
conditions than about government border protection 
response, producers price expectation in period t for the 
landed import price (CPi®) of exchange bundle i in period 
t+1 is a three year weighted average of current and past 
target prices: 
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(4.11) CPit = 0.5*CTPit + 0.4*CTPit-i 
(CPi) 
+ 0.1*CTPlt_2 + Vt 
for i=l,...,4,6,...9. 
An exception to this rule is their expectation concerning 
dairy price. Producers form their dairy price expectation 
using the same cost of production formula the government 
uses to set target prices (see Section 4.4). 
It is assumed producers have complete knowledge about 
the relationship between the landed import prices of the 
exchange commodities and the market returns they receive 
for the different production bundles, and that they adjust 
their landed import price expectations accordingly to form 
expectations about their own market returns. 
4.3.7 Market unit value added 
Market unit value added (VAk) of production bundle k 
is defined to be that portion of net market revenue which 
is attributable to the services of the primary factors used 
in bundle k's production. It is calculated as market 
return (Pk) less unit variable cost (VCk): 
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(4.12) VAkt = Pkt - VCkf 
This value added concept has greater relevance for factor 
allocation and use than does market return, per se. 
Producers will devote their fixed factors of production, 
i.e., land, labor, and capital, to the activities that will 
earn them the greatest reward in that employ. This is the 
maintained hypothesis of the nonlinear optimizing model 
used to determine agriculture commodity factor usage in the 
CAM's input block (see Section 3.7). 
4.3.8 Variable production cost 
As shown in equations (4.13) and (4.14), the CAM 
distinguishes between two types of variable inputs: yield 
increasing and nonyield increasing: 
(4.13) VCkt*ykt = [l+Zlk]*PFZt*FZkt + Z2k*PPNt*Ykt 
+ vt 
(VCk) 
for k6 crops; 
and 
J VCk 
(4.14) VCkt = 2: 
j=l 
for k6 livestock. 
FPjt*FDkjt + Z2k*PPNt*Ykt + v^ 
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It is assumed all nonyield increasing inputs, such as 
machinery repairs and veterinarian expenses, are applied in 
absolute constant amount, Z2k, per unit of commodity k 
produced. This holds true whether commodity k is of crop 
or livestock origin. If commodity k is of crop origin, 
then it is assumed all yield increasing inputs other than 
nitrogen fertilizer (this would include pesticides and 
herbicides as well as phosphate and potash) are applied in 
fixed proportion, Zlk, to optimal nitrogen input (FZk) per 
hectare. Optimal nitrogen input is determined according to 
the first order condition of a revenue optimization model 
that maximizes per hectare profit margin over fertilizer 
costs (see Fischer et al. 1988). If commodity k is of 
livestock origin, then the yield increasing inputs are the 
feed concentrates. Total feed cost is determined by 
summing over all exchange bundles, the optimal amount fed 
per head owned (FDkj) times the bundle's price as feed 
(FPj). Optimal feed rations are determined using a cost 
minimizing model (see Fischer et al. 1988). 
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4.4 Dairy Supply Management 
Because domestic dairy prices are completely insulated 
from world prices and are administratively set according to 
changes in cost of production, the world to producer price 
linkage of Section 4.3.2 is not used to determine target 
prices for the dairy exchange bundle. Instead the dairy 
target price (CTP5) is calculated by adjusting the previous 
annual value in line with changes in cost of production. 
The change in cost of production is calculated by taking a 
weighted average of the percentage changes in the price of 
each variable and fixed input. The percentage price change 
of each input is weighted according to that input's 
contribution to total cost on an ^average' dairy farm. 
Feed ingredients other than milk and roughage are assigned 
a weight of 0.40, other variable inputs a weight of 0.24, 
labor a weight of 0.20, and interest and depreciation a 
weight of 0.16. The dairy target price formula is 
presented in Table 4.5. As shown the cost of production 
formula assumes 0.8 units of hired labor are used in 
association with every unit of operator labor. The 
nonagriculture capital rental rate is used for the interest 
and depreciation price. 
Although the realized consumer price (CPS) for dairy 
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Table 4.5: Policy block specification for dairy supply 
management 
Consumer Target Price 
CTP5t = CTP5t-i*[l + 0.40*% A((FPlt*FD51t+FP3t*FD53t+FP7t 
*FD57t+FP8t*FD58t)/YDYt) + 0.24*%&(0.007*PPNt) 
+ 0.20*%A (0.56*WNt+0.44*WAt) + 0.16*% ARNt] 
Realized Consumer Price 
CP5t = CTP5t 
Expected ConsinnAT- Price 
* * * 
CTP5t = CTP5t_i*[l + 0.40*%tk( (FPlt*FD51t-i+FP3t*FD53t-i 
* 
+FP7t*FD57t-i+FP8t*FD58t-i)/YDYt-i) +0.24 
*%A(0.007*PPNt) + 0.20*% A (0.56*WNt_i+0.44*WAt-i) 
+ 0.16*% AkRNt-i] 
Producer Price 
PP5t = 1.0*CP5t 
Feed Price 
FP5t = 0.25*PP5t 
Production Quota 
QDYt = 1.0055*(D5t_i-I5t-i) 
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Market Return 
PDYt = PPSt + PP4t*BY54t + PP72t*BY57t + PP82t*BY58t 
+ PP92t*BY59t 
Unit Value Added 
VADYt = [PDYt*YDYt - FPlt*FD51t - FP3t*FD53t - FP5t*FD55t 
- FP7t*FD57t - FP8t*FD58t - 0.08*YDYt*PPNt]/YDYt 
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products is not forced to equal the target price, it is 
constrained to lie in close proximity to it by the same 
relationship as that used for the other exchange bundles 
(see equation 4.3). 
The market return (PDY) dairy producers receive per 
unit of production includes not only the price of dairy 
products (PP5), but also the returns earned on the beef 
(BY54), meat meal (BY57), ruminant fat (BY58) and hide 
(BY59) byproducts resulting from milk production. Value 
added per unit of milk production (VADY) equals the market 
return less feed and other variable costs. 
Producers dairy price expectations correspond to how 
they think cost of production is going to change, which in 
turn is based on their extrapolative market price 
expectations. As explained in Section 4.3.6 their 
expectations concerning feed prices for year t+1 are 3 year 
weighted moving averages of current and past consumer 
target prices times the appropriate weight aggregation 
correction factors to get to feed price basis. Because 
factor returns are more stable than commodity prices, 
producers expectations about factor costs are naive. They 
take the current value as their expected value for next 
year. This is consistent with the specification of the 
agriculture cost function and input demands of Chapter 3. 
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Producers expectations about feed concentrate consumption 
and milk yield per cow are also naive. 
Producers are not able to freely respond to their 
price and value added expectations since dairy production 
is constrained by quota. The quota restricts national 
dairy production to a constant multiplicative factor of 
domestic demand in the previous year (D5) less beginning 
stocks (15). 
4.5 Western Grain Stabilization Program (WGSP) 
For representational ease, several assumptions are 
made in contradiction to actual features of the WGSP. They 
are as follows: 1) the WGSP is applicable to all grain and 
oilseeds grown in Canada, not just those grown in the 
Prairies; 2) there is full producer participation, i.e., 
all producers sign up for the program and never exercise 
their withdrawal option; 3) the WGSP covers all commercial 
grain sales, not just an individual's first $60,000 worth; 
and 4) specialty crops are not included in the program. As 
a consequence of the first three assumptions, the 
representation over estimates program benefits. However, 
it is felt the gain in model interpretabi1ity wrought by 
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making these assumptions is worth the bias in results. 
Also for representation ease, producers are assumed to 
be risk neutral. To the extent producers are risk averse, 
as they are generally believed to be, this assumption will 
cause production to be under estimated since output 
increases associated purely with the risk reduction aspect 
of this program are ignored. It is unknown how much this 
production under estimation will offset the program benefit 
over estimation resulting from the first three assumptions. 
Tables 4.6 to 4.9 lay out the CAM's WGSP 
specification. Table 4.6 contains the specifications for 
the general program variables, while Tables 4.7 to 4.9 
contain government assisted value added calculations for 
the wheat, coarse grains, and oilseed meal production 
bundles, respectively. In Table 4.6 aggregate net eligible 
commercial grain and oilseed returns (NRWGS) for the 
current year are calculated by summing net eligible 
commercial wheat, coarse grains and oilseed returns. Net 
returns for crop i are calculated as the historical ratio 
of commercial marketings to production times market value 
added (VAi) times production (Qi). Aggregate net eligible 
commercial returns for the current year are compared with 
their historical 5 year moving average both on a gross and 
a per tonne basis. If the current value is below the 5 
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Table 4.6: Policy block specification of WGSP deficiency 
payments 
Total WGSP Payout 
5 
PYTWGSt = Max { 0 , (1/5)* SNRWGSt-k-NRWGSt , 
k=l 
5 
QWGSt* [ ( 1/5) * SL (NRWGSt-Jc/QWGSt-k) " (NRWGSt 
k=l 
/QWGSt)] ) 
Net Returns on WGSP Eligible Cornmpt-rnial Sales 
NRWGSt = 0.887*VAWHt*QWHt + 0.625*VACGt*QCGt 
+ 0.918*VAOMt*QOMt 
WGSP Eligible nommercial Sales 
QWGSt = 0.887*QWHt + 0.625*QCGt + 0.918*1.56*Q0Mt 
WGSP Producer Lew 
/ 0.04 if BALWGSt-i < 0 
LVYWGSt = \ 0.03 if BALWGSt-i>0 
5 
& BALWGSt-i<0.5*(l/5)* NRWGSt-k 
k=l 
0.02 if BALWGSt_i>0 
5 
\ & BALWGSt-i>0.5*(l/5)* NRWGSt-k 
^ k=l 
where BALWGSt = BALWGSt-i + WGSFD&t - PYTWGSt 
Table 4.6 (Continued) 
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WGSP Funding; Government and Producer Contributions 
WGSFDGt = (2*LVYWGSt + 0.02) * [0.887*PPlt*QWHt 
+ 0.625*PP3t*QCGt + 0.918*(PP71t*Q0Mt 
+ PP82t*QOOt)] 
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year average on one or koth of these bases, a deficiency 
payment is triggered. The size of the deficiency payment 
(PYTWGS) is set equal to whatever is the maximum of the 
following: zero; the discrepancy on a gross basis; and 
total grain and oilseed sales eligible for deficiency 
payment receipt (QWGS) times the discrepancy on a per tonne 
basis. Commercial grain and oilseed sales are calculated 
as the sum of each crop's production times its historical 
marketing to production ratio. In calculating QWGS account 
is taken that the WGSP figures oilseed tonnage in its bulk 
rather than crushed form. This is done by multiplying meal 
production by 1.56 to inflate it back up to uncrushed 
product. 
The percent levy on commercial sales exacted from 
producers (LVYWGS) varies depending upon the balance of the 
stabilization fund account (BALWGS). If the account is in 
deficit, producers are required to contribute 4% of their 
commercial sales. If the account is in surplus but less 
than half of the historical 5 year moving average of net 
crop proceeds, producers are required to contribute 3% of 
their sales. Finally, if the account is in surplus and is 
greater than half of the historical 5 year moving average 
of net crop proceeds, producers are required to contribute 
2%. Total funding of the stabilization account (WGSFDG) 
156 
comes from both the federal government and producers. The 
federal government's contribution on a percent basis of 
commercial sales is 2 percentage points higher than the 
producer levy. No account is taken of any interest 
accruing on fund surpluses. 
Tables 4.7 to 4.9 show that crop i's share of the 
deficiency payment, PYTWGS, equals the proportion of total 
producer levy contributions over the last three years that 
was contributed by producers of crop i. The levy 
contribution of crop i's producers (LVYi) in any year is 
the multiple of the producer levy and the proportion of 
crop i's production that is commercially sold. The total 
deficiency payment made to crop i divided by crop i's 
eligible commercial sales gives the deficiency payment for 
crop i on a per tonne basis (DPi). The return on crop i's 
commercial sales is the market return (Pi) plus the per 
tonne deficiency payment less the per tonne producer levy. 
The government assisted return (Pi&) equals the return on 
commercial sales, weighted by commercial sales over total 
production, plus the market price, weighted by the 
production remainder over total production. 
Because W6SP calculations are based on oilseed sales 
rather than their product sales, the government assisted 
returns for oilseed meal and oil are determined recursively 
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Table 4.7: Policy block specification for wheat return 
calculations 
Market Return 
PWHt = PPlt 
Government Assisted Return 
a 
PWHt = 0.113*PWHt + 0.887*[PWHt+DPWHt-LVYWGSt*PWHt] 
WGSP Deficiency Payment Per Tonne 
2 2 
DPWHt = PYTWGSt * [C (LVYWHt_k)/Sl (LVYWHt-k 
k=0 k=0 
+LVYCGt_k+LVYOMt_k)] / [0.887 *QWHt] 
WGSP Lew Payment 
LVYWHt = LVYWGSt*0.887*PWHt*QWHt 
Market Unit Value Added 
VAWHt = [PWHt*YWHt " (l.+O.5)*PFZt*FZWHt 
- 0.15*PPNt*YWHt]/YWHt 
Government Assisted Unit Value Added 
VAWHt = [PWHt*YWHt " (l.+O.5)*PFZt*FZWHt 
- 0.15*PPNt*YWHt]/YWHt 
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Table 4.8: Policy block specification for coarse grain 
return calculations 
Market Return 
PCGt = PP3t 
Government Assisted Return 
PCGt = 0.375*PCGt + 0.625*[PCGt+DPCGt-LVYWGSt*PCGt] 
WGSP Deficiency Payment Per Tonne 
2 2 
DPCGt = PYTWGSt * [22. (LVYCGt-k)/^ (LVYWHt_k 
k=0 k=0 
+LVYCGt_k+LVYOMt_k)] / [0.625*QCGt] 
WGSP Lew Payment 
LVYCGt = FT*LVYWGSt*0.625*PCGt*QCGt 
Market Unit Value Added 
VACGt = [PCGt*YCGt - (1.+0.5)*PFZt*FZCGt 
- 0.15*PPNt*YCGt]/YCGt 
Government Assisted Unit Value Added 
VACGt = [PCGt*YCGt - (l.+O.5)*PFZt*FZCGt 
- 0.15*PPNt*YCGt]/YCGt 
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Table 4.9: Policy block specification for oilseed return 
calculations 
Market Return on Oilseeds 
POSt = [PP71t*Y0Mt + PP81t*Y00t]/[1.56*Y0Mt] 
Government Assisted Return on Oilseeds 
POSt = 0.082*POSt + 0.918*[POSt+DPOSt-LVYWGSt*POSt] 
Government Assisted Return on Oilseed Meal 
PP71t = (PP71t/P0St)*POSt 
Government Assisted Return on Oilseed Oil 
PPBlt = (PP81t/P0St)*P0St 
WGSP Deficiencv Pavment Per Tonne 
2 2 
DPOSt = PYTWGSt * [S (LVYOSt-k)/'Sl (LVYWHt-k 
k=0 k=0 
+LVYCGt_k+LVYOMt-]c) ] / [0.918*1. 56*QOMt] 
WGSP Lew Pavment 
LVYCGt = FT*LVYWGSt*0.918*[PP71t*QOMt+PP81t*QOOt] 
Market Unit Value Added 
VAOMt = [PP71t*Y0Mt + PP81t*Y00t - (1.+0.8)*PFZt*FZOMt 
- 0.60*PPNt*YOMt]/YOMt 
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Table 4.9 (Continued) 
Government Assisted Unit Value Added 
VAOMt = [PP71t*ÏOMt + PP81t*Y00t - (l.+O.8)*PFZt*FZOMt 
- 0.60*PPNt*YOMt]/YOMt 
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from the government assisted return for oilseed. 
It is assumed producers make their cropping decisions 
based on their expectations concerning government assisted 
unit value added (VAi^) rather than just market unit value 
added (VAi). The two value added concepts differ in that 
the former takes into account deficiency payment receipt 
from the WGSP while the latter doesn't. To form their 
expectations about deficiency payment receipt, producers 
must first form preliminary production estimates. At the 
point of time they are making these estimates, producers 
have already decided the total amount of land they are 
going to commit to crop and forage production in the coming 
year. They use this knowledge to estimate individual crop 
areas for year t+1. In particular producers in year t 
initially expect crop i's area (Ai®) in year t+1 to equal 
current area (Ai) adjusted by the percent change in total 
crop and forage area (AA); 
(4.15) Ait = Ait * [ 1 + (AAt+i - AAt)/AAt ]. 
Producers initial yield expectations incorporate trend 
yield growth rates. In particular producers expect crop 
i's yield (Yi®) in year t+1 to equal current yield (Yi) 
162 
adjusted by the simple average of the trend yield growth 
rate (YTRDi) and last year's growth rate: 
(4.16) Yit = Yit * [ 1 + 0.5*(YTRDi+(Yit-Yit_i)/Yit_i)]. 
Ideally, these initial production expectations should be 
used only as the starting values of an iterative procedure 
which would simultaneously solve producers deficiency 
payment expectations with yield and area. However, since 
the allocation model is very computer intensive, such an 
iterative procedure would greatly escalate computation 
time. For the sake of minimizing computation time, this 
simultaneous solution was not attempted. The recursive 
passage of information from deficiency payment expectation 
formation to yield calculation to area calculation is only 
gone through once in each time period. 
4.6 Red Meat Tripartite Stabilization 
A hybrid of the different stabilization schemes 
covering the various stages of production and the various 
commodity components of the bovine and ovine production 
bundle in the different provinces is structurally 
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represented. The hybrid comes closest to resembling the 
slaughter cattle and feeder cattle National Tripartite 
Price Stabilization (NTPS) schemes. Specifically, producer 
floor prices (SPBO) are calculated on an annual basis as 
current cash costs plus 90 percent of the preceding 5 year 
average margin between cash costs and market realized 
prices. As for the WGSP, several sweeping assumptions are 
made for representation ease that are in contradiction to 
actual features of the NTPS schemes. They are as follows: 
1) there is neither individual or national limits to the 
stabilization coverage, all production is eligible; 2) 
there is full province and producer participation; and 
finally 3) the scheme is indefinite with no set termination 
date. Again producers are assumed to be risk neutral. 
Table 4.10 shows that the government assisted return 
(PBO®) on bovine and ovine production equals the market 
return (PBO) or the support price, depending on which is 
the higher, less the producer levy. The market return 
includes the revenues earned on the meat meal, fat, and 
hide byproducts. 
If the support price is greater than the market price, 
the total stabilization payout (PYTBO) equals the price 
difference times production (QBO). Otherwise the payout is 
zero. The producer levy on commercial sales is assumed to 
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Table 4.10: Policy block specification for bovine and 
ovine return calculations 
Market Return 
PBOt = PP4t + PP72t*BY47t + PP82t*BY48t + PP92t*BY49t 
Government Assisted Return 
PBOt = Max { PBOt, SPBOt } - LVYBOt*PBOt 
Stabilization Support Price 
5 
SPBOt = [VCBOt + 0.90 * SI. VABOt_k*YBOt ] / YBOt 
k=l 
Total NTS Pavout 
PYTBOt = Max { 0 , SPBOfPBOt } * QBOt 
Producer Lew 
LVYBOt = 0.015 - 0.0001*BALBOt_i 
Stabilization Fund Balance 
BALBOt = BALBOt_i + FDGBOt - PYTBOt 
NTS FUNDING: Government and Producer Contributions 
FDGBOt = 3 * LVYBOt * PBOt * QBOt 
Variable Cost Per Head 
VCBOt = FPlt*FD41t + FP3t*FD43t + FP5t*FD45t + FP7t*FD47t 
+ FP8t*FD48t + PPNt*0.06*YBOt 
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Table 4.10 (Continued) 
Market Unit Value Added 
VABOt = [PB0t*YB0t - VCB0t]/YB0t 
Government Assisted Unit Value Added 
VABOt = [PB0j*YB0t - VCB0t]/YB0t 
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be 1.5 percent plus an adjustment according to the size of 
the stabilization deficit (BALBO). The federal government, 
provincial governments and producers all contribute to the 
total funding (FDGBO) of the stabilization account. Both 
the federal and the provincial governments contribute in 
equal proportions to producers. 
As for the WGSP, it is assumed beef producers take 
into consideration expected deficiency payment receipt when 
forming production decisions for the coming year. To form 
these deficiency payment payout expectations they need 
initial yield estimates. It is assumed beef producers form 
their initial yield estimates the same way as grain 
producers form their initial yield estimates (see Equation 
(3.16)). 
Ideally, pork policy should be specified similar to 
bovine and ovine policy, and poultry and egg policy similar 
to dairy policy. However, because pork, poultry and eggs 
are combined into a single production bundle in the CAM, 
such differential policy treatment is difficult to 
quantify. As a result, since pork is the dominant 
component of the other livestock products production 
bundle, a decision was made to just represent pork 
stabilization policy for this bundle. As can be seen in 
Table 4.11 the specification is exactly the same as that 
167 
Table 4.11: Policy block specification for pork, poultry 
and egg return calculations 
Market Return 
PPOt = PP61t + PP72t*BY67t + PP83t*BY68t + PP93t*BY49t 
Government Assisted Return 
a 
PPOt = Max { PPOt, SPPOt } - LVYPOt*PPOt 
Stabilization Support Price 
5 
SPPOt = [VCPOt + 0.95 * C VAPOt_k*YPOt] / YPOt 
k=l 
Total NTS Payout 
PYTPOt = Max ( 0 , SPPOt-PPOt } * QPOt 
Producer Lew 
LVYPOt = 0.02 - 0.0001*BALPOt_i 
Stablization Fund Balance 
BALPOt = BALPOt-i + FDGPOt - PYTPOt 
NTS Funding; Government and Producer Contributions 
FDGPOt = 3 * LVYPOt * PPOt * QPOt 
Variable Cost Per Head 
VCPOt = FPlt*FD61t + FP3t*FD63t + FP5t*FD65t + FP7t*FD67t 
+ FP8t*FD68t + 0.04*YPOt*PPNt 
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Table 4.11 (Continued) 
Market Value Added 
VAPOt = [PP0t*YP0t - VCP0t]/YP0t 
Government Assisted Value Added 
VAPOt = [PP0t*YP0t - VCP0t]/YP0t 
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for bovine and ovine, with two exceptions. First, producer 
floor prices (SPBO) are calculated as current cash costs 
plus 95 percent of the preceding 5 year average margin 
between cash costs and market realized prices rather than 
90 percent. Second, the producer levy on commercial sales 
is assumed to be 2 percent with adjustment rather than 1.5 
percent. 
4.7 Government Program Financing 
It is assumed the government finances its share of 
stabilization funding through an income tax, J,. The size 
ofvaries from year to year in direct correspondence to 
the amount of monies needed. The government just collects 
funds sufficient for its current needs, no more, no less, 
and levies the income tax after (or multiplicatively to) 
the income tax, ^  , used to service the trade deficit. It 
is assumed that agriculture producers must pay both types 
of income tax on any deficiency payments they receive as 
well as on their market income. 
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4.8 Summary 
This chapter concentrated on the process by which 
Canadian policies filter world prices before they are 
transmitted to the various levels of the domestic market. 
It was decided after a brief review of Canadian commodity 
specific agriculture policy, that out of the myriad of 
policies affecting domestic agriculture production and 
trade, supply management and income stabilization programs 
were the most deserving of particular attention. 
Structural specifications were formed of the mechanics of 
these programs, and incorporated into the CAM. The effects 
of all other farm programs and border measures on domestic 
prices were netted together and expressed as a tariff 
equivalent. 
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5. AGRICULTURE FACTOR RETENTION UNDER THE 
CURRENT COMMODITY SPECIFIC POLICY REGIME 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the long run implications, as 
portrayed by the CAM, of the current commodity specific 
policy setting for agriculture factor retention. To get 
these results two policy simulations involving the entire 
BLS were carried out. Section 5.2 outlines how the CAM was 
calibrated for these policy runs. The first scenario, 
described in Section 5.3, assumes a continuance of current 
commodity specific policies. The second scenario, 
described in Section 5.4, assumes global free trade in 
agricultural commodities. The results of this free trade 
run are used as base reference for the results of the 
status quo run. In Section 5.5 estimates are given on how 
much protection current policies provide agriculture 
commodities. Several different government intervention 
measures are employed. The impacts current policies have 
on agriculture factor usage and value are then assessed in 
Section 5.6. 
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5.2 Model Calibration 
The policy runs were conducted using the entire BLS so 
that world prices feeding into the CAM would reflect the 
interaction of the CAM with the other national and regional 
models. In other words, so world commodity prices would 
reflect any large country impacts Canada may have on them 
during the course of simulation. 
Originally 2015 was chosen for the projection horizon. 
This was shortened to 2000 when the simulation results past 
this date were found to be dynamically unstable. Continued 
extrapolation of the growth trends estimated for the 
earlier years, gave rise in the latter years to 
unreasonable projections, both in terms of their magnitude 
and inter-year stability. 
The breakdown of the simulation results after year 
2000 is not surprising. During initial construction of the 
BLS, solution alignment devices were introduced into the 
structure of each of its component models to guide 
simulation solutions of selected variables towards pre-set 
target values for the year 2000. The purpose was to 
prevent simulation solutions from straying off on tangents. 
Since the BLS was not originally intended for use beyond 
2000, similar guidance measures are not available in its 
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structure to provide corrective influence beyond this date. 
To create a realistic starting point for the 
scenarios, equations in the input block of the CAM were 
calibrated to project close to actual values and growth 
rates for the mid '80s. In line with the recessionary 
character of this period, scaling parameters were lowered 
in the investment supply and agriculture cost equations, 
and time trends were dampened in the nonagriculture value 
added and land supply equations. 
5.3 Scenario 1: The Status Quo 
5.3.1 structural representation 
Agriculture policy representation in the CAM for the 
status quo scenario is as described in Chapter 4. All 
border instruments are expressed in terms of tariff 
equivalents in world to domestic price linkages mimicking 
the reduced form of the government's decision making 
process. Overlaid on this specification are the mechanics 
of selected domestic farm programs, namely the Dairy Supply 
Management Program, the Western Grain Stabilization 
Program, and the Red Meat Stabilization Program. 
The methodology employed to represent agriculture 
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policy in each of the other national and regional models 
within the BLS falls into one of three categories. The 
first category is policy representation by structural 
specification. The USA, India, China and CMEA models adopt 
this methodology which differentiates between various forms 
of government intervention. The USA model, for example, 
explicitly recognizes trade quotas, land set aside 
programs, and stock policies apart from other domestic 
price support instruments. The second category is policy 
representation through the exclusive use of world to 
domestic price linkages. The linkages employed are like 
those in the CAM. They use the lagged world price, 
domestic price and self-sufficiency ratio as explanatory 
variables for synthesizing different price support measures 
into an aggregate tariff equivalent. Instruments that 
provide support via other means than price are ignored. 
The majority of models within the BLS adopt this reduced 
form specification. The third category is policy 
representation as a fixed percentage difference between 
domestic prices and corresponding world prices. This 
methodology is used in the 14 simple regional models 
accounting for the rest of the world in the BLS. Table 5.1 
shows which models in the BLS contain which type of policy 
specification. 
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Tcible 5.1: National and regional model classification of 
the BLS according to agricultural policy 
specification® 
Type 1; Structural 
U.S.A. India 
China Canada (Revised 
CMEA Version) 
Type 2; Reduced Form 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Brazil 
EC 
Egypt 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Japan 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Type 3; World Price Percentages 
African Oil Exporters 
African Medium Income Calorie Exporters 
African Medium Income Calorie Importers 
African Low Income Calorie Exporters 
African Low Income Calorie Importers 
Latin American High Income Calorie Exporters 
Latin American High Income Calorie Importers 
Latin American Medium-Low Income 
Southeast Asia High-Medium Income Calorie Exporters 
Southeast Asia High-Medium Income Calorie Importers 
Asia Low Income 
Southwest Asia High Income Oil Exporters 
Southwest Asia Medium-Low Income 
Rest of the World 
^Source; Fischer et al., 1988. 
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5.3.2 Simulation output 
Simulation output for the status quo scenario is 
presented in Tables 5.2 through 5.7. While examining these 
tabular results it should be kept in mind that the BLS does 
not purport to be a forecasting medium capable of picking 
up every market inflection. Rather, the BLS should be 
interpreted as a policy analysis tool that sifts through 
short term market fluctuations, as well as spurious 
deviations, to extract underlying secular trends. 
The BLS's portrayal of a continuance of status quo 
policies is as follows. As shown in Table 5.2 the general 
economy's recovery from the effects of the '80s recession 
will be protracted, but sure and stable. The economy^s 
annual growth rate during the forecast horizon slowly, but 
steadily increases from 1.7 percent in 1989 to 2.1 percent 
in 2000. Labor force expansion does not keep up with this 
output expansion. The growth rate of the labor force 
gradually falls over time from 1.1 percent in 1989 to 0.8 
percent in 2000 in correspondence to a downward trend in 
population growth rates. Population growth rates are 
exogenous to the simulation and were provided by the 
Environmental Protection Agency. In reaction to the tight 
labor supply, wages rise at an increasing rate relative to 
both the nonagriculture price and capital rent (see Table 
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Table 5.2: Estimated growth rates for economic indicators 
in the status quo scenario^ 
Macro Statistics 
GDP in 70$ 
Per Capita GDP in 70$ 
Nonagriculture GDP in 70$ 
Agriculture GDP in 70$ 
Market Income Parity 
Labor Statistics 
Population^ 
Labor Force 
Unemployment Rate 
Total Employed 
Nonagriculture Employed 
Agriculture Employed 
Capital Statistics 
Total Capital 
Nonagriculture Capital 
Agriculture Capital 
Total Investment 
Nonagriculture Investment 
Agriculture Investment 
YEAR 
1989/1995 1996/2000 
1.7 
0.9 
1.7 
0.4 
-1.8 
1.9 
1.3 
2.0 
0.1 
-0.9 
0.7 
0.9 
0 . 2  
0 . 8  
0.9 
0.9 
0 .  
0 .  
0 .  
0 .  
0 .  
0 .  
1.2 
1.2 
1.3 
1.6 
1.6 
1.4 
1.4 
1.5 
1.4 
1.8 
1.8 
1.4 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent change 
in each economic variable. 
^Population growth rates are exogenous to the 
simulation. The source for these growth rates is the 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
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5.3). The rise in real wages hinders a drop in the 
unemployment rate in two ways. First, it promotes 
increased effort on the part of all employed workers, so 
the physical number of workers required to perform any task 
is less than it was previously. Consequently, not as many 
workers have to be hired to service the output growth as 
would have had to have been hired if the real wage had 
remained constant. Second, and more importantly, it 
encourages the substitution of capital for labor in the 
nonagriculture production process. 
Market income parity of agriculture workers is 
measured by dividing the per worker contribution to 
agriculture GDP by the per worker contribution to 
nonagriculture GDP. Agriculture workers steadily lose 
parity to nonagriculture workers throughout the forecast 
horizon. In response to this parity loss, the influx of 
new farm entrants declines (see Table 5.4). The crop and 
forage area growth rate increases simultaneous to the 
decline in the growth rate of farm operators implying a 
gradual expansion in the average size farm. As land 
holdings increase per farm enterprise, so does the 
requirement for complementary capital and labor services. 
Capital stock grows at a constant annual rate of 1.3 
percent throughout the forecast horizon. Supplemental 
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Table 5.3: Estimated growth rates for real factor rents in 
the status quo scenario^ 
YEAR 
1989/1995 1996/2000 
Factor Rents^ 
Nonagriculture Wage 0.8 1.1 
Nonagriculture Capital Rent 0.5 0.5 
Agriculture Wage 0.8 1.6 
Agriculture Capital Rent 0.6 0.5 
Agriculture Land Rent 0.9 1.3 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent change 
in each economic variable. 
^All factor rents are expressed relative to the price 
of nonagriculture. 
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Table 5.4: Estimated growth rates for agriculture factor 
usage in the status quo scenario^ 
Factor of Production 
Agriculture Labor 
Operator Labor 
Hired Labor 
Capital Services 
Crop and Forage Area 
Sunmverfallow and Pasture 
YEAR 
1989/1995 1996/2000 
0.9 
0.7 
1.2 
1.3 
0.5 
-0.3 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
1.3 
0.7 
-0.7 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent change 
in each economic variable. 
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labor input is obtained through the hireling market. Since 
agriculture is the less preferred sector of employment, 
agriculture wages are perforced to grow at a faster rate 
than nonagriculture wages to attract additional farm hired 
help. The ensuing rapid rise in agriculture wages, 
however, serves to choke back the momentum in hired labor 
demand from 1.2 percent in the early '90s to 0.5 percent at 
the end of the decade. 
Table 5.5 shows that crop producers essentially 
receive all the benefits from the stabilization programs. 
No deficiency payments are triggered for cattle or hogs 
throughout the forecast horizon. This is in direct 
contradiction to the current state of affairs which has 
seen frequent and large payouts issued under the red meat 
stabilization plans. The CAM appears to be incapable of 
handling the red meat stabilization plans in a credible 
manner. The trouble lies in its annual framework. The 
quarterly income dips, which the red meat stabilization 
programs are designed to guard against, are masked in the 
average annual income figure which the CAM calculates. As 
a result the model has a built in bias to under estimate 
both the occurrence and size of livestock deficiency 
payments. 
For the next decade grain deficiency payments are 
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Table 5.5: Estimated stabilization policy parameters for 
the status quo scenario^ 
YEAR 
1989/1995 1996/2000 
All Procrrams 
Total Transfer^ -0.2 0.3 
Required Income Tax 0.2 0.2 
Western Grain Stabilization Program^ 
Expected Payout 8.4 10.4 
Actual Payout 16.5 17.5 
Wheat's Share (%) 48.5 47.3 
Coarse Grains' Share (%) 25.3 28.4 
Oilseed's Share (%) 26.2 24.2 
Fund Surplus 11.1 4.8 
Beef Stabilization^ 
Expected Payout 0.0 0.0 
Actual Payout 0.0 0.0 
Fund Surplus 32.9 46.8 
Levy 1.4 1.0 
Pork Stabilization^ 
Expected Payout 0.0 0.0 
Actual Payout 0.0 0.0 
Fund Surplus 32.4 50.2 
Levy 1.8 1.1 
^Reported statistics are calculated as simple averages 
of each economic variable. 
^The total transfer to agriculture producers is 
expressed as apercent of GDP of agriculture. 
^Stabilization payouts and fund balances are expressed 
as a percent of total commercial sales for the commodities 
in question. 
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forecast to be, in value, roughly equal to 17 percent of 
commercial sales. Of this total amount payable to the 
grain sector, wheat, in absolute terms, gets the lion's 
share of the benefits, but in relative terms, loses ground 
to coarse grain. The shifting of benefits towards coarse 
grains mirrors a relative shift in production patterns 
towards coarse grains because of depressed world wheat 
prices (see Table 5.6). Note that under the assumption of 
full producer participation in the Western Grain 
Stabilization Program and the assumption that the current 
levy system was in effect since the start of the program, 
the fund does not go into deficit despite the high payout 
rate. Under these qualifying assumptions the WGSP seems to 
be self-sustainable. 
A quick comparison of the rate at which agriculture 
producers lose parity throughout the projection period with 
the amount of income they receive from the stabilization 
programs reveals the anomaly that the rate at which 
producers lose market parity is countercyclical to the 
payout of the stabilization payments. Intuitively, one 
would expect market parity loss to be the greatest when the 
most stabilization payments are being made since these 
payments are triggered by falling agriculture producer 
incomes. The key to this anomaly lies in the value added 
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Table 5.6: Estimated growth rates for agriculture commodity 
production in the status quo scenario® 
YEAR 
1989/1995 1996/2000 
Agriculture Cmmmndity 
Wheat 2.8 1.0 
Coarse Grains 3.4 4.9 
Oilseed Meal 2.2 -0.1 
Other Food of Crop Origin 1.0 0.9 
Nonfood of Crop Origin 0.9 0.9 
Fruit 0.7 0.3 
Other Livestock Products 1.0 1.1 
Bovine and Ovine Meats 1.7 1.5 
Dairy Products 0.7 0.3 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent change 
in each economic variable. 
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nature of the GDP calculations. Depressed feed grain 
prices are a double edged sword with regard to aggregate 
agriculture income. On the one hand they lower grain 
producers incomes, but on the other hand they increase 
livestock producers profitability. The results imply that 
livestock producers net income gain from falling feed grain 
prices compensates for grain producers net income loss 
during the '90s. 
Table 5.5 shows that an income tax of around 0.2 
percent is required throughout the projection period to 
finance the stabilization programs. Because of the cam's 
bias against livestock stabilization payment payouts, this 
estimate is better interpreted as a lower bound for the 
required tax rate, rather than the mean value. If there 
were livestock payouts, the producer levy, and hence the 
government contribution share would not drop. 
Table 5.7 shows how agriculture's share of the primary 
resources is distributed across commodities. Wheat and 
coarse grains use the most land, bovine and ovine meat 
production the most labor, and other livestock products the 
most capital. 
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Table 5.7: Estimated factor allocation by agriculture 
commodity in the status quo scenario^ 
YEAR 
1989/1995 1996/2000 
Wheat Land Shareb 43.2 41.8 
Labor Share 3.2 3.1 
Capital Share 12.9 9.1 
Coarse Grains Land Share^ 38.2 40.3 
Labor Share 2.4 3.6 
Capital Share 4.6 7.3 
Oilseed Heal Land Share^ 14.2 13.5 
Labor Share 0.7 0.6 
Capital Share 3.5 3.4 
Other food Crops Land Share^ 4.3 4.1 
Labor Share 9.2 8.4 
Capital Share 9.4 8.8 
Nonfood Crop Land Shareb 0.2 0.2 
Labor Share 13.3 12.2 
Capital Share 1.4 1.3 
Fruit Labor Share 1.7 1.5 
Capital Share 1.6 1.3 
Other Livestock Labor Share 19.8 19.4 
Capital Share 32.8 33.2 
Bovine and Ovine Labor Share 30.3 32.9 
Capital Share 18.2 20.4 
Dairy Products Labor Share 19.5 18.3 
Capital Share 15.7 15.2 
^Reported statistics express average annual commodity 
use as a percent share of total agriculture use. 
^Area devoted to each crop is expressed as a percent 
share of total crop area only. Land put aside for forage 
use is not included in the calculation 
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5.4 Scenario 2: Multilateral Trade Liberalization 
5.4.1 Hypothesis 
In this scenario it is assumed all countries, except 
the centrally planned economies, agree to completely phase 
out over a five year period, starting in 1990, all 
intervention in agriculture markets. 
5.4.2 Domestic price determination 
Parikh et al. (1988) point out that under multilateral 
trade liberalization the domestic market price of an 
exchange bundle for any particular country need not equal 
the world market price. There are three possible sources 
of deviation between the two prices. The first source of 
deviation is peculiar to the BLS and concerns the way world 
prices were constructed for the exchange bundles. The 
world market price for each exchange bundle was constructed 
by weighing the world prices of its commodity components by 
internationally traded quantities. But, when considering 
the world price of an exchange bundle in the context of a 
particular country, the weights need to be changed to 
domestically consumed quantities. The second source of 
deviation concerns product quality differences between what 
the particular country produces and what is internationally 
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traded. The third source of deviation concerns the 
particular country's net trade position. Due to 
transportation costs the domestic price of importers is 
higher than the world market price, and the domestic price 
of exporters lower. 
The procedure used to account for these three sources 
of price deviation in the BLS for the multilateral trade 
liberalization scenario is the same as that employed by 
Parikh et al. (1988). For convenience, this two-step 
procedure is briefly reviewed. In the first step the world 
market price (Pi*) of each exchange bundle i is adjusted to 
reflect the domestic consumption pattern and product 
quality of country j by successively multiplying the world 
price by constant multiplicative factors: WTOCij and 
QADij. WTOCij, which corrects for the domestic consumption 
pattern, is the historical average ratio of the world 
prices of bundle i's commodity components weighted by world 
trade to the prices weighted by country j's domestic 
consumption. QADij, the correction factor for quality 
differentials, in contrast to WTOCij which is data based, 
reflects for the most part subjective judgments. 
Parikh et al. call the world price, after the above 
adjustments have been made, the country specific world 
market price (CSWPij); 
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* 
(5.1) CSWPijt = WTOCij * QADij * Pif 
In the second step the influence of the country's net trade 
position on domestic prices is determined from the CSWPij's 
according to country j's self-sufficiency in commodity i. 
Given a self-sufficiency ratio (SSRij) of unity, the 
domestic price of a bundle (CPij) equals the country 
specific world market price. For all other values of the 
self-sufficiency ratio, the domestic price varies, within 
absolute bounds, from the country specific world market 
price inversely as the self-sufficiency ratio varies from 
unity; 
(5.2) CPijt = E 1 + (l-SSRijt_i)*WPDEVijt ] * CSWPijt 
with WPDEVijt = WPMAXi if SSRijt < 1 
and WPDEVijt = WPMINi if SSRijt > 1 
where 
WPMAXi is the maximum percent difference allowed between 
the domestic price of exchange bundle i and 
the commodity specific world market price; and 
WPMINi is the minimum percent difference allowed between 
the domestic price of exchange bundle i and 
the commodity specific world market price. 
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5.4.3 Transition period 
To promote solution stability in the BLS a five year 
transition period is allowed between the time the move to 
multilateral trade liberalization is initiated and the time 
it takes full effect. As a result the model's portrayed 
solutions do not fully reflect free trade until the year 
1995. This transition period is consistent with reality to 
the extent countries will want to gradually rather than 
instantaneously remove their protection measures in order 
to give their producers time to adjust to the new global 
trading conditions. 
During the transition period domestic market prices 
are weighted averages of what the price would be assuming a 
continuation of current commodity specific policies and 
what the price would be under free trade. The weights 
assigned to each price varies over time with the free trade 
price being assigned the smallest weight during the first 
year of the transition period and the largest weight during 
the last year. 
Stabilization deficiency payments are phased out 
during the transition period by gradually lowering program 
support prices. This is done by introducing an adjustment 
variable, FT, into the support price calculations so that 
in general; 
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5 
(5.3) SPit = t VCit + FT*SLi*2:. VAit_k*Yit_]c ] / Yit 
k=l 
where SLi is the stabilization program support level: 
0.90 for beef, 0.95 for pork, & 1.00 for 
grain and oilseeds; 
SPi is the support price of commodity i; 
VAi is value added or market return over cash costs 
of commodity i; 
VCi is the cash costs associated with producing 
commodity i; and 
Yi is yield of commodity i. 
The adjustment variable FT takes the value of 1 under the 
current policy regime and 0 under multilateral free trade. 
During the transition period it progressively adopts lower 
values between the range of 0.95 and 0.75. This means, for 
example, that for the beef stabilization program, producers 
support price for the first year of the transition period 
equals current unit cash costs plus 95*90 percent of the 
preceding 5 year average margin between unit cash costs and 
market realized prices. Producer levies are decreased 
simultaneously with and in equal proportion to value added 
support. 
At the end of the transition period, it is assumed 
that if there is a deficit in the stabilization fund 
account, the government will completely absorb the deficit. 
If there is a surplus individual producers will be paid 
back their contributions in proportion to the total amount 
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they paid into the fund. Because these refunds will be 
based on producers historical production rather than their 
current production, it is assumed effects of the refunds on 
production will be null. That is, it is assumed that 
producers will regard the fund as windfall gains that have 
no association with their production decisions. 
5.5 Commodity Protection Rates 
5.5.1 Measures 
Reviews cataloguing the strengths and weaknesses of 
different government intervention measures are readily 
available in the literature (for e.g., Corden, 1971; 
Balassa, 1971; Strak, 1982; Hazier and Parsons, 1987; and 
Schwartz and Parker, 1988). The five measures employed in 
this study correspond to the Hazier and Parsons 
definitions. Four of the measures determine the amount of 
income transferred to producers by just focusing on the 
policies implications for price and producers in-pocket 
unit return. The fifth measure provides a more balanced 
assessment of income transfer. It allows production 
quantity to respond, as well as price, to policy 
implementation and change. 
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The first measure considered provides the least policy 
coverage, but is the most often used because it is the 
easiest to calculate. The nominal rate of protection (NRP) 
of commodity i is defined to be the percentage excess, 
attributable to government intervention, of the domestic 
market price (Pi) over the world market price (Pi*): 
(5.4) NRPi = (Pi - Pi*) / Pi* 
As defined, the NRP only recognizes policies that drive a 
wedge between domestic and world market prices. Thus, 
while the NRP recognizes all border barriers, both tariff 
and nontariff, directly applicable to commodity i, it does 
not recognize the tariff structure on intermediate inputs 
used in commodity i's production. Likewise, while the NRP 
recognizes farm programs, such as government surplus 
purchases, production quotas and administrative pricing, 
that support producers incomes via market price, it does 
not recognize programs, such as deficiency payments, 
marketing subsidies, research and extension funding, and 
input subsidies, that support producers incomes via other 
means than market price. 
The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) and the effective 
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rate of protection (ERP) pick up some, but not all of this 
policy fallout. Each captures all the policy instruments 
captured by the NRP, plus a few more. They differ with 
respect to what types of additional instruments they 
incorporate. 
The NRA of commodity i is defined to be the percentage 
excess, attributable to government intervention, of 
producers gross unit return adjusted by direct government 
assistance (Pi^), over the world market price: 
(5.5) NRAi = (PiS - Pi*) / Pi*. 
As defined, the NRA accounts for deficiency payments and 
marketing subsidies in addition to all the policies that 
drive a wedge between domestic and world market prices of 
commodity i. It ignores, however, all input directed 
instruments. 
The ERP of commodity i is defined to be the percentage 
excess, attributable to government intervention, of unit 
value added (VAi) calculated with domestic market prices 
over unit value added (VAi*) calculated with world market 
prices: 
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(5.6) ERPi = (VAi - VAi*) / VAi*. 
While this measure recognizes all price supporting 
instruments directly applicable to commodity i and each of 
its intermediate inputs, and recognizes to a certain extent 
research and extension funding through the input-output 
coefficients used to calculate unit value added, it does 
not recognize producer income support via other means than 
price. 
The fourth measure considered is the effective rate of 
assistance (ERA). The ERA of commodity i is defined to be 
the percentage excess, attributable to government 
intervention, of unit value added calculated using 
producers gross unit return adjusted by direct government 
assistance (VAi®) over unit value added calculated with 
world market prices; 
(5.7) ERAi = (VAi® - VAi*) / VAi*. 
Although the ERA is more comprehensive in terms of 
policy coverage than the other three government 
intervention measures discussed so far, it is just as 
lacking as they are when it comes to quantifying production 
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effects of policy implementation and change. It is 
unrealistic to assume that producers will not adjust their 
production levels in response to changes in their in-pocket 
unit returns. Completely different pictures can be 
obtained about the impacts of a policy change on producers 
welfare when production is allowed to react as well as 
price. For example, because supply management programs 
restrict output, the income transfer associated with them 
is less than that implied by just looking at the programs' 
effect on price. The producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) 
takes into account both price and quantity affect of 
government intervention. 
The PSE of a particular commodity is defined to be the 
amount of money that would have to be given its producers 
to fully compensate them for eliminating all forms of 
government intervention that influence the income they 
receive for producing the commodity. The PSE for commodity 
i is calculated as government assisted unit value added 
times production (Qi) less unit value added calculated with 
world market prices times the production that would ensue 
if this was all the return producers received: 
(5.8) PSEi = VAia*Qi - VAi**Qi*. 
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5.5.2 World market price 
The crucial question when calculating the above 5 
measures is *What values should be used as the world market 
prices?'. For lack of better information, many studies 
(Josling, 1981; Barichello, 1982; Marling and Thompson, 
1983; OECD, 1987b; and Goodloe, 1988) have just used 
current world prices. There are two problems with this 
practice. First, it subsumes Canada is a small country 
with respect to every commodity. While this assumption is 
legitimate for the majority of agriculture goods, it is not 
for grains, particularly wheat. Second, it is completely 
misleading when the protectionist action is pursued simply 
to offset world price distortions induced by other 
countries interventions. The appropriate reference world 
prices are the world prices that would prevail if all 
countries stopped intervening in agriculture markets. The 
advantage of working in the BLS is that it is possible, by 
running a multilateral trade liberalization scenario like 
the one described in Section 5.4, to estimate these 
hypothetical prices. 
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5.5.3 Protection estimates 
Table 5.8 contains estimates of commodity protection 
rates for each of the production bundles. The estimates 
were calculated using mean price and quantity values for 
the 5 year period starting in 1996. Unfortunately the ERA 
estimates only reflect those farm programs, which support 
producers incomes via other means than price, explicitly 
incorporated in the structure of the CAM. For example, the 
effective rate of assistance estimates for wheat, coarse 
grains and oilseed meals do not reflect transportation 
subsidies since these subsidies are not structurally 
represented in the CAM. Because no attempt was made to 
represent farm programs, which support producers incomes 
via other means than price, for commodities other than 
grain and livestock products, estimates of nominal and 
effective rates of assistance for these commodities are the 
same as the respective estimates of nominal and effective 
rates of protection. 
One of the most striking things about Table 5.8 is the 
preponderance of negative numbers listed there. The 
implication is that most of current Canadian government 
intervention just goes to offset the harmful price 
distorting effects of other countries policy actions. In 
other words, status quo policies do not transfer excess 
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Table 5.8: Estimates of commodity protection rates 
associated with status quo policies® 
NRP ERP NBA ERA PSE^ 
Wheat -4.7 -14.2 -1.6 -6.1 -16.5 
Coarse Grains -3.4 -28.4 -1.2 -24.3 -22.8 
Oilseed Meal -2.4 -9.9 0.9 -3.9 -8.5 
Other Food 
of Crop Origin 
-7.8 -15.2 -7.8 -15.2 -17.5 
Nonfood Crops 15.9 17.9 15.9 17.9 25.7 
Other Livestock 
Products 
-1.6 —1.3 -2.7 —3.2 4.1 
Bovine and Ovine 
Meats 
-13.5 -15.6 -14.4 -16.6 -31.8 
Dairy Products 2.9 3.3 2.9 3.3 -12.1 
Fruit —6.6 -23.7 —6.6 -23.7 00 
^Reported statistics are calculated using the mean 
value of price and quantity estimates over the period 1996 
through 2000. 
^Producer Subsidy Equivalents are expressed as 
percentages of net income in the status quo scenario. 
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income to Canadian agriculture producers, but only restore 
their incomes to levels that they would otherwise be at if 
other countries didn't intervene in the marketplace. The 
inference is that Canada could be quite competitive with 
agriculture products in a multilateral free trade 
environment. 
The above results are in direct contradiction to those 
obtained in other studies (see Table 5.9). Both the USDA 
(1988) and the OECD (1987b) depict Canada as a significant 
subsidizer in its own right rather than a guilt free party 
trying to mend damage caused by the policy setting actions 
of other governments. Several factors contribute to this 
divergent portrayal. First, PSE's are time dependent. 
Their value is a function of the period for which they are 
calculated. Both the USDA and OECD estimates reflect 
historical data. The present study's estimates reflect 
forecast data, and are calculated for a period when 
commodity prices are even more bleak than they have been to 
date. The implication is that Canada, because of its 
relatively small treasury, and hence lack of wherewithal to 
compete, has to give ground in this future period in the on 
going subsidy war between major exporters. It is a 
realization of a fear that is currently pushing Canada to 
the GATT bargaining table. 
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Table 5.9: Comparison of producer subsidy equivalent 
estimates across studies 
Present 
Study 
OECD 
Study® 
USDA 
Studyb 
Time Frame 1996/00 1979/81 1982/86 
PSEs° 
Wheat -16.5 16.6 30.4 
Coarse Grains -22.8 11.2 23.6 
Oilseed Meal -8.5 17.4 26.6 
Other Livestock 
Products 
4.1 21.7 12.8 
Bovine & Ovine Meats -31.8 13.1 9.9 
Dairy -12.1 80.2 73.7 
^Source: OECD (1987b). 
^Source: USDA (1988). 
CpSEs are expressed as percentages of net income. 
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A second factor contributing to the divergence of 
results is the incomplete policy recognition of the present 
study. Among key policies omitted from the protection 
estimates are transportation subsidies for grains and 
oilseed, and direct producer payments for manufacturing 
milk. 
The third factor concerns what world reference prices 
the different studies use. Both the USDA and the OECD use 
current world prices mirroring the policy actions of all 
countries, rather than world prices "uncontaminated" from 
government intervention. As a result, it is impossible to 
decipher from the OECD and USDA estimates whether current 
Canadian policies are adding to or correcting world price 
distortions. 
Finally, the fourth factor concerns quantity response. 
The USDA and OECD studies implicitly assume production 
levels will be impervious to removal of status quo 
policies. The present study allows production quantities 
to adjust. The importance of this feature can be 
demonstrated by examining the ERA and PSE estimates for 
other livestock products. The ERA estimate, which does not 
consider production response, implies a negative protection 
rate while the PSE estimate implies a positive protection 
rate. 
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5.6 Factor Usage and Reward Comparison Across Sectors 
Tables 5.10 through 5.13 show the estimated percent 
differences between the two scenarios in level values of 
selected economic indicators. Free trade values are 
expressed relative to the status quo values. In general, 
in terms of variable coverage, these Tables follow the 
format of Tables 5.2 through 5.7 with the omission of 
variables describing nonagriculture output and factor 
usage. Because these is less than a 0.2 percent difference 
in nonagriculture output and factor usage between the two 
scenarios, data for the nonagriculture sector are not 
reported. The tentative conclusion is made that a move to 
free trade in agriculture commodities will have minimal 
impact on the nonagriculture sector. 
Although agriculture output, as a whole, only 
increases a marginal 1.6 percent under multilateral trade 
liberalization, much more buoyant prices in this scenario 
than in the status quo scenario increase agriculture 
producers market income parity by 32.3 percent (see Table 
5.10) As a result of greater parity, significant 
differences in agriculture labor force size and composition 
can be noted between the two scenarios (see Table 5.12). 
Total labor employment in agriculture is less in the 
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Table 5.10: Estimated percent differences in agriculture 
profitability indicators between the 
multilateral trade liberalization and status 
quo scenarios^ 
Profitability Indicators 
GDP of Agriculture 
Market Income Parity 
YEAR 
1990/1995 
0.3 
25.3 
1996/2000 
1.6 
32.3 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent 
difference in each economic variable between the two 
scenarios, using the status quo figure as the base. 
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Table 5.11: Estimated percent differences in real factor 
rents between the multilateral trade 
liberalization and status quo scenarios^ 
YEAR 
Factor Rents*) 
Nonagriculture Wage 
Nonagriculture Capital Rent 
Agriculture Wage 
Agriculture Capital Rent 
Agriculture Land Rent 
1990/1995 
0 . 0  
0 . 0  
9.4 
0 . 0  
2 . 0  
1996/2000 
- 0 . 2  
0.1 
27.3 
0 . 0  
3.6 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent 
difference in each economic variable between the two 
scenarios, using the status quo figure as the base. 
^All factor rents are expressed relative to the price 
of nonagriculture. 
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Table 5.12: Estimated percent differences in agriculture 
factor usage between the multilateral trade 
liberalization and status quo scenarios^ 
Factors of Production 
Agriculture Labor 
Operator Labor 
Hired Labor 
Capital Services 
Crop and Forage Area 
Suininerfallow and Pasture 
YEAR 
1990/1995 1996/2000 
0.7 
2.5 
-1.9 
0 . 8  
1.4 
•2.0 
-1.4 
7.7 
-13.7 
2.5 
1.8 
-2.7 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent 
difference in each economic variable between the two 
scenarios, using the status quo figure as the base. 
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Tcible 5.13: Estimated percent difference in agriculture 
comodity production eind factor usage between 
the multilateral trade liberalization and 
status quo scenarios^ 
YEAR 
1990/1995 1996/2000 
Wheat Production -0.3 10.5 
Land Use 3.7 5.6 
Labor Use 9.5 11.9 
Capital Use 12.8 21.4 
Coarse Grains Production -3.8 -7.1 
Land Use -2.9 -4.3 
Labor Use -16.8 -25.7 
Capital Use -14.1 -19.3 
Oilseed Heal Production 3.1 4.1 
Land Use 1.5 0.1 
Labor Use 1.4 -8.1 
Capital Use 4.4 — 0.2 
Other Food Crop Production 1.6 -0.3 
Land Use -1.1 -3.4 
Labor Use -9.0 -21.8 
Capital Use -6.4 -15.2 
Nonfood Crops Production -5.9 -12.5 
Land Use -7.9 -12.4 
Labor Use -35.8 -52.5 
Capital Use -34.1 -48.3 
Fruit Production 0.0 -2.7 
Labor Use —6.8 -19.2 
Capital Use -4.0 -12.3 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent 
difference in each economic variable between the two 
scenarios, using the status quo figure as the base. 
208 
Tctble 5.13 (Continued) 
Other Livestock Production -5.1 -7.3 
Labor Use —26. 6 -34.6 
Capital Use -24.5 -29.1 
Bovine and Ovine Production 3.6 10.0 
Labor Use 13.7 24.4 
Capital Use 17.8 34.9 
Dairy Products Production 13.1 16.0 
Labor Use 40.0 33.0 
Capital Use 42.0 44.3 
209 
multilateral trade liberalization scenario. However, while 
total labor employment is down by 1.5 percent the number of 
farm operators is up by 7.7 percent. The absolute decline 
in employment opportunities in agriculture is strictly with 
respect to hired labor. The implication is clear. Current 
commodity specific policies are not preserving the 
traditional family farm, as is often their stated intent. 
Instead, they are aiding and abetting the demise of the 
family farm by encouraging a move to huge industrial 
agrarian operations that are run using a hired work force 
rather than unpaid family labor. 
Capital use and land use increase under multilateral 
trade liberalization in correspondence to the increase in 
number of farm operators, but does not keep pace implying 
smaller farm sizes and a switch to more labor intensive 
agriculture activities. Table 5.13 shows dairy and beef 
production, which don't require as large a scale 
operations, as say grains do, to achieve economies of 
scale, are favored. Beef production is up 10 percent and 
dairy 16 percent. Higher world wheat prices increases the 
production of this commodity at the expense of coarse 
grains. Both the production of other livestock products 
and the production of nonfood items of crop origin is down 
in comparison to production levels in the status quo 
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scenario. Note, these are the two commodities that were 
estimated to have positive PSEs. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter explored the factor market implications 
associated with a continuation of the status quo policy 
course. Under this policy regime, it was projected there 
will be a trend to larger farm sizes. Farmers will become 
more and more dependent on capital and hired labor to 
augment their own labor services in the running of these 
larger farm operations. Because agriculture producers will 
find it increasingly difficult to scrape a living from the 
depressed commodity market conditions characteristic of 
this period, there will be a decline in the growth rate of 
number of farm operators. Grain markets will be 
particularly hard hit. WGSP deficiency payments annually 
paid out during this period amount to 17 percent of 
commercial sales. There are no deficiency payments made 
under the red meat stabilization plans, but this is more a 
reflection of structural weaknesses in the CAM than healthy 
livestock markets. Financing of stabilization programs 
costs Canadian taxpayers a little less than 0.2 percent of 
211 
their income. 
Estimated commodity protection rates indicate Canada 
is not a major subsidier in its own right, and that most of 
Canadian government intervention just goes to offset 
harmful price distortions induced by other countries 
policies. If all countries were to stop their 
protectionist activities, it is estimated there would be an 
increase in number of Canadian farm operators, and 
decreases in the average farm size with respect to the 
situation under a continuation of current agriculture 
policies. 
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6. AGRICULTURE FACTOR RETENTION IN 
A DECOUPLED POLICY SETTING 
6.1 Introduction 
Decoupling is the current catchword being bandied 
around in agriculture policy discussions. Many people feel 
that the only viable way to bring order to the chaotic 
state world agriculture markets are now in is to 
multilaterally separate farm income subsidies from farm 
production decisions. This chapter explores the resource 
implications if Canada should take the initiative and 
unilaterally implement such a policy regime. Specifically, 
this chapter examines what would happen to agriculture 
factor usage if the aggregate producer subsidy equivalent 
of the present policy setting were passed on to producers 
in lump sum transfers. 
The chapter is organized as follows: To begin with 
Section 6.2 explains, using welfare concepts and diagnostic 
tools, the theoretical economic advantage associated with 
Canada making such a policy change. In theory economic 
efficiency gains can be made because producers receipt of 
the lump sum transfer would be independent from their 
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production decisions. Unfortunately, lump sum transfer 
payments lose their theoretical production neutrality when 
actually put into practice. Stated in other words, it is 
impossible to design a workable payment scheme that will 
not to some extent distort relative factor usage. Section 
6.3 discusses this and other issues involved in devising a 
workable decoupled policy program and describes the program 
chosen for analysis in this study. Section 6.4 explains 
how this program was structurally incorporated in the CAM. 
Simulation results are presented in Section 6.5 as percent 
comparisons with the results obtained for the status quo 
scenario of the previous chapter. Finally in Section 6.6 
conclusions are drawn about the long run implications this 
policy program has for agriculture resource retention. 
6.2 Theoretical Rationale 
The income disparity between individuals in the 
agriculture sector and individuals in the nonagriculture 
sector in the Canadian economy can be depicted as in Figure 
6.1. The curve UU represents the grand utility possibility 
frontier for the two sectors. For each level of utility, 
u°, that individuals in the agriculture sector receive, it 
UTILITY OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Figure 6.1: Illustration of income disparity between individuals in 
agriculture and nonagriculture in terms of a grand utility 
possibility frontier for the two sectors 
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shows the maximum utility obtainable by individuals in the 
nonagriculture sector. Without government intervention, 
the economy would be on the frontier at a point, such as A, 
with individuals in the nonagriculture sector receiving a 
disproportionate amount of utility compared to individuals 
in the agriculture sector. Although point A is pareto 
efficient, it is not the social optimum. It can be 
inferred from past government behavior that the social 
optimum lies somewhere to the right of point A, at a more 
egalitarian income distribution. Bergman's (1938) social 
welfare function, mapped as isocurves in utility space, is 
invoked for pictorial convenience. Society can maximize 
its welfare at point C where isocurve W2W2 is tangent to 
the utility possibility frontier. To bring the economy 
closer to this social optimum, the Canadian government is 
currently using border instruments and farm programs to 
redistribute income in favor of the agriculture sector. 
However, because this type of government intervention 
distorts price signals, the economy is not winding up at 
point C, but at some point B inside the utility possibility 
frontier. Although point B is not pareto efficient, it is 
on a higher isocurve than point A indicating that society, 
as a whole, feels better off at point B than it does at 
point A despite the inefficiencies associated with being at 
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point B. Society is willing to sacrifice economic 
efficiency in order to ensure a minimum standard of living 
for all segments of its populace. But the sacrifice is 
unnecessary. By changing its method of income 
redistribution to a lump sum transfer, theoretically the 
government should be able to move the economy down along 
the utility possibility frontier from point A, if not all 
the way to point C, at least to some point between D and C 
on the frontier. All these points are pareto superior to 
point B. At all these points both sectors of the economy 
would receive greater utility than they are currently 
receiving at point B. Note, according to the social 
welfare function drawn, even if the government only moved 
the economy to a point between F and D, society as a whole 
would still be better off than it is at point B, although 
individuals in the agriculture sector would be slightly 
worse off. 
6.3 Designing a Decoupled Policy Program 
As a prerequisite to implementing a decoupled 
agriculture policy program, the government must ask itself 
several questions. The first question is \How much income 
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in total should be transferred from consumers and 
taxpayers^ to agriculture producers?'. The normative 
answer to this question is that the government should 
transfer that amount of income sufficient to move the 
economy from point A (the competitive solution) in Figure 
6.1 to point C where the isocurve of the social welfare 
function is tangent to the utility possibility frontier. 
The problem with this answer is the difficulty in 
analytically identifying the social welfare function. 
Although the social welfare function is a conceptually 
pleasing construct, it does not survive the transition from 
theory to practical application. Arrow (1951), by his 
impossibility theorem, showed that there is no way to 
derive this function democratically. Moreover, as Mishan 
(1973) comments "Even if there were no fundamental 
obstacles to its construction, or even if one could think 
up reasonable conditions under which a social welfare 
function could exist, there would remain the virtually 
impossible task of arranging for society to rank 
unambiguously all conceivable combinations of the 
^Although agriculture producers are consumers and 
taxpayers as well as nonagriculture producers, they make up 
such a small segment of the total population, that almost 
all the monies collected for redistribution to the 
agriculture sector, do come from the nonagriculture sector. 
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individual welfares". 
Because of the positive slant of this study, it is 
possible to beggar the above issue of what is the optimal 
size income transfer for the government to make, and to 
take a more pragmatic approach. It is assumed, without 
allusion to how this amount measures up to the optimal size 
transfer, that the government will give agriculture 
producers the compensating variation associated with 
discontinuing current commodity specific policies. This 
arbitrary assumption is all that is required to assess 
which policy regime gives the biggest bang per dollar 
received by agriculture producers^. An estimate for the 
compensating variation of the policy change is derived by 
taking the difference between what producers would receive 
as income assuming a continuance of current commodity 
specific policies and what they would receive assuming 
multilateral trade liberalization. Because the reference 
is multilateral trade liberalization rather than 
unilateral, monies, presently given to producers just to 
offset the price distorting effects of other countries 
drawback with focusing on dollar received by 
agriculture producers rather than dollar collected from 
consumers and taxpayers is that it does not permit 
measurement of how much income is lost in making the 
transfer between sectors. Okun (1975) calls this income 
loss the leakage associated with the income transfer. 
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policy actions, are excluded from the lump sum transfer 
calculation. 
The second question the government has to answer is 
^How should this lump sum transfer be allocated among the 
various agriculture producers?'. Ideally, it should be 
allocated in such a manner to be production neutral with 
respect to both output and input mixes, and to be targeted 
towards the most needy producers without encouraging 
inefficiency. Unfortunately, taken together, these 
combined requirements are too tall an order to fill in the 
real world. There is a wide gulf between what can be done 
in theory and what can be done in practice. 
So the individual producer payments do not favor the 
production of one commodity over another, they need to be 
distributed per farm enterprise (or equivalently per man-
year of operator labor). Distribution according to 
ownership or current usage of any other resource will not 
be output neutral, but will favor some agricultural 
activities over others. This is not to say that 
distribution according to operator labor is without 
shortcomings. For one thing, it is not resource neutral. 
Because operator labor is not in fixed supply, but an 
upward sloping function of its own rewards, distribution 
according to operator labor will have the same price 
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distorting impacts that an unit subsidy on operator labor 
would have in these circumstances. 
As shown in panel A of Figure 6.2, in the first 
instance the transfer payments would shift the operator 
labor supply curve to the right until the vertical distance 
ab equals the size of the individual producer payment, 
increasing operator labor employment in agriculture from 
NAOq to NAO^. The increase in operator labor supply, in 
turn, would put downward pressure on its own reward, 
decreasing the market return for operator labor from Wq to 
W^. As the market return for operator labor falls, so 
would demand for its substitutes^, i.e., demand for hired 
labor, capital services and land. Panel B shows that in 
the second instance, the price of these substitutes falls 
in reaction to the shift backwards in their demand curves, 
causing a similar shift backwards in the operator labor 
demand curve. As all the primary input prices drop, so 
would the cost of agriculture production, causing a 
rightward shift in the commodity supply curve. More output 
^Hired labor, capital and land are all input 
subsititutes for operator labor in agriculture production 
according to the parameters estimated for the cost function 
in Chapter 2. Findings of other empirical studies may 
disagree with this classification. For e.g., Lopez (1984) 
found operator labor and hired labor to be complements 
rather than substitutes. 
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Figure 6.2 The impacts of a lump sum transfer distributed 
according to operator labor 
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would be offered to the market at each price, than was 
offered previously. The additional commodity output, in 
its turn, would depress commodity prices. As shown in 
Panel C, commodity prices drop from PAq to PA^, shifting 
all the input demand curves further backwards. As a result 
the relationship between final and beginning operator labor 
employment is indeterminate. It depends on how far 
backwards the operator labor demand curve shifts in 
response to decreases in the price of its input substitutes 
and the price of output. As drawn operator labor 
employment is greater in the long run than in a free market 
situation, but whether this would be true in actuality 
depends on own and cross price elasticities. 
6.4 Structural Framework 
In the scenario under analysis in this chapter, it is 
assumed that only Canada decouples its farm income 
subsidies from farm production decisions. All the other 
countries continue with their current policy regimens. 
Accordingly, the policy specification in all the models in 
the BLS, except the CAM, is the same as in the status quo 
scenario. The policy specification in the CAM for this 
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scenario, has as its basis, the format it had in the 
multilateral trade liberalization scenario. Overlaid on 
these bare bones, the following structural alterations were 
made to emulate the effects the lump sum transfer would 
have on agriculture production. 
First, on the assumption the lump sum transfer to the 
agriculture sector will be equally distributed among 
operator labor, no matter what type of agriculture activity 
they are engaged in or the size of their farm operations, a 
variable, called SUB, is introduced to represent the unit 
subsidy to each producer. It is calculated internally by 
dividing the total income transfer (TSUB) by the number of 
farm operators (NAO): 
(6.1) SUBt = TSUBt/NAOt. 
The total income transfer is an exogenous variable to the 
model simulation. It is calculated for year t as a 5 year 
moving average of the sum over all agriculture bundles, of 
the positive subsidy equivalents (PSE) that producers would 
have received under a continuation of the current policy 
setting relative to what they would have received under 
multilateral trade liberalisation: 
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4 9 
(6.2) TSUBt = s: <SI Max { 0, PSEit }. 
t=0 i=l 
On the assumption negative producer subsidy equivalents for 
any commodity are indicative of a lack of government 
intervention, rather than deliberate producer exploitation 
on the part of the government, only positive subsidy 
equivalents are totaled in equation (6.2). A five year 
average is used rather than a single year's value to smooth 
out sharp inter-year fluctuations, and thus to provide 
solution stability. 
To account for the unit subsidy's effect on resource 
allocation, the cost function and input demand equations 
are respecified taking the nonagriculture wage less the 
unit subsidy to be the market price of operator labor 
(WN^); 
(6.3) WNJ = (WNt - SUBt). 
Somewhat similar assumptions are made regarding the 
financing of the lump sum transfer payments to agriculture 
producers as were made regarding the government financing 
of the stabilization payments in the status quo scenario. 
First, it is assumed that the full amount of monies 
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transferred to agriculture producers in any given year is 
collected in that year through an income tax, . Second 
it is assumed that the transferred monies are prey to the 
same income taxes, as producers market income is. Third, 
it is assumed that the income tax, , is collected after 
(or multiplicatively to) the income tax, 0 , used to 
service the trade deficit. Together, these three 
assumptions ensure the aggregate disposable income of the 
populace is the same in total as it was before the income 
redistribution. They are not sufficient, however, to 
guarantee that the income redistribution will be 
consumption neutral. Because the CAM does not recognize 
agriculture producers as different consumers from 
nonagriculture producers, the consumption effects of the 
income redistribution can not be analyzed within the 
confines of this study. 
6.5 Simulation Results 
Tables 6.1 through 6.6 contain the results for the 
decoupled policy scenario. The simulation output depicts 
the Canadian nonagriculture sector as being quite 
insensitive to the adoption of a decoupled policy regimen. 
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Nonagriculture production and input usage vary by less than 
half of one percent between the decoupled policy scenario 
and the status quo scenario. For this reason, attention 
will be confined to ramifications of the decoupled policy 
regime for the agriculture sector. 
Estimated policy parameters for the lump sum transfer 
payment program are summarized in Table 6.1. The first 
thing to note about the estimates is that they imply a 
smaller income tax is needed to finance the decoupled 
policy program than would be needed to finance a 
continuation of current stabilization policies. The status 
quo scenario projected that a tax rate of 0.15 percent was 
required, on average, to fund the government's 
contributions to the Western Grain and Red Meat 
Stabilization programs, alone. The decoupled scenario 
projects that a tax rate of only 0.06 percent is 
sufficient, on average, to fund the lump sum transfer 
payments to agriculture producers. This tax rate 
differential, however, does not constitute evidence that a 
lump sum transfer payment program would be less costly to 
taxpayers than status quo policies since taxpayers monies 
going to just offset the price distorting effects of other 
countries policy actions in the status quo scenario are not 
being collected in the decoupled scenario for lump sum 
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Table 6.1: Estimated program parameters for the decoupled 
policy scenario^ 
YEAR 
1990/1995 1996/2000 
Lump Sum Transfer^ 2.4 2.3 
Individual Producer Payment® 3.5 3.2 
Income Tax Required to 0.1 0.1 
Service Program (Percent) 
^Reported statistics are calculated as simple averages 
of each economic variable. 
^The total transfer to agriculture producers is 
expressed as a percent of GDP of agriculture. 
^Producer payments are expressed as a percent of the 
nonagriculture wage. 
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Tcible 6.2: Estimated percent differences in agriculture 
profitcibility indicators between the decoupled 
policy and status quo scenarios^ 
YEAR 
1990/1995 1996/2000 
Profitability Indicators 
GDP of Agriculture 2.4 2.3 
Market Income Parity 3.5 3.2 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent 
difference in each economic variable between the two 
scenarios, using the status quo figure as the base. 
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Tcible 6.3: Estimated percent differences in real factor 
rents between the decoupled policy and status 
quo scenarios® 
YEAR 
1990/1995 1996/2000 
Factor Rents*) 
Nonagriculture Wage 0.0 0.0 
Nonagriculture Capital Rent 0.0 0.0 
Farm Operators -3.5 -3.1 
Opportunity Cost 
Agriculture Wage 5.1 18.4 
Agriculture Capital Rent 0.0 0.0 
Agriculture Land Rent -0.1 -3.9 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent 
difference in each economic variable between the two 
scenarios, using the status quo figure as the base. 
^All prices are expressed relative to the price of 
nonagriculture. 
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Table 6.4: Estimated percent differences in agriculture 
factor usage between the decoupled policy and 
status quo scenarios^ 
YEAR 
1990/1995 1996/2000 
Factors of Production 
Agriculture Labor 0.4 -2.2 
Operator Labor 3.2 5.4 
Hired Labor -3.7 -13.2 
Capital Services -0.3 -0.3 
Crop and Forage Area 0.0 1.6 
Summerfallow and Pasture 0.1 -2.4 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent 
difference in each economic variable between the two 
scenarios, using the status quo figure as the base. 
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transfer. 
The aggregate amount of income transferred to 
agriculture producers makes up in value a little less than 
two and a half percent of total GDP of agriculture. This 
payment on an individual producer basis works out to be 
roughly three and a half percent of the nonagriculture wage 
rate. 
It is estimated an unilateral move on the part of 
Canada to a decoupled policy regime would have similar 
directional effects on Canada's agriculture labor force 
size and composition as a multilateral move to trade 
liberalization would have. Table 6.4 shows that the 
agriculture labor force declines relative to the status quo 
scenario in absolute number by 2.2 percent, but all of the 
decrease is in the hired work force. The hired work force 
decreases by over 13 percent. The number of farm 
operators, and implicitly the number of farm enterprises 
increase, but not to the same extent as in the free trade 
scenario. Operator labor increases by 5.4 percent compared 
to 7.7 percent in the free trade scenario. 
Likewise as in the free trade scenario, total area put 
into crops and forage increases relative to the status quo 
scenario. However, in contrast to the free trade scenario, 
capital usage declines relative to the status quo scenario. 
232 
Capital usage in the decoupled scenario is 0.3 percent less 
than in the status quo scenario, while capital usage in the 
free trade scenario is 2.5 percent higher. Because 
countries other than Canada continue with their current 
trade distorting commodity specific policies in the 
decoupled scenario, there is not expanded international 
market growth as there is under multilateral trade 
liberalization. Without this market growth there is no 
room for combined labor and capital increases. Operator 
labor in the decoupled scenario increases relative to the 
status quo scenario at the expense of capital input. 
Table 6.5 shows percentage differences in commodity 
production between the decoupled and status quo scenarios. 
The results show a greater diversification of output in the 
decoupled scenario. Beef, dairy and specialty crop 
production gain prominence while grain production 
decreases. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the agricultural literature's 
contention that most of the benefits associated with 
current programs are capitalized into land values, and go 
to land owners rather than farm operators. Table 6.6, 
which compares shadow prices in the decoupled policy 
scenario with those in the status quo scenario imply farm 
labor would retain more government sponsored benefits if 
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Table 6.5: Estimated percent differences in agriculture 
commodity production and factor usage between 
the decoupled policy and status quo scenarios^ 
YEAR 
1990/1995 1996/2000 
Wheat Production -9.7 -11.8 
Land Use -2.9 0.8 
Labor Use -11.0 2.9 
Capital Use -10.4 7.0 
Coarse Grains Production -6.3 -15.1 
Land Use -0.7 -1.6 
Labor Use -3.7 —6.0 
Capital Use -3.1 -2.2 
Oilseed Meal Production 6.4 9.2 
Land Use 5.6 7.7 
Labor Use 32.3 47.5 
Capital Use 33.1 53.2 
Other Food Crops Production 4.7 3.9 
Land Use 2.7 0.8 
Labor Use 12.3 4.5 
Capital Use 13.0 8.7 
Nonfood Crops Production -2.8 —6.6 
Land Use -2.9 -6.9 
Labor Use -13.1 -28.7 
Capital Use -12.7 -25.9 
Fruit Production 1.7 -0.4 
Labor Use 7.8 0.9 
Capital Use 8.5 4.9 
Other Livestock Production -3.9 -8.1 
Labor Use -18.1 -35.7 
Capital Use -17.2 -33.1 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent 
difference in each economic variable between the two 
scenarios using the status quo figure as the base. 
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Table 6.5 (Continued) 
Bovine and Ovine Production -0.3 2.0 
Labor Use -4.3 2.2 
Capital Use -3.5 6.3 
Dairy Products Production 14.8 15.8 
Labor Use 30.9 38.4 
Capital Use 31.9 35.6 
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Table 6.6: Estimated percent differences in shadow prices 
between the decoupled policy and status quo 
scenarios^ 
YEAR 
1990/1995 1996/2000 
Land Shadow Price -8.5 -30.6 
Labor Shadow Price 12.9 48.4 
^Reported statistics for each time period are 
calculated as simple averages of the annual percent 
difference in each economic variable between the two 
scenarios, using the status quo figure as the base. 
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they were issued as lump sum transfer payments rather than 
through current commodity specific policies. The shadow 
price of labor in the decoupled scenario is up 48 percent 
and the shadow price of land down 31 percent relative to 
the status quo scenario. 
de Gorter and McClatchy (1984) argue that the 
agriculture policies of a country should be evaluated with 
respect to how much they distort world prices than with 
respect to how much income they transfer to producers of 
that country. Table 6.7 shows estimated percent 
differences in relative world prices between the two policy 
scenarios and the multilateral trade liberalization 
scenario. The numbers in the Table indicate that current 
Canadian policies do affect world prices. That is, Canada 
is not a small country in international grain and livestock 
trade. World prices of these commodities are, in general, 
higher in the decoupled scenario than they are in the 
status quo scenario. The exception is the world price of 
dairy products. Although rents are being transferred to 
dairy producers through current dairy policy, Canadian 
dairy output is restricted minimizing the impact of the 
rent transfers on world trade. 
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Table 6.7: Estimated percent differences in relative world 
prices between the two policy scenarios and the 
multilateral trade liberalization scenario^ 
YEAR 
1990/1995 1996/2000 
Wheat -20.0 -16.7 
(-21.9) (-18.2) 
Coarse Grains -16.0 -16.2 
(-17.6) (-18.0) 
Bovine and Ovine Meats -28.4 -27.0 
(-29.0) (-27.5) 
Dairy Products -8.0 -11,3 
(-7.4) (-10.9) 
Other Livestock Products -15.4 -14.5 
(-16.0) (-14.5) 
Protein Feed -13.0 -13.1 
(-14.0) (-14.0) 
Other Food Items 0.4 3.9 
(0.4) (3.9) 
Nonfood Agriculture 5.2 13.0 
(4.5) (12.2) 
®The simulation results for the decoupled policy 
scenario appear first. Underneath these in parentheses are 
the results for the status quo scenario. 
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6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter looked at the implications Canada's 
unilateral adoption of a decoupled policy regime would have 
for agriculture resource retention in Canada. Although 
many policy programs could have been designed that would 
qualify to varying degress as being decoupled, only one was 
considered for this analysis. The particular program under 
consideration consisted of lump sum transfer payments 
payable in equal amounts to farm operators, regardless of 
their farm size or commercial sales value. The total 
amount of monies transferred to farm operators was equal to 
the estimated compensating variation associated with the 
status quo policy regime. 
It was estimated such an unilateral move on Canada's 
part would have similar effects on Canada's labor force 
size and composition as a multilateral move to trade 
liberalization would have. The number of farm operators 
increase relative to what they would have under a 
continuation of current policies while the average size 
farm decreases. In contrast, however, to multilateral 
trade liberalization the increase in operator labor 
reflects a switch towards more labor intensive technology 
rather than market growth. Capital usage declines. 
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The results also suggest that farm operators would retain 
greater portion of government assistance if it was passed 
to them through lump sum transfers rather than through 
current commodity specific policies, and that lump sum 
transfers would have less negative impact on world prices 
than the current policies do. 
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary 
This study explored the implications different policy 
regimes have for agriculture resource markets. Particular 
attention was focused on agriculture labor retention. Two 
markedly different policy regimes were analyzed. The first 
regime was just a continuation of the current commodity 
specific policy setting. The second regime, composed 
purely of lump sum transfer payments to operator labor, 
decoupled agriculture producers receipt of government aid 
from their production decisions. These two regimes 
represent extreme cases bounding the most likely outcomes 
of the ongoing GATT negotiations. 
The analysis was performed in the empirical setting of 
the CAM and the BLS. The procedure was to run two 
simulations, each one representing one of the policy 
regimes, and to compare and contrast across these 
simulations Canadian factor usage and reward levels. The 
assumption was made throughout these simulations that the 
governments in other countries maintain their status quo 
policy courses. The amount of income transferred to 
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agriculture producers in the decoupled policy run was set 
equal to the amount of benefits producers would receive in 
aggregate without any policy change, i.e., the compensating 
variation associated with current policies. The 
compensating variation was determined by taking the 
difference between Canadian producers net income when all 
countries, inclusive of Canada, continue with their status 
quo policy courses and when they stop all government 
intervention. This method of calculation for the 
compensating variation excludes government program benefits 
that just go to offset the harmful world price distortions 
induced by other countries policy actions. 
Before the policy simulations were run, the input 
block of the CAM was revised with the intention of making 
the CAM a more responsive tool for the study. The 
efficiency wage hypothesis was used along with Okun's law 
to explain the existence of unemployment at equilibrium. 
Input demands for nonagriculture were derived from the 
combined estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function 
and the first order conditions for profit maximization. 
Input demands for agriculture were derived from the 
estimation of a translog cost function and the associated 
input cost shares. 
Alterations were also made to the policy block of the 
242 
CAM. These alterations centered on adding stabilization 
program representation and linking changes in dairy target 
prices to changes in dairy cost of production. 
7.2 Conclusions 
The main findings of this study are: 
1) The Canadian nonagriculture sector is quite insensitive 
to agriculture policy regimes in reign both 
domestically and abroad. Nonagriculture production and 
factor usage took on the same values over the forecast 
horizon under multilateral agriculture trade 
liberalization and unilateral agriculture policy 
decoupling as they did under the status quo policy 
course. 
2) According to the Producer Subsidy Equivalents 
estimated, that allowed production as well as price to 
respond to the removal of all government intervention 
in agriculture markets, most of current Canadian 
government assistance to agriculture producers just 
goes to compensate them for the market distorting 
impacts of government intervention in other countries. 
Further, the compensation is incomplete so Canadian 
producers as a whole, are worse off than they would be 
in a global free trade situation. The implication 
is that Canadian agriculture producers can compete in a 
free trade environment. 
3) Government assistance administered through lump sum 
transfer payments to farm operators is more conducive 
to preserving the traditional family farm than 
government assistance administered through current 
commodity specific policies. It was projected farm 
number would be greater, but the average farm size 
smaller in the former situation than in the latter. 
Use of hired farm labor would also fall in the former 
situation relative to the latter. 
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4) Unilateral adoption of a decoupled policy regime of the 
type considered would have similar directional effects 
on agriculture labor force size and composition in 
Canada as a multilateral move to agriculture trade 
liberalization would have, but opposite directional 
effects on capital usage. Under multilateral trade 
liberalization there would be sufficient growth in 
commodity markets to accommodate both increased capital 
usage and operator labor usage. The same growth 
possibilities are not available when other countries 
continue with their present trade distorting policies. 
As a result, operator labor input increases at the 
expense of capital and hired labor input. 
5) Unilateral adoption of a decoupled policy regime of the 
type considered would lead to a greater diversification 
in agriculture output in Canada. Beef, dairy and 
specialty crop production would gain greater 
prominence. Current commodity specific policy 
instruments encourage large scale farm operations since 
benefits are tied to level of production. Without this 
encouragement to expand, grain production would take a 
back seat as producers diversify their operations. 
6) A smaller proportion of government income transfers to 
the agriculture sector would be lost to producers 
through capitalization if the income transfer was 
administered in lump sum form rather than through 
present commodity specific policies. The estimated 
shadow prices imply that in a decoupled setting farm 
operators would retain the benefits rather than pass 
them on to farm land owners. 
7) In general, government assistance administered through 
lump sum transfer payments to farm operators rather 
than through current commodity specific polices would 
have a smaller negative influence on commodity world 
prices. The exception to this rule occurs when 
government price and income assistance is accompanied 
by mandatory output restrictions, as with the case of 
dairy. 
244 
7.3 Areas of Further Research 
Further research can branch off in two different 
directions. First, additional work needs to be done in 
improving the structural integrity of the CAM. Structural 
modifications are needed in several areas. For example, 
more research is needed in the area of identifying the 
agriculture cost and input demand equations. The policy 
block should be further refined to accommodate explicit 
representation of access barriers. Effort should be made 
to determine why the current specification of the red meat 
stabilization program consistently under estimates the size 
and frequency of payments, and to correct this known bias. 
Finally, in light of the different policy frameworks in 
which pork and poultry operate in Canada, the nonlinear 
optimizing model needs to be reconfigured to treat pork and 
poultry as two separate production entities rather than as 
a single entity so that this different policy framework 
will be reflected in the forecasted production responses. 
The second direction further research can take is to 
extend the results of the study to consider multilateral 
adoption of the decoupled policy regime assumed for Canada, 
to consider Canada's unilateral implementation of other 
types of decoupled policy regimes, and to consider the 
245 
effects on resource allocation of different transfer 
payment amounts. 
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9. APPENDIX A: VARIABLE MNEMONICS 
A Land Base in Agriculture, Canada 
AA Crop and Forage Area, Canada 
AGE Proportion of Population Aged 16 to 45, Canada 
Ai Production Unit of Agriculture Production Bundle 
i, Canada 
BAL Trade Balance, Canada 
BALBO Balance of the Fund Account for Beef Under NTPS 
BALPO Balance of the Fund Account for Pork Under NTPS 
BALWGS Balance of the Fund Account for WGSP 
BYkl Byproduct 1 Resulting From the Production of 1 
Unit of Agriculture Exchange Bundle k, Canada 
CPi Consumer Price of Agriculture Exchange Bundle i, 
Canada 
CPN Consumer Price of Nonagriculture, Canada 
CTPi Consumer Target Price of Commodity i, Canada 
DA Capital Depreciation Rate in Agriculture, Canada 
DAA Planned Crop and Forage Area, Canada 
DKA Planned Capital Stock for Agriculture, Canada 
Di Domestic Demand of Agriculture Exchange Bundle i, 
Canada 
DN Capital Depreciation Rate in Nonagriculture, 
Canada 
DNAH Planned Hired Labor Employment for Agriculture, 
Canada 
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DNAO Planned Operator & Family Labor Employment for 
Agriculture, Canada 
FDij Amount of Feed Concentrate j Fed to Produce 1 
Unit of Livestock Commodity i, Canada 
FPi Price of Feed Concentrate i, Canada 
FZi Nitrogen Fertilizer Applied Per Hectare of Crop 
i, Canada 
GDPCO Gross Domestic Product, Canada 
gi Area of Forage Production Required to Feed 1 
Production Unit of Livestock Commodity i, Canada 
GRPOP Population Growth Rate, Canada 
I Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Canada 
lA Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Agriculture, 
Canada 
ii Ending Stocks of Agriculture Exchange Bundle i, 
Canada 
IN Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Nonagriculture, 
Canada 
KA Capital Stock in Agriculture, Canada 
Ki Capital Stock Allocated to Agriculture Production 
Bundle i, Canada 
KN Capital Stock in Nonagriculture, Canada 
L Labor Force, Canada 
LVYWGS Producer Levy on Commercial Sales Under the WGSP 
NA Employment in Agriculture, Canada 
NAH Hired Labor Employment in Agriculture, Canada 
NAO Operator Labor Employment in Agriculture, Canada 
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Ni Labor Allocated to Agriculture Production Bundle 
i, Canada 
NN Employment in Nonagriculture, Canada 
KRWGS Aggregate Net Commercial Grain & Oilseed Market 
Returns Eligible for the WGSP 
PART Labor Force Participation Rate, Canada 
PFZ Nitrogen Price, Canada 
Pi Market Return of Agriculture Production Bundle i, 
Canada 
PIGDPA Price Deflator for the Gross Domestic Product of 
Agriculture, Canada 
PIGDPN Price Deflator for the Gross Domestic Product of 
Nonagriculture, Canada 
PN Price Index for Nonagriculture, Canada 
POP Population, Canada 
PPi Producer Price of Agriculture Exchange Bundle i, 
Canada 
PPN Producer Price of Nonagriculture, Canada 
PSBO Producer Support Price for Beef Production Under 
the Red Meat NTPS 
PSPO Producer Support Price for Pork Production Under 
the Red Meat NTPS 
PYTBO Total Stabilization Deficiency Payment for Beef 
Issued Under the Red Meat NTPS 
PYTPO Total Stabilization Deficiency Payment for Pork 
Issued Under the Red Meat NTPS 
PYTWGS Total Stabilization Deficiency Payment Issued 
Under the WGSP 
QA Gross Domestic Product of Agriculture, Canada 
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Qi Production of Agriculture Commodity i, Canada 
QN Gross Domestic Product of Nonagriculture, Canada 
QWGS Grain & Oilseed Production Eligible for 
Deficiency Payment Receipt Under the WGSP 
RA Nominal Capital Rental Rate in Agriculture, 
Canada 
RN Nominal Capital Rental Rate in Nonagriculture, 
Canada 
SF Summerfallow and Pasture Area, Canada 
SSRi self-sufficiency Ratio for Agriculture Commodity 
i, Canada 
T Linear Trend (Calendar Year less 1900) 
TA Nominal Land Rental Rate in Agriculture, Canada 
u Unemployment Rate, Canada 
VAi Unit Market Value Added of Agriculture Commodity 
i, Canada 
VCi Unit Variable Cost of Agriculture Production 
Bundle i, Canada 
WA Nominal Wage Rate in Agriculture, Canada 
WN Nominal Wage Rate in Nonagriculture, Canada 
WPi World Price of Agriculture Exchange Bundle i, 
Canada 
WPN World Price of Nonagriculture, Canada 
Yi Yield of Agriculture Production Bundle i, Canada 
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10. APPENDIX B: UNITS OF MEASDREMENT 
Agriculture Exchange Bundles 
Quantity 
Wheat 
Rice 
Coarse Grains 
Bovine & Ovine 
Meats 
Dairy Products 
Other Livestock 
Products 
Protein Feed 
Other Food Items 
Nonfood 
Agriculture Items 
1000 Tonnes 
1000 Tonnes Milled 
Rice 
1000 Tonnes 
1000 Tonnes Carcass 
Weight 
1000 Tonnes Milk 
Equivalent 
1000 Tonnes Protein 
Equivalent 
1000 Tonnes Protein 
Equivalent 
Millions 1970 US $ 
Millions 1970 US $ 
Price 
1000 $/Tonnes 
1000 $/Tonne 
Milled Rice 
1000 $/Tonne 
1000 $/Tonne 
Carcass Weight 
1000 $/Tonne 
Milk Equivalent 
1000 $/Tonne 
Protein 
Equivalent 
1000 $/Tonne 
Equivalent 
$/1970 US $ 
$/1970 US $ 
Agriculture Production Bundles 
Production Unit 
Wheat 1000 Hectares 
Coarse Grains 1000 Hectares 
Oilseed Meal 1000 Hectares 
Yield 
Tonnes/Hectare 
Tonnes/Hectare 
Tonnes of Protein 
Equivalent/Hectare 
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Other Crops 
Nonfood Crops 
Other Livestock 
Products 
Bovine & ovine 
Meats 
Dairy Products 
Fruit 
1000 Hectares 
1000 Hectares 
1000 Tonnes 
Protein 
Equivalents 
Million Head 
Million Head 
Millions 1970 
US $ 
1000 1970 US $ 
/Hectare 
1000 1970 US $ 
/Hectare 
Tonnes of Carcass 
Weight/1000 Head 
Tonnes of Milk 
Equivalent/1000 
Head 
Factors of Production 
Land 
Labor 
Capital 
National Account Series 
Quantity 
1000 Hectares 
1000s 
Million 1970 US $ 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
Trade Balance 
Quantity 
Million 1970 US $ 
Million 1970 US $ 
Price 
Index 
1000 $/Year 
Index 
Price 
Index (1970=1) 
